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All the Italian trade unions present in GDF Suez had given the mandate to negotiate to Stefano Bassi. Therefore, Bassi was representing all the workers present in the GDF Suez in Italy (Breda 2014: Interview). In reality, FIOM was the more active federation in following the process and the other federations were not really concerned about the negotiation. Therefore, they left quite a space of maneuver to FIOM and Bassi and they limited their involvement in adhering to the main, formal, decisions (Bassi 2014: Interview).

Nevertheless, during the negotiation, the Italian federations were constantly updated by Bassi. They often shared comments about the proposed texts, they met once in order to discuss the text and they sent a letter to the management saying that they would have not signed the agreement (Breda 2014: Interview; Bassi 2014: Interview). Ultimately, all the trade unions agreed that it could not be implemented in Italy (Breda 2014: Interview). The other EWC members were aware that the italian trade unions did not sign because of the content of the agreement which did not improve the condition of the workers in Italy (Textoris 2014: Interview).

The reasons for rejecting the agreement were mainly three. First, the Italian trade unions unanimously disagreed on the content of the agreement, since it undermined the rights recognised by the Italian law on health and safety, in as much as it was giving some responsibilities to the workers in case of injury at work or absence of safe conditions (Bassi 2014: Interview).

Second, the method was considered wrong because a significant European Trade Union Federation was missing (Bassi 2014: Interview; Petrucci 2014: Interview). Indeed, according to Petrucci the absence of the EMF has been crucial for the Italians to oppose the agreement. The trade unionist wrote: “We don’t negotiate without the European Trade Union representing us and which is bound to negotiate accordingly with the rules contained in the statute. Further, also the content of the final text would have been different since the ETUF is constantly sharing and discussing the versions with the affiliates” (Petrucci 2014: Interview, Translation by G.F.). This attitude is consistent with the Italian approach, indeed the Italians have been since the beginning positively strict about the correct application of the procedure (Samyn 2014: Interview).

Third, due to the fact that the trade unions did not have and active and meaningful role, the feeling of the Italian organizations was that what was going to be concluded was not a real agreement to be signed, but just a “company routine” (prassi aziendale) (Breda 2014: Interview).

Overall, the text was considered dangerous both practically and politically (Bassi 2014: Interview; Petrucci 2014: Interview).

On the 7th _{of April 2010, a joint letter was sent to the Human}

Resources Management of GDF Suez from the nine Italian trade unions involved in the company. Namely the federations of metalworkers, energy and “commerce” from the three confederations (FIM-CISL, FISASCAT-CISL, FLAEI-CISL, FIOM-CGIL, FILCAMS-CGIL, FILCTEM-CGIL, UILM-UIL- UILTUCS-UIL, UILCEM-UIL). In the letter it was acknowledged that the Italian companies belonging to the body seemed considering the

application of the Health and Safety agreement in their plants. The trade unions underlined that, since the representative for the Italian organizations had not signed the agreement, the text was not enforceable in Italy. Therefore, the confederations and the interested federations warned the Italian managers not to apply any term and condition not agreed with the Italian organizations involved. Instead, the national legislation and the collective agreement in place should be applied (Letter to the human resource manager of GDF Suez, 7th April 2010.).

The management replied with a letter of the 17th _{of May. In brief}

the management argued that, even if the agreement at stake cannot be qualified as a national collective agreement in compliance with the Italian law, it is anyway enforceable in all European branches of GDF Suez and in all the companies where GDF Suez has a dominant influence. This point was supported by a weak argument, based on the absence, in article 1.1 of the agreement (scope of application), of any reference to the fact that the agreement should be implemented only in those countries where the relative organizations have ratified it (Letter to FIM-CISL et al., 17th May 2010.). However, in practice, the company did not try to force the implementation of the agreement in the Italian plants (Breda 2014: Interview; Bassi 2014: Interview).

The FIOM representative commented on this letter in an e-mail addressed to EMF. She made clear that the agreement cannot, in any case, be implemented in Italy without an agreement with the national trade unions. Finally, the main concern is on a matter of principle: it cannot be accepted that an agreement not signed/agreed upon by the trade unions of a given state can be implemented within that state (E- mail to EMF, 18th May 2010).

On the very same day, the EMF reacted in support of the national trade unions facing pressure from the company. The EMF letter’s main point was that the GDF Suez agreement on Health and Safety “cannot be said to be valid European-wide as the EMF did not sign” it. As a consequence, it is in complete discretion of national unions whether to endorse the text in the national agreements or not (Letter to GDF Suez management, 18th May 2010). Few days later, EMCEF Secretary General made a similar statement, adding that the non application of the EMCEF Mandate Procedures was the reason why the European trade union did not sign the agreement (Letter to GDF Suez management, 26th May 2010). We should bear in mind that, at the same time, the three European federations were clarifying the procedure to be applied in future negotiations.

For what concerns FIOM, the Italian federation is against a negotiating role of the EWCs. According to S.P. “trade unions are not

enough represented in EWCs and there are no rules to guarantee representation, transparency, democracy and rights of the minorities. The negotiating role of the trade union cannot be replaced by a body not elected, under direct owner control” (Petrucci 2014: Interview, translation by G.F.), where the independency is not safeguarded. Moreover, the EWC is often influenced by the trade unions of the company’s hometown (Ibid). As a consequence, the Italian trade unions do not consider as EFAs those agreements not signed by the ETUFs and that do not follow a mandate procedure (Ibid).

Moreover, it is noted that the EWC representatives lack the necessary expertise to negotiate at a such high level. That’s why the national trade unions had to intervene through letters even if they did not participate in the negotiation directly (Breda 2014: Interview) and the support of European Federations, and their expertise, is necessary (Ibid; Textoris 2014: Interview). Last, Bassi underlines that the distance between the EWCs and the workers is really huge (Bassi 2014: Interview).

It is interesting that both Italian and French representatives agree on one point: the Health and Safety negotiation was crucial to understand how TCB should be carried out and that the involvement of EMF, together with a clear procedure, is necessary (Bassi 2014: Interview; Textoris 2014: Interview).

Indeed, even if the CGT signed the agreement, the French respondent talks about it as a “experimental negotiation” (Textoris 2014: Interview, Translation by G.F.), meaning that the negotiation on Health and Safety was useful to understand that the EWC needs a well framed procedure, well known by the EWC and by the Management, and the active involvement of a ETUF. This is especially important since in each country there are different negotiating rules, so when negotiating at European level “we need to agree on a frame”(Ibid).