Maquinaria de transporte de tierras

Ghazali, across the corpus of his writings, repeatedly alludes to a particular kind of skepticism: the extraordinary power of the human mind but also its limitations and even ignorance. This is not the confusion of the mystics, as seen in chapter one, beginning with Junayd. Rather, Ghazali is suggesting that knowledge operates according to two sets of rules, one for the physical realm, where logic holds, and one for the otherworldly realm, where mystical insight is needed. But the philosophers are ignorant of the otherworldly realm, as defined by Ghazali, even if their methods bring them close to it, making him skeptical of the claims of philosophers to know things of the otherworldly realm with certainty. There, the causality, on the basis of which philosophical

inquiry into the created order makes sense, does not necessarily apply. Rather, God directly determines things by means of his speech (conveyed via pro- phecy), making him the immediate cause of the mystical knowledge that Ghazali seeks to advance. In contrast, the physical realm, even if the result of God’s actions, is sufficiently removed from God (not in terms of space but in terms of existence) to make secondary causality possible and even necessary. Here, God does not directly intervene. A causal order exists on its own terms, making it possible to derive knowledge about it through philosophical inquiry, which can yield knowledge of God that is certain because it is based on proof, not hearsay, even if it falls short of the mystical knowledge that comes from inquiry into things by starting from God, a method made possi- ble by learned ignorance and fulfilled by revelation, which attunes the mind to the otherworld.

Ghazali has thus succeeded in demonstrating the truth of prophecy while also accepting the truth of philosophy. In this fashion, he has domesticated the achievements of philosophy, especially those of Avicenna, within the theological parameters of Islam. But in so doing, he has to reconfigure those parameters, placing the logic of philosophy at the heart of Islam! This is not to redefine philosophy. Rather, by claiming logic for Islam, he seeks to show that the philosophers are not being sufficiently philosophical. In his view, they only parrot the teachings of the past masters, such as Avicenna, whereas philosophy, to be true, requires independent thinking. Philosophers should emulate no one, heeding only the conclusions of compelling proofs.28

Thus, with the intention of teaching the philosophers a philosophical lesson, Ghazali set out to build a surer foundation not so much for Islam but rather for logic. With him, it is not a question of using the logic of Aristotle to demonstrate the rationality of Islam’s teachings, as it had been with ‘Amiri, but rather of aligning Islam’s teachings with the methods of logic. The result is a mixture of philosophy and prophecy, the coherency of which is at times difficult to pin down.

This can be seen in a chapter from The Revivification of Religious Sciences that treats the topic of reasoned reflection (tafakkur), which, as seen earlier, Ghazali identifies as the process of obtaining knowledge of God through intellectual contemplation of his creation. The term occurs in the Qur’an, where it is used to call people to consider the order of the world as a sign of God’s power: The idea is that knowledge of God results from reflection on the world. Here, in his magnum opus, Ghazali defines the term more pre- cisely, equating it with syllogistic reasoning, where two premises (he refers to them as two pieces of knowledge) necessarily lead to a conclusion (he refers to it as a third piece of knowledge). To illustrate, he poses a question about the purpose of existence. Do we live for this world or for the other world?

So many people truly know that the other world is the better choice, but when asked for the reason, they cannot explain why they know it to be the better choice unless their knowledge of this truth is the result of two

prior pieces of knowledge: first, that what is more enduring is a better choice, and, second, that the other world is more enduring than this one. A third piece of knowledge results, namely, that the other world is the better choice. The product of true thinking occurs when two pieces of knowledge lead to a third.29

By identifying a scriptural term, tafakkur, with syllogistic reasoning, Ghazali is following in the footsteps of ‘Amiri, who, it will be remembered from the last chapter, equated God’s pen with universal rationality and the heavenly tablet with the world soul. Here, Ghazali tightens the connection between scripture and philosophy. By virtue of syllogistic reasoning, now conceived as a scriptural category (tafakkur), one can know with certainty that it is better to choose the other world over this one. This knowledge, now certain because syllogistically derived, becomes a light to illuminate the heart. The impact of this knowledge on the heart, in turn, leads to a transformation in one’s limbs, which respond by acting in the service of a transformed heart. In other words, because one has certainty that the other world is better, one will not hesitate to act for it, renouncing this world and itsfleeting pleasures. The process, connecting knowledge and action, can be summed up as follows: What one does depends on the state of one’s heart; the state of one’s heart depends on certain knowledge; and certain knowledge depends on syllogistic thinking. For Ghazali, then, it is by the force of logic that Islam would be revived.

Ghazali is pressing a very important point, one relating to his engagement with philosophers, namely, that people will not do something if they have doubts about its veracity. Doubt can lead to indifference. Why act in the name of Islam if I am not certain about its claims? This was the crisis that in Ghazali’s view the philosophers had provoked. By claiming certainty for phi- losophy over Islam, they had made it difficult for the learned to feel com- pelled to act in the name of Islam. Why follow prophetic instruction if I have doubts about its fundamental claims? Can I accept it as authoritative if the certain knowledge I have about God comes from philosophy rather than prophecy? This, for Ghazali, threatened the moral life of Islam, which is based on prophetic instruction. There could be no moral life apart from the revealed teachings of Islam. It was thus not only Islam’s beliefs about God that were threatened by philosophy: The greater threat was to the virtuous life in Islam, which, after all, was the reason why one pursued knowledge in the first place.

For this reason, in his analysis of contemplation (tafakkur) in The Revivi- fication of the Religious Sciences, Ghazali likens the syllogism to fire that ignites when steel is struck by flint. Two premises, brought together, create a conclusion that, like a spark offire, produces light for one to see where before one was blind, and to be roused to virtuous action where before one was enslaved to the ways of the world. Ghazali is not always a philosopher but he does draw on syllogistic reasoning, the method of certainty, to develop a

theory of action. His ultimate goal is to get people to be virtuous by showing them that they can follow the teachings of Islam with the certainty of demonstrable proof. He is making every effort to use the achievements of philosophy to imbue the umma with a sense of certainty and inspire it to act for the other world. Philosophy does not determine knowledge of God but rather brings people to a point of certainty about the knowledge of God as revealed by Islam. Once there, once they have attained certainty with the help of philosophy, they will act accordingly for the otherworldly purposes of Islam.