Marco Contextual

Given the worsening conditions in the region caused by the different factors mentioned in the previous chapter, particularly those linked to the political competitions between the political parties, the rebel movements in the region have clearly emerged. Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013), the private peace consultant of president al-Bashir and responsible for the Darfur file and the former head of the governmental negotiation team from 2008–2010, emphasises that there is no doubt that the high degree of awareness that occurred amongst the youth of Darfur – because of higher education, which has not been matched by the equivalent availability in jobs – has created a layer of educated and aggrieved Darfurians who aspire to certain rights. This brought about a suitable environment for the insurgency and revolution.

The main theme that has prevailed among these elites in Darfur is that the dominance of small groups from northern Sudan, who have ruled Sudan since independence in 1956, was the primary reason for the deteriorating situation in the region and the current crisis (El-Tom 2011, p. 231). They were dissatisfied with this dominance

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especially with the absence of development in their region (Salih 2005, p. 7). The political competition between the two largest sectarian and traditional political parties in the late 1980s – The Umma Party (UP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – dominates the political scene and the executive branch. The focus on achieving their partisan interests to the neglect of the development of the region has led to their failure to rule the country democratically and equally. The UP and the DUP are accused of caring less about the marginalised tribes in provinces such as Darfur than focusing on winning votes in Darfur (El-Affendi 2009, p. 56).

These reasons and others that led to the eruption of the rebellion in Darfur were discussed previously in Chapter three. The beginning of the military rebellion in Darfur 2003 was initiated by both the Darfur Liberation Movement (DLM) (changed later to Sudan Liberation Movement) and the JEM from the Jebel Marra (the highest plateau in Sudan). The rebels took the mountain as a base from which to launch their armed attacks on government forces and carried out attacks on police forces, positions, vehicles, and government institutions. Despite the multiple opposition movements and the tangle of internal parties in the conflict in Darfur, two categories of domestic parties, which are directly responsible for the aggravation of internal armed conflict and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur, are identifiable. These are the GoS on one side and the rebel movements on the other. There are three key activist insurgencies in the territory. These are the SLM, led by Abdul Wahid Nour, the SLM/A (the armed wing of the SLM), led by Minni Arco Minnawi, and the JEM, led by Jibril Ibrahim, who assumed the leadership of the movement after the death of its leader and founder, his brother Khalil Ibrahim (Minnawi 10/11/2012).

 The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

This movement emerged in July 2002 in the area of Golo in Jebel Marra after a series of sporadic military operations carried out against the Sudanese army under the name of "the Darfur Liberation Army". It officially declared itself in February 2003 under the name of "the Sudan Liberation Movement” (Salem 2004). Different sources suggest that the adoption of the new name was on the recommendation of John

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Garang, leader of the SPLM in the south, and suggests the shared relationship and nationalist visions that combine the two movements (de Waal 2005a). This movement is formed of individuals belonging to three major non-Arab tribes, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, in addition to some groups that belong to other tribes. In March 2003 the general conference of the SLM was held in the Jebel Marra area to form an agreement regarding the distribution of leadership positions within the movement. Under this agreement the post of head of the movement and political leadership was given to the Fur tribe, led by lawyer Abdul Wahid Nour. The military leadership was given to the Zaghawa tribe, led by Abdullah Abkar and then by Mini Arco Minnawi after the former's death in 2004. While the position of vice president was given to the Masalit tribe, represented by Mansour Arbab, he was later replaced by Khamis Abdullah. Most of the movement’s leaders were military officers in the Chadian and Sudanese armies (Ahmed 2007).

The formation of the armed movement was a result of the policies of marginalisation and racial discrimination, exploitation and division, which have been practised by the successive Sudanese governments, both civil and military, towards the region. The SLM believes that governments have strengthened tribal ethnic factors when they recruited some Arab tribes to fight non-Arab tribes. This was worsened further, sometimes to the extent of ethnic cleansing, in some areas of Darfur in what was once a safe and stable region – according to the allegations of the leaders of the movement who emphasise that these policies culminated in the arrival of the Inqad government to power in 1989 (Minnawi 10/11/2012).

The movement’s main demands are the prevention of the nomadic militias from carrying out armed attacks against settled tribes. The GoS's refusal to implement this requirement has led the movement towards armed action and raising the ceiling of its demands (Willemse 2005). Further calls for the removal of marginalisation of the region and its development, equitable political representation in the central government, and abolition of the division of Darfur into three states in favour of one province, have become the key demands of the movement. The SLM is regarded as one of the most active movements in Darfur, especially at the military level (Minnawi 10/11/2012). Most of the military actions which have been committed against the government army in Darfur are ascribed to the SLM, because of the power and effectiveness of its military wing (Brooks 2008). This efficiency was not

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equalled by the same level of political effectiveness, which was the main factor that led to the movement’s later split into two factions (Minnawi 10/11/2012). The aim was to disavow any intention to separate Darfur from Sudan and, secondly, an assurance that the embryonic SLM would declare itself a political movement and not an anti-Arab militia (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 82)

Flint and de Waal (2008, p. 86) have demonstrated that significant disputes between Abdul Wahid Nour and Minnawi appeared when the government surrounded Abdul Wahid’s forces in the south of Jebel Marra early in 2004. Minnawi refused to send reinforcements to aid the Fur leader who had to resort to the SPLA, which airlifted them to Nairobi. This event negatively affected trust and caused deterioration in relations between the two leaders and their tribes, leading to fierce fighting between the former allies, as happened on 15 January 2009. A general congress of the movement, held 29–31 October 2005, resulted in the split into two factions: the political led by Abdul Wahid Nour (Flint and de Waal 2008), and the military led by Minnawi (Ahmed 2007, p. 18). On 5 May 2006 the SLA signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with the GoS in Abuja. Whereby, Minnawi became the senior aide to the Sudanese president as well as president of the transitional authority for Darfur (Jooma 2011, p. 1). While Abdul Wahid Nour refused to sign (Flint 2006). This refusal was also a result of the same differences in perspectives among the leaders during the negotiations (discussed in more detail below).