MARCO TEÓRICO

On the basis of the brief case studies presented above, it is difficult to infer any strict model of relationships between the media and the political sphere in Central Eastern Europe. Countries have different transition trajectories, different cultures and institutional set up. One conclusion could be that there is no longer Central Eastern Europe as a political phenomenon. Yet, it might be too premature to bury a concept, which has proved useful over the last two decades, since there are many similarities in the discussed countries. It is true that some of them are probably more advanced (Estonia, for instance) in terms of resembling more Western European models. Yet, one feature in common is the fragility of the institutional set up, and the possibility of re-emergence of problems, as demonstrated by the developments in Hungary (a country not covered by our study) after the electoral victory of Fidesz in 2010. There, a strong majoritarian government started to resort to methods of direct partisan control over the media, methods which were more typical of the 1990s, as our case studies have demonstrated.

With this important caveat, we can proceed with the formulation of a typical Central European model of relationships between the politics and the media. The following formula could be useful in this regard:

EE Media-Politics Model = PSB (relatively independent) + messy private sector (from oligopoly through problematic concentration to fragmentation) + laissez faire regulatory approach + important privileges for the media (taxes, advertising limits for PSB, direct or indirect public subsidies)

As the case studies have demonstrated, the countries in the region put significant resources in their public service broadcasters. In some of the countries these broadcasters still play an important role and have a significant (although diminishing) share of the market (Bulgaria, Slovakia). In some countries the public television has been marginalised in terms of influence (Romania), although even there the public radio is still dominant in its segment of the market.

In terms of levels of independence, the public broadcasters differ. In Romania, their heads are still appointed in a rather partisan fashion, and the state interference is much more visible. In the other countries, the influences are subtle, but continuing controversies and scandals indicate that there is no perfect model of insulation of the

public sector from political influences. In general, however, Eastern Europe has opted for a regulatory model concerning the electronic media with significant political input.

Despite the fact that there are various degrees of partisan behavior (the strongest seems to be in Romania, and the weakest in Estonia), independent bodies with a strong political input do play a significant regulatory role.

The private sector is the dominant player in all of the countries by now: while the public broadcasters enjoyed a monopoly in the beginning of the transition, now we have complex media markets with powerful private players in them. Yet, one common feature of these markets is that they are small, and they cannot by themselves ensure pluralism through vigorous competition. The problems to which small markets lead are of two types. Either there are cartels or oligopolies that are very hard to displace (Estonia, Croatia), or there is inefficient pluralism in which numerous media are competing for small resources (Bulgaria). Both circumstances are not conducive to media independence and quality journalism. In both scenarios, the media become speakers of corporate interests. In the second scenario, the main business of the media is actually not journalism, since they cannot survive only on sales of their product (newspapers, television programmes, etc.) Thus, many media outlets actually become the PR departments of specific economic groups.

Because of this shape of the private sector, it could hardly survive without significant direct or indirect state aid. State help may take the following forms:

toleration of oligopolies (Estonia is the typical case, but everywhere the state has a laissez faire approach to regulating competition), tax privileges for the media (Croatia), significant public subsidies for the political parties, which go mainly for paid access to the media (Bulgaria, but generally the other countries as well), significant advertisement by the state enterprises in (specific) media (a problem reported in all countries, except Estonia). Thus, despite the mostly laissez faire approach to the regulation of the media in the region, the state by no means has been marginalised in terms of influence. On the contrary, the leverage is there, but it is exercised through more subtle means, which are often not captured by traditional notions of media regulations, but concern competition issues, and even such remote questions as the financing of the political parties.

Now, if we come back to the suggested model, one thing that is striking is that it is hardly distinctive only for Central Eastern Europe. After all, everywhere in Europe there are relatively important public service broadcasters, everywhere the private sector is dominant, and also indirect forms of state aid do persist, despite different waves of liberalisation of regulation inspired by the laissez faire model.

These similarities with the West could be read in two ways. One is that Eastern European countries are ‘normalizing’ and that gradually they become very similar to the western part of the continent. Still, differences remain and they could be searched for in two directions. First, in contrast to Western Europe, volatility in the media markets in the region is considerable. There are new players constantly emerging. From this perspective Estonia is probably an exception with the oligopoly situation in the country. Croatia is also following the steps of Estonia, which indicates that stability is achieved only in situations where foreign capital has largely shaped the media environment. With the economic crisis hitting hard, significant foreign investors in the sector left the region, however (as the WAZ group in Bulgaria and Romania). The withdrawal of foreign capital leads to intensification of domestic

competition – in the case of Bulgaria in fact a media war broke out among the two most powerful media groups in the country (in 2011-2012).

Secondly, the party systems of Eastern European countries are much more volatile than the ones in the western part of the continent. Because of that, agreements between political players are never really final, since new players come along and challenge them in due course. All this creates a situation of fragility of institutions and vulnerability of the legal framework.

From this point of view, what is distinctive of Eastern Europe is that the processes of ‘cartelisation’ (in the meaning of Katz and Mair, 1995) in the party system and the media sector in Eastern Europe have not been completed. Again, Estonia may be a partial exception among the studied countries: in all others political and media volatility is still very significant.

There is a second interpretation of the Eastern European data as well, however.

This second perspective questions the ‘normality’ of cartelisation both in the media and in the political sphere. From this perspective, Eastern Europe may appear as the more experimental and more sensitive to the problems of entrenchment of interests region, which highlights some of the flaws in the European model more generally.

After all, oligopolistic private sectors, coupled with cartelised parties, cannot seriously be taken as ideal from the point of view of normative democratic theory.

From this perspective, Estonia – the best performer in the region – may appear to be the most problematic as well.

Our case studies are not a sufficient basis for settling the dispute between the two competing hypotheses presented above. Yet, they provide the necessary data for probing deeper into the relationships between the media and the political sphere. In the first part of our analysis we have essentially argued that direct forms of political interference with the media have generally subsided in Eastern Europe. Now, much of the action takes place in the private media sector, and the role of politics is mostly visible in the details of its regulation. To this problem we now turn in the next section.

Part II: The private sector as the centre of most of the action 3. The private sector: The clay-footed giant

When discussing the media landscapes in the ex-communist-turned–EU-member countries, one cannot avoid analysing the huge challenges the public broadcast media (PBM) - the only media they had under communism - had to face. First, they had to turn from state to public institutions, a move hindered by both lack of know-how, internal inertia and external (mostly political) pressures not to do it. Moreover, the PBM had to reinvent themselves on a competitive market, shifting from a rock-solid monopoly to a quicksand-like market shared with ever more numerous (or potent) private media. Last but not least, the reforming process overlapped partially with the disruptive innovation brought about by the new technologies that changed the whole media market and even the way information gathering and processing (formerly known as ‘journalism’) has changed.

All these factors contributed at giving the private media the upper hand on policy formulation – either directly or via political connections. Therefore, it is worthy to engage in a cross-country analysis of how the private media markets have been shaped up and functioned in the five countries targeted by our study (Bulgaria,

Croatia, Estonia, Romania and Slovakia). In particular, we will focus on the private media influence over policy-making, their ownership problems and the way their content is monetised.