MARCO LEGAL.

What Turner and Bakhtin seem to have in mind when they speak of “structure” is primarily the structure of hierarchy. And the festive rituals that they describe were not themselves free from possessing some structural fea- tures: they were more or less routinized collective practices performed by specifi c actors in fairly specifi c times, places, and formats, which diff ered from everyday, free- form, ad hoc, spontaneous, unpredictable, individualis- tic, or collective fun. In these latter forms, fun has the potential to defy not only hierarchy and diff erentiation but any kind of structure. Thus, it is partially this antistructure disposition of spontaneous, free- form, and public fun that seems to cause anxiety and antagonism among political- moral authorities. For it disturbs the sense and security of order, stability, and tranquility that charac- terize the conservative image of a sensible world.

It would be a mistake, however, to reduce the threat of fun to merely its potentially antistructure disposition. Nor should an understanding of the subversive element in fun be limited to considering the rowdy, unruly, and undisciplined crowd action in pursuit of simple pleasures— those that feature the carnival festivities of early modernity.87 _{The fact is that even the private,} harmless, and commoditized expressions of plea sure are also strictly regu- lated and inhibited. What possible injury is done to the ideological state by the innocent act of fl ying kites, by the joyous movement of the body in a private wedding festivity, or by the exchange of harmless smiles between timid teen- agers in the tense moments of backstreet love? Why should a mighty state be apprehensive of colorful outfi ts, the showing of a few inches of hair, the in- tense plea sure of joking and play among intimate friends, or the expression of impulsive jubilance for the victory of one’s national soccer team? My argu- ment is that beyond its physicality, fun also presupposes a powerful paradigm, a set of presumptions about self, society, and life that might compete with and undermine the legitimizing ideology of doctrinal power when these ideolo- gies happen to be too narrow, rigid, and exclusive to accommodate ethics of fun. It is particularly this aspect of fun that causes fury among the Islamist moral- political authority.

Anti- fun ethics, whether religious or secular, modern or premodern, bour- geois or communist— and espoused by individuals, movements, or states— are not merely doctrinal concerns; they are primarily historical- political mat- ters. More immediately, they represent and embody a par tic u lar technique of power, a discursive shield that both legitimizes and insulates moral or po liti- cal authority by binding it to “what is not to be questioned,” to the sacrosanct,

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the untouchables— God, the Revolution, the Re sis tance, the Proletariat, the Nation. Fear of fun, consequently, is not necessarily about diversion from the higher powers or noble values as such, but about the fear of exit from the para- digm that frames and upholds the mastery of certain types of moral and po- liti cal authorities, be they individuals, po liti cal movements, or states.

Any type of authority, including Weber’s famous ideal types, may be real- ized only within its own discursive paradigm— a body of consistent concepts, meanings, and understandings. Billy Graham may hold authority only among a segment of American Christians to whom his message makes sense. For the rest of Americans, or Egyptian Muslims for that matter, he holds little power. Graham’s authority not only derives from what and how he preaches but also is realized specifi cally within the paradigm or discursive frame that allows him to operate and communicate with his audience. This is the “paradigm power.” It refers to the discursive space that enables those in charge within a par tic u- lar paradigm to maintain their position by making them meaningful and acceptable to their subjects. Thus, any challenge from without or departure from within this discursive space amounts to a challenge to those in author- ity. Because when subjects exit from the shared paradigm, by way of adhering to a diff erent value system and way of life, they eff ectively leave the masters’ fi eld of infl uence and in eff ect render them powerless. Note how an Ira ni an hard- line weekly expresses this apprehension of exit: “When the chants of Allah- Akbar [God is Great] are replaced by whistling and clapping hands, prayers will come to an end, God will be overlooked, and the doors of lustful- ness will be wide open. In such conditions, you cannot hear the voice of God; you will commit anything in this state of unconsciousness. Even Imam Kho- meini’s cries will fall on deaf ears.”88 _{This anxiety is basically about how the} rival paradigm (fun) may come in between the moral authority and its follow- ers to divert the latter’s devotion to the former. A powerful conservative aya- tollah in Iran declares fi lms, arts, and cultural centers “as the most dangerous thing[s] that threaten humanity,” because he fears that they would push mosques, churches, prayers, supplication, and ultimately devotion to God to the side- lines.89 _{His feeling of threat lies not simply in people forgetting God (aft er all,} people themselves are assumed to be responsible before God), but in under- mining the “divine- driven” (khoda- mehvar) doctrinal paradigm that ensures his moral mastery. In a diff erent, secular setting in July 2005, armed militants from the al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigades disrupted a music concert in the Palestin- ian town of Nablus, because, they argued, the joy of love songs would divert

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