Mapa de densidad

It is precisely because God's knowledge infallibly or perfectly corresponds to what is, that his knowledge must be considered as truly and unrestrictedly relative.

Hartshorne argues that the "knowledge" of men is not truly relative, that is, does not truly correspond to

reality; we think we know when we do not; we make mistakes..^ But not so with God. Whatever is, God knows infallibly; his knowledge is truly relative, truly corresponds to reality. Thus for Hartshorne, infallibility implies relativity. Hartshorne further argues that -since God's knowledge is truly relative to the actual as actual and the possible as possible, that his infallible knowledge can grow in content as future possible events are actual-

4

ized. Thus the specific content of God's knowledge is contingent, that is, depends upon the free choices and actions of the finite existents.^

^Ibid., pp. 121, 122. ^Man's Vision of God, pp. 98,

2 ÏÔ41

Ibid., p p . 8-I5.

159

Thus far what has been emphasised is that God's

concrete knowledge is truly relative. In what sense, then, can God’s knowledge be absolute, which by Hartshorne's own

definition, means unrelated? The answer, of course, lies in Hartshorne*s distinction of abstract and concrete

aspects of God. In his concrete aspect God's knowledge is truly relative ; in his abstract aspect his omniscience is truly absolute, that is, nonrelative or unrelated. This is the case because omniscience is a type of relation, not a relation itself. (As noted earlier, God's abstract

character is made up of relational types). As Hart­ shorne says,

The type of a relation is not itself subject to the relation, is not relativized by it. "Greater than" is not itself greater than, cognitive

adequacy does not itself know, whether

adequately or otherwise— any more than it is volition that wills . . . . If volition does not will, and cognitive adequacy does not know, then cognitive adequacy need not be relative, even though the adequate knowér

himself is relative, relative to what he knows. Thus there is in God something absolute or non- relative, his cognitive adequacy. Nevertheless, in knowing any actual thing, God himself is

related and relativized with respect to that thing. There is here no paradox, unless it is paradoxical that seeing does not see, or that humor does not laugh.^

God's knowledge, then, is both absolute in that it partakes of the abstract relational form of adequacy, and relative in that it truly corresponds to every concrete existent

and circumstance.

Also with reference to God's omniscience, Hartshorne argues two further points of importance. First, in keep­ ing with realistic epistemology, he contends that knowledge is an internal relation as far as the subject is concerned, that is, knowledge makes a difference to the subject and is

-1

therefore constitutive of the knower. This principle Hart­ shorne applies also to God, thereby making God's knowledge

2

constitutive of his being. Here, too, Hartshorne is emphasising the relativity of God's knowledge. Secondly however, Hartshorne goes beyond this principle that the object known is constitutive of the subject who knows; he argues that relations— such as the relation involved in knowledge— contain their terms. He states.

We find that persons contain relations of know­ ledge and love to other persons and things,

and since relations contain their terms, persons must contain other persons and things. If it

seems otherwise, this is because of the inadequacy of human personal relations, which is such that the terms are not conspicuously and clearly

contained in their subjects . . . . In God, terms of his knowledge would be absolutely manifest and clear and not at all "outside" the knowledge or the knower.3

On the same theme Hartshorne writes.

To include relations is to include their terms. , pp. 7, 119.

^Ibid.. p. 17.

l6l

Hence to know all is to include all. Thus we must agree with modern absolutism and orthodox Hinduism that the supreme being must be all-inclusive.^

Thus Hartshorne presents an epistemological argument for God as all-inclusive in addition to the general metaphys­ ical argument and specific aesthetic argument discussed earlier.

Compared to the other attributes of God discussed by Hartshorne, God’s holiness receives little attention. However, in compliance again with Hartshorne’s view of adequacy as the measure of greatness, he defines God’s holiness as "motivational adequacy". This motivational adequacy is implicit in God's omniscience.

If then, God is adequately aware of all actuality as actual and all possibility as possible, he has adequate motivation for seeking to actualize maximal possibilities of further value. There

can be no ethical appeal beyond the decision of the one who in his decision takes account of all actuality and possibility . . . . There could not be a wrong decision which thus took account of the situation; for a right decision can "be defined as one adequately informed as to its context.

Omniscience in action is by definition right action.3

So we see that God’s cognitive adequacy (or omniscience) is the foundation for his motivational adequacy (or

holiness). Because God knows everything, he is able to have an adequate or appropriate purpose or goal for

^Ibid., p. 76. p. 124. ^Ibid., p. 125.

actualization. Hartshorne continues,

The holiness of God consists . . . in the single aim at the one primary good, which is that the creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of

living, and pour this richness into the one ultimate receptacle of all achievement, the life of God.^ Thus while God's holiness is absolute in that it is an abstract relational type— motivational adequacy--it seems to be the case that the concrete response of the creatures is necessary for the "completion" of that holiness, that is, for the realisation into fact of the purposes or aims which God recognizes as maximally good.

It could probably be argued with much justification that the attribute most associated with God is love. In Hartshorne's estimation, "the new doctrine . . . is nothing at all but the analysis of the simple idea that

2

God is 'the perfectly loving individual,'" and since God is love, then the attribute of love must determine "the

3