6 . Estructura del manual
8. Marco Legal
solutions for the housing needs of less privileged groups.
Thus, the law instructed the improvement of building conditions in gecekondu neighbourhoods, the heightening of urban density on the periphery and the formation of ‘gecekondu prevention areas’ to achieve planned urban growth.12 The law was also followed by a number of ‘land development and reconstruction plans’ starting from 1986, which ordered the physical and large‐scale upgrading of ‘first generation’
gecekondus.13 In no time, “squatter settlements which started out as one, or two room shacks in small gardens built with mixed construction materials” developed into
“several‐storied cement blocks” (Buğra, 1998) and such gecekondu neighbourhoods as Kağıthane, Ümraniye and Sultanbeyli experienced a sizeable growth (Erder, 1996);
Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001). It is within the context of these developments that a particular form of power hierarchy also formed within these neighbourhoods: As formal ‘ownership’ came to be defined by the provision of title deeds and as extra storeys were constructed, ‘tenancy rates’ climbed within these previously illegal areas (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001). This post‐gecekondu phase, as it is often referred to in the literature, represents the ultimate commercialization of gecekondus which have produced a new cluster of more fortunate and less privileged groups within these areas (Esen, 2005).
3.1.1.4. Emergence of Middle to Upper Middle Class Housing
What is of critical importance is that new steps taken in the legal and administrative reorganization of urban planning, governance and land markets during the 1980s all developed within a culture of ‘urban populism’, a novel condition brought about by
12 Gecekondu prevention areas were designated by the Metropolitan Municipality for redevelopment and upgrading plans for the provision of social housing for low‐income groups. According to regulations, “land within municipal boundaries and in designated adjacent areas which belonged to the treasury, provincial administrations and annex budgeted state organizations, or lands under state control and use would be allocated with no cost to the municipalities” (Tekeli, 1994: 181) for the given purposes.
13 First generation, or traditional gecekondus as they first emerged within the 1940s were shack‐like buildings limited to a single storey.
MP (Keyder and Öncü, 1993). Treatment of ‘urban land market as a major distributive‐redistributive arena’ had already been pursued as a populist strategy during the national developmentalist era, when investments on urban land had almost become the sole channel of capital accumulation, as mentioned earlier. Urban land, as a state resource, was distributed among urban crowds through the relaxation of regulations and non‐application of rules both in an effort to secure votes and prevent social and economic unrest at a time of limited financial resources and savings channels (Öncü, 1988; Ayata, 1994).
What made the ‘urban populism’ of MP distinct, though, was its focus on a “free market model, free of government tutelage, and likely to reward initiative and luck” especially within the context of metropolitan centres (Keyder and Öncü, 1993: 398‐399). That is, the liberal shift in the populist perspective did not only appeal to socio‐economically less privileged urban populations who wanted to achieve upward mobility in an increasingly competitive environment, but also to big capital groups who wanted to make use of the opportunities presented by new politico‐economic constellations and their regulatory mechanisms. Thus, the populist approach of MP also led to various forms of corruption and the institution of what Buğra (1998) calls the ‘immoral’
aspect of urban governance in the post‐1980s.
Buğra particularly makes reference to the workings of middle to upper middle class housing markets in explaining this ‘immorality’ and calls the Amnesty Law of 1984 mentioned in the previous section, and its effects on upper‐middle class housing production to attention. As mentioned earlier, the Amnesty Law of 1984, and ‘the land development and reconstruction plans’ which followed, had made the legalization and then commercialization of informal housing units possible. Commercialization had not only become evident in the physical improvement of buildings, or the maximization of tenancy rates in formerly owner‐resident inhabited structures, but also in the climbing real estate value of peripheral urban land upon which construction could take place.
The integration of the periphery into a dynamic sector as such soon overlapped with
the rising demand of middle and upper‐middle urban classes to move away from the city centre and triggered the interest of large construction firms, willing to respond to this emergent demand. With the contribution of newly available MHA funds as well, the formerly squatted periphery of Istanbul came to be dotted with upper‐middle class residential compounds. Moreover, ‘the land development and reconstruction plans’, originally devised to prevent the further construction of illegal units and the improvement of already existing ones, functioned in a way to grant building permits to large development companies to expand towards forest land, water reservoirs and other special zones which should had otherwise been protected by master plans. In other words,
Both the commercialization of gecekondu and the emergence of competing claims on peripheral land appear to be outcome of squatter regularization processes whereby the privileges accorded to the underprivileged (…) have been subverted and used to sustain diverse forms of illicit income generation (Buğra, 1998: 312).
This ‘immorality’, however, cannot only be understood in the mere presence of the Amnesty Law of 1984 and the enactments that followed it. It was the combined influence of all the recently released laws which widened the scope of rent seeking activity, and the powers granted to local governments which led not only to the misuse of new directives, but also to the violation of existing planning schemes and conservation rules. Many residential compounds, which came to represent the gated communities of Istanbul, were built in this period with the extension of ‘land development and reconstruction plans’ to natural reserve zones, and the violation of the Bosphorus Law.14 Entry of large construction companies into the protected site had become possible with the changes that Mayor Dalan brought to the Building Development Law. Although the changes were taken to the court by the opposition party of the time, SHP, and although these changes were abolished by court decision, deliberate delays in putting the court decision into process had resulted in the provision of hundreds of building permissions to various companies for the construction of luxury villas during the time of delay.15 Moreover, the majority of the
14 The law had come into effect during the military rule of 1980 in order to protect the Bosphorus, which was declared a conservation zone in 1974.
15 Between the years 1984‐1994, 3000 villas were built illegally around the Bosphorus although this
companies that acquired building permissions had organic relations with MP.
A series of incidents which involved allowing capital groups with strong links to MP to realize upscale projects in areas either with no development plans, or under protection, rendered the period between the 1984‐1994 as one of the most ‘corrupt’
and ‘scandalous’ within the history of Turkish urbanization (Ekinci, 1994). It is thus no coincidence that the very first reactions from such civil groups as the Chamber of Architects and the Chamber of Planners started to be voiced in this period.
3.1.2. Istanbul in the 1990s: Landscape of the First Round of Urban Globalization