MARCO CONTEXTUAL

Thus far in this chapter, I hope to have dispelled some of the misconceptions about perfectionism. It does not have the objectionable air that it at first might seem to have. Of course, perfectionism might be committed to elitism and/or the use of coercion. But, it need not be committed to either of them. What is common to all perfectionist positions is precisely Wall’s four conditions. That is, if we can identify which goods are sound, and if the state can act so to promote them, then we should allow political action which seeks to promote these goods.

In this section I will attempt to label six of the most prominent perfectionists in the literature as mixed or pure perfectionists. I will discuss the theories of

30 _{I am using the term “belief system” following Bernard Williams (1981) and (1985). Note that}

the most plausible form of perfectionism (assuming it is pluralist) might include goods of both kinds. That is, it might seek to promote some goods that are ahistorical, and others that are only of value to the community in question.

Thomas Hurka, Joseph Raz, Joseph Chan, George Sher, Steven Wall and Vinit Haksar. This task is easier for some than it is for others. Four of these philosophers are fairly explicit about which category their view should fall under. The other two will require a bit more in the way of guess-‐‐work, meaning that I will only cautiously offer a way of understanding their theories, rather than place them in one camp rather than the other.

Thomas Hurka is perhaps the paradigm example of a pure perfectionist. Hurka is primarily concerned with perfectionism as a general moral theory, rather than specifically as a political theory, leading him to justify political principles insofar as they promote the perfection of moral agents. Thus, he argues, “The best political act, institution, or government is that which most promotes the perfection of all humans.”32 _{Hurka believes that the fundamental liberal values, such as liberty,} autonomy and equality are best justified by an appeal to the good. Joseph Raz is also a pure perfectionist. He believes “it is the goal of all political action to enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good, and to discourage evil or empty ones.”33 _{Like Hurka, Raz believes that liberalism is best justified by an appeal} to human flourishing. For example, he believes that a perfectionist reading of Mill’s harm principle is more plausible than an anti-perfectionist one.34

Joseph Chan explicitly subscribes to mixed perfectionism. He champions what he calls moderate perfectionism. According to Chan, moderate perfectionism -‐‐ which “allow[s] the pursuit of the good life to be tempered by other values”35 _{-‐‐ is} “much more sensible and acceptable” than a stronger pure perfectionism.36 George Sher is similarly clear in his mixed perfectionist leanings. He accepts that perfectionist values are not “the only proper grounds for political decisions [and] nor…should [they] dominate all others.” 37 _{Nevertheless, non-perfectionist} reasons do not exhaust the legitimate reasons for state action: “when a

32 _{Hurka (1993: 147)}

33 _{Raz (1986: 133). Emphasis added.} 34 _{ibid. pp. 412-‐‐420.}

35 _{Chan (2000: 15)} 36 _{ibid. p. 17.}

government can elevate its citizens’ tastes, characters, aspirations, and modes of interaction, these too fall within its legitimate aims.”38

Steven Wall and Vinit Haksar are a little tougher to pigeonhole. I tentatively suggest that both should be understood as mixed perfectionists. Steven Wall calls perfectionism a “results‐priority view.” 39 _{That is, perfectionism argues that} political institutions should be judged in part as instruments for serving the goals of substantive political morality. He contrasts results‐prioritarian views with what he calls “process‐centred views.”40 _{Such views judge state action by} asking which procedures are fair, or which institutions treat people with equal respect, and so on.41 _{In discussing the relation between the two, Wall argues:}

The results-priority view does not imply that process-oriented considerations could not have intrinsic value. If one rejects the process‐ centred view, then one must accept that political procedures are to be judged in part by the substantive results they are likely to yield; but it does not follow that one must discount process-oriented considerations altogether. If this is right, one can accept both the results-priority view and the view that [for example] democracy has intrinsic, as well as instrumental, value.42

Thus, by allowing that “process‐oriented considerations” can have intrinsic value, and can be weighed against the substantive results they are likely to yield, I suggest that Wall should be understood as subscribing to mixed perfectionism. Vinit Haksar, who was writing over two decades before Chan drew the distinction between mixed and pure perfectionism, is the least explicit on this issue. I think that he is best read as arguing that perfectionism should be a supplement to liberal egalitarianism. That is, I believe that Haksar is arguing that

38 _ibid.

39 _{Wall (1998: 22)} 40 _ibid.

41 _ibid.

liberalism is a theory that has to appeal to perfectionist reasoning in some spheres, for example when ranking liberties. However, I also believe that he holds that other spheres do not require such an appeal to the human good. Thus, I think that he is best understood as being a mixed perfectionist. But, as I suggested earlier, this is only a tentative claim, based on my best understanding of Haksar’s work. It could well be that he would take issue with such a label. Thus, we can neatly set out the respective positions of the philosophers discussed in Fig. 1.1.

Fig. 1.1.