The process of deepening Bulgaria’s European integration encounters several persistentproblems. First and foremost, Bulgaria lacks a strategic vision of its engagement with the European agenda and reforms. The country has not
produced a coherent understanding of its own place and role in the pluralist European public order, and it has not clearly defined its national strategy in reforming the EU (either towards more
federal, or more decentralised system). The White Paper on the Future of Europe, produced by the Commission in 2017, has remained largely neglected by the Bulgarian political leadership, and neither have the institutions expressed a clear view or preference with respect to the different scenarios developed in the document. Bulgaria’s participation in different initiatives remains rather low-key and inefficient, and the country does not exercise leadership in any specific integration process. The political ambition to contribute to the EU accession of the Western Balkans is far beyond the country’s competence and the capacity of its current political leadership.
The public image of the EU, as portrayedby the majority of the Bulgarian media, is far from positive. Anti-EU propaganda reached its peak in the past three years.
It has exposed the vulnerability of Bulgarian institutions and society to Eurosceptic and populist rhetoric (Antidemocratic Propaganda Report, 2018).Insome media outlets, the EU is publicly associated with the inefficient institutional response to mass
Bulgaria lacks a strategic vision of its engagement
with the European agenda and reforms.
Recent anti-EU propaganda has exposed
the vulnerability of Bulgarian institutions and
society to Eurosceptic and populist rhetoric.
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migration, with imposinga new value system (described by some media outlets as ‘genderism’) opposed to traditional family or Christian values supported by the majority (as indicated by the fierce public debate about the failed ratification of the Istanbul Convention), as well aswith limiting the discretion on policy issues of national political institutions.
On key foreign policy issues Bulgarian institutions, including the ruling party and the parliamentary majority, have endorsed official positions that either openly or factually undermine the common European response to different sensitive policy issues: in the Skripal case, Bulgaria refused to expel Russian diplomats (and spies) in a gesture of solidarity with the UK and other EU states; the Bulgarian authorities continue to endorse strategic engagement with Russia in the field of energy supply, thus undermining the common EU rules and EU supported projects in the region; the ruling party GERB and the Bulgarian government officially support Orban’s Eurosceptic government, contrary to the prevailing position of other member states and EU institutions (Stanev, 2018).
As regards relations between the major Bulgarian parties and their European counterparts, there are certain developments. The ruling GERB party, notwithstanding its domestic policies undermining the EU fundamental principles and values (the rule of law), has publicly supported the leading candidate (Spitzenkandidat) of the EPP, Manfred Weber, in the 2019 European Parliament elections.This double play of some EPP member parties is often tolerated by the EPP itself, thus raising strong criticisms of having double standards and advancing a semi-authoritarian political agenda in some countries (e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria). In the autumnof 2018, the major opposition party BSP embraced a more populist platform (including anti-eurozone statements, anti- immigrant policies and an anti-Istanbul Conventionstance), openly opposed key PES official declarations and declined participation in the XIth PES Congress that took place on 7-8 December in Lisbon, though remaining a PES member (Gotev, 2018).
The internal guiding principles and rules of the European parties are not sufficiently operational as regards their member parties. Whenever EU party rules and discipline face opportunistic domestic policies of their members, what remains is only a European veil covering a deeply corrupt domestic political process.
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Conclusion
In the context of declining rule of law and democracy standards in Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria’s political leadership has at best an ambivalent role as regards the necessary institutional reforms that would place the country at the core of the EU (the eurozone and the Schengen area). Last year, duringthe Bulgarian presidency of the Council when the European issuesdominated the public media landscape, some steps were taken in the right direction, notably the application to join the European banking union and the emphasis on the enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans. With domestic policy, however, no decisive reforms were undertaken to cope with the most persistent institutional problems connected to upholding the rule of law and combating high-level corruption. For eleven successive years Bulgaria has been monitored under the CVM, but the remaining specific reforms yet to be implemented outweigh the achievements.
In the context of a rapidly changing European political landscape, Bulgaria’s growing leadership ambitions in the SEE region are doomed to face the chilling reality of unfulfilled promises and poor institutional performance. Relying on national populist and Eurosceptic parties to maintain the parliamentary majority, making flattering concessions to Orban’s regime, and refusing to implement key institutional reforms can hardly help the Bulgarian government stand firmly on pro-European ground. Without a clear and committed reformist agenda, executed by adequate political leadership, Bulgaria will continue to struggle with its institutional deficiencies that erode the rule of law and the democratic process in the country. Along with the political and strategic changes at the EU level, Bulgarian society also faces important political choices. It is a decisive period for the pro-European forces in the country. Either they will mobilise public support for a clear reformist agenda or the country will continue to slip towards the European periphery with its political uncertainty, volatile economies and persistent threats to democracy.
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