Terrorist Attacks
In the last decade, terrorism has emerged as a very real risk, particularly in Southeast Asia. The effects of a terrorist attack in either the Malacca Strait or one of the major ports within the region, especially Singapore, would be catastrophic.15 If terrorists succeeded in sinking a large ship in the narrowest part of the Malacca Strait, then there would be the possibility of the Strait‟s temporary closure and shipping companies being forced to send their ships through another, more expensive, route.16 International shipping would also be operating under conditions of heightened fear and those nations heavily dependent on seaborne trade, such as New Zealand, may find their economic security at risk. An attack on a port such as Singapore using a ship carrying an explosive cargo, such as a Liquid Petroleum Gas carrier, would be even more dramatic. Such an act would potentially kill thousands of people and damage one of the world‟s busiest
15
Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, Safety and Security in the
Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for Action (Singapore: Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, 2006), p. 23.
16
J Ashley Roach, 'Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore',
Journal of International Affairs, 59, no. 1 (2005), p.97.
The risk of an attack was highlighted recently with the Singapore Shipping Association announcing it received a warning from the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre that a terrorist group is intending to attack oil tankers in the Malacca Strait. AFP,
Singapore Says Terror Attacks Planned on Oil Tankers [online]. Updated 2010,
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_singapore/view/1041481/1/.html> [accessed 5 March 2010].
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ports.17 Because of concern that the same methods may be used by terrorists to hijack a ship as would be used by pirates, there is a need for increased emphasis on dealing with piracy. In order to lessen the risk of maritime terrorism, New Zealand should promote international initiatives which seek to minimise the risk of an attack. New Zealand should encourage regional nations to participate in efforts such as the PSI and APEC STAR initiative, as well as complying with the ISPS code. Organisations such as the ARF and FPDA should also be encouraged to include a robust maritime terrorism aspect to their programs, whether it is through exercises or discussions. Finally, New Zealand should promote the regional adherence to the principles of the Container Security Initiative, even though it is not a member, and continue to adjust its own systems to align with this initiative. These measures will allow New Zealand to be involved in the strengthening of regional defences against the threat of maritime terrorism.
Piracy
Piracy is an issue which has in the past plagued Southeast Asia, and in particular Indonesia and Malaysia. 18 While piracy figures in the Malacca Straits have decreased since 200519, attacks in the Singapore Straits and the South China Sea have increased. 20 Some people have concerns that the global financial crisis will cause piracy to rise once again. If piracy were to increase again in Southeast Asia, then it would have the potential to impact on New Zealand‟s trade, much of which relies on safe passage
17
Joshua H. Ho, 'The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia', Asian Survey, 46, no. 4 (2006), p. 563.
18
Bradford, p. 474. 19
This decrease has largely been credited to efforts by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. These include the „eye in the sky‟ patrols, which conduct aerial surveillance over the strait. Aircraft only cross into each member nation‟s territory under strict controls, with members of all nations being present onboard the aircraft and taking responsibility for patrols within their territory. Sea patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have also been important although these are limited to coordinated efforts. Each nation shares information on patrols and attempts to hand-over pursuit of suspect vessels if they reach another countries territorial boundaries.
20
ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual
Report 1 January – 31 December 2009 (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau,
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through Southeast Asia and in particular the Malacca Strait. Another possible consequence of an increase in piracy is that if the littoral states appear to be unable to control the situation themselves, then outside states may intervene. Those states who rely heavily on the security of seaborne trade, and in particular its passage through Southeast Asian waters, may decide that the model established for intervention in Somalia could also work in Southeast Asia.21
This model would be considered by Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, as an extreme violation of their sovereignty, and would have the potential to cause tension, and maybe even conflict, between those nations and any nation seeking to use force within their territory. New Zealand should encourage the Southeast Asian nations to work hard to control piracy and assist them in any way it can. These nations have been open to assistance by foreign nations in the past, as long as it is on their terms and does not involve the use of force.22 Therefore, New Zealand, as a non- threatening nation, should play an active role in promoting cooperation and assistance to address the root causes, as well as the symptoms, of piracy. By enhancing the maritime security of Southeast Asian waters, New Zealand would also be helping secure safe passage for its trade and shipping, on which it heavily relies.
The Five Power Defence Arrangements
Given the resilience shown by the FPDA in the past, the signs are positive for it to continue to function as a valuable contribution to security in Southeast Asia. However, in order for it to do so, it must overcome several hurdles. The first challenge is due to the rising costs for all parties in participating in the FPDA exercises. This is particularly expensive for New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain, who have to send their forces a considerable distance in order to take part. Unless the FPDA exercises
21
Mark J. Valencia and Nazery Khalid, 'The Somalia Multilateral Anti-Piracy Approach: Caveats on Vigilantism' at Austral Policy Forum 09-4A (2009), p. 4.
22
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continue to remain relevant and valuable, the three external members may be forced to reconsider their level of participation.23
The second problem the FPDA faces is the high level of operational commitments that Australia and Great Britain are currently maintaining due to their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. With Australia and Great Britain committed elsewhere, Malaysia and Singapore may expect to take a greater role in the management of FPDA bodies such as the headquarters Integrated Area Defence System, and if this occurs Australia and Great Britain may be less interested in maintaining their commitment.24
A third difficulty that the FPDA faces is that, as Australia and Great Britain seek to remain interoperable with US forces, they may move away from capabilities which are relevant to the FPDA. Also, if they move at a pace in acquiring new technologies which the other partners are unable to maintain, interoperability within the FPDA may be significantly compromised.25
While these issues definitely present challenges which the FPDA member nations will need to overcome, the organization has proved resilient in the past and it has changed to become a relevant organisation which is directly addressing current security issues in the region. Considering the development seen in the FPDA since its creation in 1971, it would be unfortunate for it to fail to overcome these new challenges. New Zealand is a great supporter of the FPDA, and in order to ensure it continues and remains relevant, it should make every effort to overcome these challenges.
The ASEAN Regional Forum
New Zealand‟s membership of the ARF will enable it to contribute to discussions on regional responses and actions regarding issues such as maritime security. New Zealand is unlikely to be viewed suspiciously or 23 Thayer, p. 95. 24 Thayer, p. 95. 25 Thayer, p. 95.
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with hostility within the ARF, and thus it may be well placed to make suggestions and contributions in the area of maritime security. Maritime security in Southeast Asia has often been hampered by sovereignty concerns, especially when extra-regional powers attempt to make suggestions on how the Southeast Asian region should handle the issue. These suggestions are often seen as outside states attempting to infringe on the littoral states‟ sovereignty. Southeast Asia‟s acceptance of New Zealand as a significant participant in maritime security discussions can be seen by New Zealand‟s hosting of the 2nd
ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security on 29 and 30 March 2010.26 New Zealand is likely to continue to be active within this forum and can potentially play a significant role in enhancing maritime security in Southeast Asia through this involvement.