MARCO CONCEPTUAL

Several drivers to normative convergence exist that act as catalysts to the development of a “community of interest” on water resources.

4.9.1. TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

As previously noted, technical collaboration has been particularly dominant in the Orange-Senqu basin, largely influenced by the political and historical context in which it was necessitated. Due to the relative scarcity of water as a resource in the region, and despite the political instability and distrust, there were few alternative options that countries had other than to co-operate in this manner.79

4.9.2. NORM ENTREPRENEURS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF

PERSONALISED POLITICS

As previously noted, the importance of individuals to the success or failure of effective water governance in southern Africa is noteworthy (see Closed Meeting Proceedings: Appendix seven). As Swatuk argues, water governance in southern Africa exists within a context of differently empowered actors who negotiate and renegotiate roles and rights to resources (Swatuk, 2002b, 2005a). This may have positive consequences (a close-community of technical experts based on trusting relationships, a wealth of knowledge and experience in the water sector) and negative consequences (power asymmetries and an elite epistemic community, institutional memory loss when these individuals leave as alluded to previously etc.). These individuals have succeeded in persuading their constituencies of the moral appropriateness of certain codes of conduct relating to transboundary water governance. Mr. Piet Heyns, facilitated the Namibian ratification of the UN Convention. Mr. Dudley Biggs; Mr. Piet Heyns; Mr. Leleka; former Water Affairs Minister of South Africa, Kader Asmal; Mr. Emmanuel Lesoma; Mr. Reginald Tekateka and other key individuals, encouraged the drafting of the 1995 SADC

Water Protocol.80 In essence, key individuals have played a significant role in ‘bringing’ international and national norms and principles home. Moreover, where certain of these norms have been ambiguous or deliberately vague in wording (such as equitable utilisation), individuals, acting as norm entrepreneurs, have adopted the language of the norm without giving it immediate substance (Swatuk, 2005a), or have interpreted them for specific national contexts.

4.9.3. CAPACITY BUILDING

Despite the fact that Orange-Senqu riparians have developed, or are in the process of developing sophisticated water policy, without appropriate capacity to implement the policy in the long term, little is likely to change for the better at a local level. Effective policy implementation is dependent on a combination of technical knowledge, social skills, and practical experience. This need to develop capacity translates into the need to increase social learning capacity. SADC has, since its inception, placed an emphasis on international programmes that foster human resources capacity building (Swatuk, 2005a). There is wide recognition of the capacity deficit in the region (Swatuk, 2005a), and it is through capacity building that institutions can be strengthened, regional integration facilitated, reform effectively implemented, and normative convergence evolved. This growing awareness of the need for capacity is evident in the regional trend of donor-funded institutional strengthening and capacity building projects.

4.9.4. SUSTAINABLE KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER POLICIES

Sustainable knowledge transfer policies, while few (or non-existent) in most river basin organisations, contribute to capacity and competence building but also competence sustainability. Sustainable knowledge transfer policies therefore address issues of continuity, a phenomenon which is often lost through social/professional mobility, when individuals move to other organisations or sectors or retirement. According to a study conducted by the WRC of South Africa, the natural tendency for knowledge gained through involvement in policy processes is to dissipate to the extent that it is unavailable as a resource for the next generation of policy makers (Pegram, et al., 2006). As was

discussed in chapter three, social (and collective) learning processes help to educate and make individuals aware of the moral appropriateness of a given norm, as it involves the expansion in time and space of the background knowledge that constitutes practices and, thus, also in the expansion of ‘communities of practice’ (Adler, 2005).

Sustainable knowledge transfer policies therefore include the re-defining of capacity needs of institutions, equipping young professionals with relevant skills by revising curricular to address emerging issues in the water sector, as well as formal mentoring programmes, which retain the knowledge of the old by transferring it to the young. This point reiterates the importance of individual non-state actors, their interests and identities as endogenous to the system of interaction and social interaction processes that determine both behaviour, and in this case, institutional effectiveness. Moreover, it includes the development of suitable Research and Development strategies that follow a learning-by-doing approach i.e. mentorship, incremental participation in RBO processes. These processes are largely absent in the Orange-Senqu River basin, although an RBO strengthening process is underway to ascertain the best R&D strategy for the basin.81

4.9.5. TRUST AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

As previously noted, institutional or state-to-state trust is not a necessary factor for co-operation particularly that of a technical nature, but it does produce more effective co- operative management strategies. Once again, the distinction between individual trust and institutional trust is worthy of reiteration. RBO management is largely based on individual personalities and identities. Trust in this context is of paramount importance since good relations translate into more robust policies. Institutional trust, however, builds the credibility of the institution and how it is perceived as a functional institution which effectively carries out its mandate. The latter is equally important to facilitate normative convergence by persuading other institutions of the moral appropriateness of certain principles and/or ways of doing things. Indeed, ORASECOM has developed a great deal of credibility both regionally and internationally and acts as the multilateral model for RBO institutional development in the region. As such, it arguably sets the standard for best practice in the region in activities regarding multilateral institutions. Norms adopted or

created by ORASECOM therefore carry greater clout than those borne out of, or advocated by less respected institutions.

4.9.6. CONGRUENT NORM SETS

In line with the Finnemore-Sikkink logic (1998: 908) of adjacency claims or path dependence i.e. when the norm fits, or can be portrayed to fit, into existing normative frameworks (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 908), when a set of global principles are more congruent with the existing domestic normative structures, these norms have a greater probability of being accepted. Similarly, Checkel (1999) refers to this as “cultural match.” As the case of southern Africa shows, the domestic context is conducive to the socialisation of several of the global principles since versions of these principles (such as co-operative governance, communication and information exchange, and so forth) have become prioritised in post-colonial and post-apartheid ideals of democratic governance, stakeholder participation, and decentralisation. In essence, the domestic context allows for ‘normative fit’ with several global principles. Indeed, actors throughout the SADC region support those ideas that are morally appealing and that serve their political interests, without threatening pre-existing configurations of power, such as the notion of ‘peace parks’ (Swatuk, 2005a).

4.9.7. THE BENEFIT-SHARING PARADIGM

While benefit-sharing as an ideal to effective water governance at the transboundary level is often cited, little is discernable beyond the catch-phrase level (Phillips, et al., 2006: 29). Sadoff and Grey (2002) provide the simplest and most useful general framework to date regarding benefit-sharing, arguing that benefits from co- operation over a shared river basin may be divided into four categories: environmental, economic, political and catalytic. Using this as their point of departure, they argue that conflict/co-operation between states is largely determined by incentives for co-riparians to co-operate. Other scholars have expanded on this notion, noting that one option for sharing the resources in a basin could be to identify development strategies that can thrive under the equitable division of water and other resources (Savenije and van der Zaag, 2000).

Sadoff and Grey (2002; 2005) also explain that states will always have a “national agenda” for a river that they share, and that they will co-operate if it serves that national agenda. But central to their argument is the potential to move from national agendas that are unilateral, to national agendas that incorporate significant co-operation, and to converge upon a shared co-operative agenda. The extent to which this is possible will be determined by each party’s perception of the benefits it can secure from co-operation. Convergence towards this co-operative agenda will be facilitated by the following:

• The perception of the range and extent of the potential benefits needs to be expanded, from the tangible to the less obvious – also going beyond the river and mere water-sharing solutions (Sadoff and Grey, 2005: 2).

• The distribution of benefits and benefit-sharing opportunities to redistribute the costs and benefits of co-operation need to be explored and agreed upon to enable the definition of co-operation that will be perceived as fair by all parties (ibid.)

• Alternative modes of co-operation as well as appropriate types of co-operation need to be identified to secure the greatest net benefits (ibid.)

A collaborative team of researchers from the CSIR, SIWI and PRA have however, produced a practical methodology as to how benefit-sharing can be achieved, called the Transboundary Waters Opportunity (TWO) Analysis (Phillips, et al., 2008). The conceptual framework of the TWO Analysis comprises of a matrix with four key development opportunities (hydropower production and power trading, primary production, urban and industrial development, and environment and ecosystem services), and two main categories of sources of water to realise those opportunities (New Water, defined as the potential for new water to be developed through water demand management strategies, or supply-driven infrastructure; and the efficient use and management of water i.e. institutional strengthening, joint management regimes etc). Through a participatory process, development preferences are discussed, negotiated and/or agreed upon, by stakeholders. Benefit-sharing can therefore be classified as the incremental and iterative process whereby states develop a similar development strategy regarding shared water resources. Indeed, benefit-sharing norms become more influential within this framework as they have a “normative fit” with notions of regional integration and thus fit into the existing normative structure.