ANÁLISIS PROTEÓMICO SHOTGUN MEDIANTE ESPECTROMETRÍA DE MASAS EN TÁNDEM

Oleg V. Khlevniuk

Thoughthe‘personalfactor’inSoviethistoryhasbeendebatedcountless times,itshouldsurprisenoonethatkeyeventsandevenentirestagesare associated with individuals, such as Lenin with NEP, Stalin with the Great Break, Khrushchev with the Thaw, Gorbachev with Perestroika.

Though these are conventions and imprecise references, they reflect an obvious fact: Soviet leaders (like leaders of other countries) had a sub- stantial influence on the course of events. What is at issue is just how strong that influence was, what were its mechanisms, what role was played by this or that leader to cause a period or event to be named afterhim.

ResearchontheroleofStalinintheStalinistdictatorshiphasprovoked widely divergent views. On the one hand, the totalitarian model pro- ceeded from the assumption that Stalin was the lynchpin of the system, andthatitwouldcollaps ewithouthi m.Ontheotherhand,somehistor - ians for various reasons have expressed doubts about the strength of Stalin’spowerandhaveevenwrittenaboutalossofrealpowerincertain periods(apeculiarversionofthetheoryofthe‘weakdictator’).However, themajorityofhistorianswritingabutStalinandStalinismprefertowork with actual documents, thanks to which substantial material has been accumulatedandimportantobservationsmade.Thistraditionofcareful workwithsourceshasplayedthebiggestroleinthelasttenyearssincethe archiveswereopened.

Beforereviewingthemainresultsofthatwork,itisnecessarytoclarify its central subject. If one does not get lost in the fine details of different periods, one can identify two structures of power in the Soviet system:

oligarchyandpersonaldictatorship.ThelatterexistedonlyunderStalin.

The fundamental difference between the two (from which most other differences follow) consists in the degree of the personal power of the leader over officialdom, and in particular its highest level. In the oligar- chy,whiletheleaderhadsignificantpower,hewassurroundedbyinflu - ential colleagu es and a powe rful elite (nomenkla tura). He played the 108

great est role in decis ion-maki ng, but decisions were impleme nted collect- ively . In the process of decision-ma king, the int erests of various ins titu- tions and groups had to be negotiate d. Me mbers of the Politburo had netwo rks of clients from among mid-l evel offi cials (the leaders of regions and minist ries an d so on) who f ormed the backb one of the Cent ral Commi ttee. The se systems of collecti ve decis ion-maki ng work ed in a regular fashion and se rved to limit the powe r of the leader and pres ent the cond itions for a relative politic al ‘predi ctabili ty’.

Stalin ’s perso nal dictators hip resulted from the destructio n of the oligarc hical syst em. At its root was the limitles s power of the dic tator over the fate of an y Soviet offic ial, includin g the members of the Politburo . The mechanis ms of decision-m aking changed correspo nd- ingly . The dictator acquire d exclusive right to ini tiate an d confi rm deci- sions, tho ugh this do es not m ean that in eve ry case he chos e to exerc ise that right. Stalin ’s dictators hip aros e from the chaos of revolu tionary chang e, and relied largely on violence. Soc iety and polit ics func tioned on the basis of a regim e of ‘extr aord inary measu res’. At times this was necess ary, as in the war, but no less often it was impo sed artificia lly.

In this way , to under stand Stalin ’s role in the Sov iet system and the exten t of his powe r, one m ust address at a m inimum two issue s: to wh at exten t Stalin cont rolled offic ialdom, and what role Stalin played in the process of decision-ma king and in the pro cess of the day-to- day le ader- ship of the country.

‘The strong dicta tor’: the consolid ation of Stal in’s dictator ship

The archi ves cont ain a rich supp ly of docum ents on the struggle for powe r followin g St alin’s death. One can on ly regret that histo rians show so little 1

interest in the subject. Wh ile the re are no t yet any specia lised publ ications on the struggle at the h ighest echelo ns of power, one can alread y assert that the archi ves pro vide subs tantial new eviden ce that Stalin ’s victory was not inevitabl e. Stalin and his ‘facti on’ worked very har d for their victory.Theiropponentswereb ynomeansdoomedtodefeat.

Similarly,thetransitiontoapersonaldictatorshipdidnotfollowauto - maticallyfromthevictoryovertheoppositions.Thedocumentsallowone

1 ThemostrecentdocumentcollectionsonthesubjectincludeA.V.Kvashonkinetal.(eds.), Sovetskoe rukovodstvo. Perepiska, 1928–1941gg. (Moscow: Rosspen, 1999);V.P.Danilov et al. (eds.), Ka k l oma li N EP. Stenogrammy plenumov TsK VKP(b), 1928–1929gg., 5 v ol s.

(Moscow:Mezhdunarodnyifond‘Demokratiia’,2000–1).Theappendicesareparticularly interestinginthisregard.

to characterise the beginning of the 1930s as a period of an unstable oligarchy in the Politburo. Politburo members derived their political influence from, on the one hand, the pre-revolutionary and post- revolutionary traditions in the Bolshevik Party, and on the other hand, the role which they played in the administration of the country. Each member of the Politburo led key institutions, as a result of which they controlled significant resources and played an important role making countless operational decisions. Each gathered round him a circle of dependent and personally loyal officials both in the centre and in the regions.InterventionsbyStalinintotheworkofPolitburomemberswere possible, but asarule,they provoked conflictandtension.Stalinhad to accept the existence of such ‘patrimonies’ and made great efforts to negotiateinterestsandpacifythe‘institutionalegoism’ofhiscolleagues. 2

ItisobviousfromarchivalsourcesthatStalin’spowergrewgraduallyin the course of the first half of the 1930s. His personal dictatorship only eme rged as a result of the m ass purges of the nomen klatura in 1936– 8 which allowed him to destroy the oligarchical system. The thesis of the decisiveroleofthe‘GreatTerror’intheconsolidationofStalin’spersonal dictatorshiphaslongbeenacceptedinthehistoriographyandnewdocu - ments completely confirm it. Relying on the punitive organs, Stalin had severalmembersofthePolitburoexecutedandsubordinatedhisremain - ingcolleagueswiththreatsofviolencetothemandtheirfamilies.Younger leaders brought into the Politburo by Stalin were raised in the spirit a different political tradition, the essence of which was personal loyalty to the le ader (vozh d’) . In this new ord er, key polit ical decisions were Stalin ’s exclusiveprerogative.ThePolitburoasacollectiveorganceasedtofunc - tion, and was replaced by meetings of Stalin and certain colleagues (commissions of the Politburo, the quintet ( piaterka)). In the middle 3

ranksofthepoliticalhierarchy,manyoftheleadersofkeycentralinstitu - tions had been removed, as had the majority of regional leaders. This meantthattheCentralCommittee,madeupofsuchofficials,wastrans - formed into a purely decorative appendage of the dictatorship. It also meant that members of the Politburo had lost the networks of political clientsthathadbeenanimportantsourceoftheirinfluence.

StalintriedtomaintainthestructureofpoweremergingfromtheGreat Terrorintothepost -waryears.As yet,westillknowverylittleaboutthe

2 The mechanism of collective leadership of the Politburo are well represented in O.V.

Khlev niuk,R.U.Dev is(R.W .Dav ies),L.P.Koshelev a,E.A.Ris(E.A.Rees),andL.A.

Rogovaia(eds.), StaliniKaganovich.Perepiska,1931–1936gg.(Moscow:Rosspen,2001).

3 SeeO.V.Khlevniuk, Politbiuro:Mekhanizmypoliticheskoivlastiv1930-egody (Moscow:

Rosspen,1996).

system of power during the war. Howe ver, from a raft of works on the post-wa r period, we know that the model of r elations bet ween Stalin and his inner ci rcle which charac terised the late 1930s was reprod uced. The 4

only chang es app ear to have taken place in the rel ationship of the dictator and the no menklatu ra, where purge s were relative ly less frequ ent and less harsh.

Obvio usly, to affirm and supp ort his powe r, Stal in had to rel y on some machi nery of stat e (apparat). It woul d not be much of an exaggera tion to argue that this m achiner y consis ted of the entire Party-st ate system of the USSR. How ever, it is also obvi ous that Stalin needed so me kind of organ isation of his own, stron g enou gh for everyd ay m onitoring an d repres sion. With this in mind , some histo rians have tried to find some kind of spe cial ‘chancel lery’ ou tside the form al structure s of powe r (fo r exampl e, in the syst em of spe cial/secre t dep artme nts). 5

Howe ver, the re is every reason to believ e that Stalin ’s personal, puni - tive organis ation was none othe r than the ‘regul ar’ organ s of stat e secur - ity. The exten sive use of the OGP U in the struggle for powe r in the Pa rty dates back to the 1920s . From the 1930s to the 1950s, the OGP U- NKVD -MGB was under Stalin ’s direct superv ision. To ensure the 6

unco ndition al subord ination of the secu rity organs, Stalin relied on the Party to purge the m occasiona lly.

It has been conclu sively establi shed that the mass campaign s of repres - sion, inclu ding campaign s direc ted agai nst the nomenkla tura an d politic al leaders , were ini tiated and supervis ed by St alin. His perso nal file contains many protocol s of the interroga tions of arres ted officials . It is well know n that Stalin perso nally sancti oned the exec ution of form er nom enklatura offic ials wh o, as a rule, were tried by the military colleg ium of the Supreme Court. While we have lots of informa tion on how Stalin con - ducted campaign s of repres sion through the OGP U-N KVD-MG B, the mecha nisms by which the polit ical polic e work ed with other members of the Politburo is less well know n. We only kno w that specia l sub-u nits acted as bodyguards and service personnel, which also constituted a constant,literallyminute-to-minutesurveillanceoftheireverymovement

4 R.G.Pikhoia, SovetskiiSoiuz:Istoriiavlasti,1945–1991 (Moscow:RAGS,1998);A.A.

Danilov, A.V. Pyzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy. SSSR v pervye poslevoennye gody (Moscow: Rosspen, 2001); O. V. Khlevniuk et al. (eds.), Politburo TsK VKP(b) i Sovet MinistrovSSSRv1945–1953gg.(Moscow:Rosspen,2001);Y.Gorlizki,andO.Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2004).

5 N.E.Rosenfeldt,BentJensen,andErikKulavig(eds.), MechanismsofPowerintheSoviet Union (Basingstoke:Macmillan,2000),pp.40–70.

6 See LapolicepolitiqueenUnionsovietique,1918–1953,aspecialeditionof Cahiersdumonde russe 2–4(2001).

and contact. Pavel Sudoplatov, a high-ranking official of the MGB, has confirmed that after the war Stalin had the phones of Voroshilov, Molotov,andMikoiantapped. 7

AllthatweknowaboutStalinandhisrelationswithhisinnercircleand the wider ranks of the nom enklatura allows us to asse rt tha t Stalin used common,sotospeak,traditionalmethodsofsurveillanceandrepression.

Senior officials were the object of continuous oversight by the secret police,whichkeptStalininformedabouttheirlifestyleandcontacts.On Stalin’sorders,theorgansofstatesecuritycould,atanymoment,arrest any Soviet leader, their deputies, or their relatives and fabricate any charges he wished. These methods were sufficient to ensure Stalin’s dominanceoverthepoliticalsystem.

T h e d i c t a t o r a t w o r k : S t a l i n i n t h e s y s t e m of dec is i on -mak i ng

Acharacterisation of Stalinasaworking dictator can befoundi n Adam Ulam’s biography of Stalin, though of course he did not originate the 8

idea.Sovietpropaganda,i.e.,Stalinhimself,madeconsiderableeffortsto crea te this very image of a ‘leade r (vozhd’) at work ’. Official docu ments, eventhosenotintendedforthebroaderpublic,constantlyunderlinedthe leadingroleofStalinintheformulationandimplementationofthemost important policies and programmes of government. The message was repeated in the speeches of Soviet leaders, the press, and propaganda literature.Towhatextentthoughdidthesecliche ´sofpropagandacorres- pond to reality? The opening of the archives has made it possible to examinethisissue.

As mentioned, in reference to the first half of the 1930s, it has been commonly accepted that there were ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ factions in the Politburo and that the zigzags of Soviet policy at the time were the productofStalin’smanoeuvringbetweenthesefactions.Therootsofthis imagecomefromthepublicationsof Sotsialisticheskiivestnik inthe1930s and most famously the article of Boris Nikolaevskii, ‘How the Moscow TrialwasPrepared(FromtheLetterofanOldBolshevik)’. 9

Thearchivesdonot,however,confirmthistheoryoffactions.Rather,a largenumberofdocumentssupportthepositionofthosehistorianswho focusedtheirattentiononthephenomenonofinstitutionalself -interestin the Soviet system. The most interesting object for the study of this

7 P.Sudoplatov, RazvedkaiKreml’(Moscow:GeiGag,1996),p.383.

8 A.Ulam, Stalin:theManandhisEra (NewYork:Viking,1973).

9 Sotsialisticheskiivestnik,23/24(1936);1/2(1937),pp.17–24.

pheno menon conce rns the activity of the eco nomic com missariats in the process of the com position and agreemen t of pro ducti on plans and the distri bution of capita l investm ent. One of the more infl uential m embers 10

of the Po litburo, G. K. Ordzho nikidze, was at the centr e of this p rocess, dem onstratin g cont radicti ng patterns of behaviou r as he shifte d from one to anothe r admini strative position – at the end of the 1920s the chairman of the Central Control Commission, and from 1931 chairman of the Supreme Economi c Coun cil (VSNK h), and then Commi ssar of Heavy Industry. One may also observe that the conflict between Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, ending in the suicide of the latter, was the sole serious conflictbetweenStalinandhisinnercircle,asmanystudieshavedemon - strated. Theopeningofthearchiveshasrevealedmanyotherconflicts 11

inthePolitburointheearly1930s.Asawholeonecancharacterisethese conflicts as ‘departmentalist’ (vedomstvennye). Various members of the Politburo took ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ positions depending on their posts they held. In this period of ‘collective leadership’ in the first half ofthe1930s,Stalinplayedtwomainroles.Ontheonehand,heactedas the supreme arbiter in inter-institutional conflicts, on the other, as the initiatoroffundamentaldecisionsofageneralcharacter.Ofcoursesucha divisionisartificial,forinanumberofcasesthesefunctionscoincided.As anarbiterofinstitutionalconflicts,Stalinchosethepositionofthe defen- der of the interests of the state as a whole, as any leader might. He frequently complained about ‘departmental egoism’ (vedomstvennyi ego- ism) and the damage it did to state interests. The example of conflicts betweenStalinandhisinnercirclein1931overimportsisrevealinginthis regard. Despite a serious financial crisis and the dangers of increasing foreign debt, central institutions continued to demand new imports.

Stalin accused his lieutenants of undermining the state budget and of

‘narrowdepartmentalegoism’.Theconflictbecamequiteserious. 12

Stalin’scriticismofnarrowinstitutionalinterestsdidnotextendtothe system that nurtured them. Indeed while he criticised ‘departmental egoism’, he encouraged it in his role as arbiter among conflicting

10 H.Kuromiya, Stalin’sIndustrialRevolution:PoliticsandWorkers,1928–1932 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1988); E.A. Rees (ed.), Decision-Making in the Stalinist CommandEconomy (Basingstoke:Macmillan,1997)pp.43–4.

11 R.W.Davies,‘SomeSovietEconomicControllers –III.Ordzhonikidze’, SovietStudies 1 (1960); Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘Ordzhonikidze’s Takeover of VSNKh: A Case Study in SovietBureaucraticPolitics’, SovietStudies 2(1985);F.Benvenuti,‘AStalinistVictim ofStalinism:‘‘Sergo’’Ordzhonikidze’inJulianCooper,MaureenPerrie,andE.A.Rees (eds.), Soviet History, 1917–1953: Essays in Honour of R.W. Davies (Basingstoke:

Macmillan, 1995); O. Khlevniuk, In Stalin’s Shadow: The Career of ‘Sergo’

Ordzhonikidze (Armonk,N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe,1995 ).

12 Khlevniuketal.(eds.), StaliniKaganovich,pp.54–7,64–76,79,87–8,90.

institutionalinterests.Forexample,inresistingthedemandsofeconomic (khoziaistvennye) commissariats for resources, Stalin was defending the positions of the Commissariat of Finance and Gosplan, which were responsible for balancing the budget and the harmonisation of plans.

Stalin’s position was not principled and unchanging. In general, he was moreinclinedtosupporttheprincipleofforcedindustrialdevelopment, andthusdefendtheinterestsoftheeconomiccommissariats.W ecan,in thisway,seeStalinasanessentialpartofasystemofSovietdepartment - alism.Thiswasparticularlythecaseduringtheperiodofthe‘collective’, oligarchic,leadership,butalso,withafewmodifications,intheperiodof hispersonaldictatorship.Indeed,departmentalismservedtosmooththe transitionbetweenthesetwoformsofrule.

Not all decisions were arrived at in the process of negotiating institu- tional interests. There was a significant body of decisions that Stalin initiateddirectly.W ecanseethisparticularlyinrelationtoadministrative reorganisations, repression, foreign policy, and others. For example, we now know precisely that Stalin was the author of the infamous law of 7August1932onthetheftof‘socialistproperty’.Undoubtedly,Stalinwas personallyresponsibleforthepactwithHitlerandsoon.

Stalin’sparticipationindecision-makingonthesetwolevelsinthefirst halfofthe1930spersistedbeyondtheemergenceofhispersonaldi ctator- ship, though from the late 1930s it took on a new quality. Within the highest echelons of power, there ceases to be any evidence, common in theearly1930s,oftheinnercirclecontradictingStalin.Stalinhadcome to monopolise the right to take decisions of a fundamental nature. The highest decision-making bodies became consultative organs for the dic- tator. Take, for example, the famous Special Committee governing the Soviet nuclear project. The Committee produced resolutions, which werethensenttoStalinforconfirmation,afterwhichtheywerepublished as decisions of the Council of Ministers. 13Various decision-making groupscentredonStalintooktheplaceofthePolitburocompletely.

The obvious impossibility of taking complete control of all spheres of governmentforcedStalintolimithisattentiontocertainpriorities.These limits became particularly pronounced in the last years of his life. He increasingly focused on the oversight of the organs of state security, foreign policy, and military issues. Occasionally, he intervened in rela- tivelylessimportantspheres.Thissortofunpredictableinterventionwas meant to create the effect of a ‘continuous presence’ and keep Stalin’s lieutenantsunderconstantpressure.Nooneknewatwhatmoment,what

13 L.D.Riabev(ed.), AtomnyiproektSSSR.Dokumentyimaterialy,t.II,Atomnaiabomba, 1945–1954 (Moscow:Nauka,1999),ch.1.

issue might interest the dictator. This limited the independence of Stalin’s lieutenants and forced them to work under the constant threat ofinterventionfromabove.

Though this system of surveillance was reasonably effective, its adop- tion was a sign of real changes in the role Stalin played in the system of decision-making. Stalin played an ever-decreasing role in the everyday administration of government. This followed from his decreasing invol- vementinthenegotiationofinstitutionalinterests,thatis,hisretreatfrom decision-makingofanoperativenature.Particularlyinthelastyearsofhis life,Stalinbecameasortofsuperstructureaboveanentirelyself -sufficient system of administration and decision-making. This was one of the key preconditionsforaquicktransitiontoanewoligarchyafterhisdeath.

The division of the systems of operative decision-making and of the dictatorship did not mean, however, that these two systems existed autonomously one of another. Decisions taken on Stalin’s initiative and reflecting his own preferences had a profound (and in some cases deci- sive) impact on the development of state and society. One can identify certain of Stalin’s priorities that became the priorities of the state as a whole.Amongthefirstofthese,onewouldhavetonameStalin’sinclina - tiontousepoliticalviolenceastheresolutiontoanyproblem.Thisisnot entirelyunexpectedifoneconsidersthetraditionsofBolshevismandthe fact that the new state was born in revolution and civil war, but Stalin undoubtedlydeepenedthistraditionandbroughttoitaparticularcruelty and intolerance. Much of the evidence supports the view of Alec Nove that real Stalinism was excessively terroristic, and gave rise to extremes andexcesses.Theseextremes,extraordinaryevenfromthepointofview oftheSovietlegalandpoliticalorderunderStalin,frequentlywentsofar beyondwhatwasneededthattheyhadtheeffectofweakeningthesystem, not strengthening it. 14The most obvious example of this is the Great Terrorof1936–8,organised,aswenowcanconfidentlyassert,byStalin himself. The devastating consequences of mass repression were so obviousthat,intheend,apparentlyevenStalincouldnotdenythem.In any case, to the end of his life, he never again undertook a campaign of repressionofsimilarscaleandcruelty.

As other dictators, Stalin relied on what he perceived to be his gift of foresightandhisowninfallibility. Heperceivedthesequalitiesalmostin mystical terms, as, it would seem, did Hitler. In practice, they led to extreme obstinacy and a resistance to compromise. Historians of Soviet foreign policy often observe and underline Stalin’s pragmatism, but

14 AlecNove,‘StalinandStalinism.SomeIntroductoryThoughts’,inAlecNove(ed.), The StalinPhenomenon (NewYork:WeidenfeldandNicholson,1993)pp.24–9.

archival sources also confirm the thesis that Stalin had very different approachestodomesticandforeignpolicy.Stalin’spragmatisminforeign policy was directed at preventing the deepening of crises. For example, his decision to support the North Koreans in war against the south was made after long hesitation, made under serious pressure from the KoreansandparticularlyfromChina. 15

Stalin’spragmatismindomesticpolicywassomuchmorelimitedthat it maybe referredto as ‘crisis pragmatism’. Stalin agreed to limited and inconsistentconcessionsonlyafterthingswereatadeadendandthecrisis situationhadbecomedangerous.Fromrecentresearch,wecanseethisin the limited measures of the so-called ‘neo-NEP’ of 1932. Strikingly, Stalinwasopposedtosomeoftheprojectsofeconomicreformpromoted at that time. 16One can say the same about those tendencies in social policy and shifts in ideology which are often referred to as the ‘Great Retreat’,thetriumphof‘middle-class’valuesandsoon.Whiletherewere such vacillations in the ‘general line’ under Stalin, there are no grounds forexaggeratingtheirdepthorsignificance.

Stalin’sinflexibleandextremelyconservativepositionwasparticularly evidentinthelastyearsofhislife.Despiteextremelyseriousagricultural and social crises, Stalin blocked even minor correctives to the policy of forcedpaceinvestmentinheavyindustryandthemilitary. Theneedfor 17

such correctives became so serious that Stalin’s successors introduced wide-ranging reforms almost immediately after his death. The events after the death of the dictator demonstrate the extent to which Stalin personally shaped many characteristics of the system which bore his name. In the few months after his death, Stalin’s successors abandoned manyoftheextremesof Stalinismwithout anydifficulty,particularlyits extraordinaryrepressiveness.Togetherwithothermeasures,thislentthe system a new quality, in spite of the fact that many other fundamental characteristicsremainedthesame.

T h e l i m i t s o f t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p

Superficially,Stalin’spoweralwaysappearedtobesovast,thathistorians frequentlyquestioneditsreallimits.Althoughnoone,tomyknowledge, has used the phrase ‘weak dictator’ to describe Stalin, some historians

15 A.V. Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina: koreiskii konflikt 1950–1953 godov (Moscow:

Rosspen,2000).

16 R.W. Davies, Crisis and Progress in the Soviet Economy, 1931–1933 (Basingstoke:

Macmillan,1996),pp.142–228,256–69.

17 GorlizkiandKhlevniuk, ColdPeace.

haveattemptedtodefendsuchaperspectiveontheStalinistdictatorship.

Forexample,therehavebeenthosewhohavearguedthatStalin’spower wasweakened,andnotstrengthenedbytheGreatTerror. Thereisalso 18

A. Avtorkhanov’s theorythat Stalin had lost real power in his last years, anddiedatthehandofBeri a. 19

None of these theories are supported either bysubstantial document- ary evidence or even elementary logic. The issue of Stalin’s ‘weakness’

shouldbeaddressednotintermsof‘conspiracies’orsome‘lossofpower’, butratherintermsoftheactualfunctioningofthedictatorshipitself.One canformulatethisapproachasfollows:atitscore,theStalinistdictator - ship generated processes deleterious a) to the Stalinist socio-economic modelandpolicies,andb)toStalin’spowerasapersonaldict ator.

Regarding the first part of this issue, most scholars who have studied the regime have uncovered one or other phenomenon on the basis of which they could negate the monolithic, ‘totalitarian’ nature of the Stalinist system. Literally in every sphere of social life and the economy (tooneextentoranother)therewereforcescontradictingtheaimsofthe regime and challenging the direction of policy. In the system of forced labouritwasnecessarytoprovideincentivestolabour.Traditionalnormsin privatelifesurvivedthestrictideologicaldemandsoftheregime.Eventhe onslaught of the regime’s campaigns of repression could not guarantee results.InStalin’slastyearstherewasaseriouscrisisoftheGulagsystem thatsetreallimitstothefurtherapplicationofmassterror.Onecouldlist otherexamples.However,fortheissueathand,onemustpayparticular attention to the way the structures at the apex of the political system functioned.ThelimitsofStalin’sdictatorshipcanbestudiedbylooking at the extent to which the system of personal dictatorship depended on, and inevitably reproduced, oligarchic structures of power. There were severalfactorsdrivingthistendencytowards‘oligarchisation’.

Though they had lost their political autonomy, Stalin’s inner circle

Though they had lost their political autonomy, Stalin’s inner circle