As noted earlier, the Treaty has become a major reference point in Maori-state relations. Many Maori have argued that full implementation of the Treaty, in particular Article Two of the Maori-Ianguage version which guarantees tino rangatiratanga, is the cornerstone of a Maori vision for Maori well-being and self determination (see Hancock 1999: 1 1 - 1 2) . The Treaty has also been increasingly conceptualised as an 'evolving constitutional document' that reflects the complexity
and multilayered character of tino rangatiratanga and supports recognition of a Maori
cultural-political community as one of two equal partners within the Aotearoa New Zealand state (see Durie 1994: 103; McHugh 1 999 :463).
The timeline demonstrated that Maori have long sought some kind of dual authority or nation-to-nation relationship with the state. Nevertheless, references to the term 'partnership' are relatively new in official discourse, stemming from a 1987 legal ruling that resulted from the Maori Council's challenge to the State Owned Enterprises Act. The Court of Appeal called for a balance between Treaty rights and obligations, with the 'Crown' on one side and 'Maori' on the other acting 'reasonably' and with 'good faith'. 'Partnership' has since become a word commonly used in the government sector and other documents relating to Maori (Kawharu 1 990:xii) . Thus, the understandings of partnership long held by Maori in relation to the Treaty have begun to be articulated within mainstream institutions (see Chapter Seven) .
Evidence from government, academia and newspaper reportage (see OMMA 1988a; Durie 1995a; James 2000a) suggests there is growing consensus, at least amongst many Maori scholars and leaders, that constitutional change is necessary for establishing such a partnership relationship between Maori and the state. There is less agreement as to which constitutional arrangements would most benefit Maori. In particular, discussion of what a specific constitutional document would look like and the place of the Treaty within it has sparked considerable debate. While a simple reference to the Treaty or even acknowledgment that 'the Treaty and the Constitution shall be supreme law' leaves open room for ambiguity in the future, greater expansion has been regarded as trying to rewrite the Treaty itself (see Havemann 1 999a; E. Durie 2000; Henare 2000) . It is this lack of consensus which resulted in the 1990 Bill of Rights being passed without entrenchment of the Treaty or the indigenous rights of Maori (Havemann 1 999a:52-54).
Maori have often had to spend more energy defending their interpretation of the Treaty as envisioning partnership than formulating concrete models upon which to base the co-partner relationship. However, as the 1 990s progressed, Maori scholarly
thinking began to place less emphasis on 'Is the constitution an issue of partnership?'
and more focus on 'What relationships can be established in a constitutional framework freed from its colonising strictures and assumptions?' (Jackson 2000: 199).
A 1995 constitutional hui, mentioned earlier, considered how partnership might be implemented, given Aotearoa New Zealand's rather weak constitutional arrangements. These constitutional structures suffer generally from the lack of an explicit, written document known and upheld as 'The Constitution' and, more specifically, an absence of constitutional guarantees for Milori (Wickliffe and Dickson
2000:48) . While a major policy 'blitzkrieg' presents greater difficulty than prior to the introduction of MMP in 1 996, Cabinet, as government's executive, still maintains considerable power in determining policy directions for Aotearoa New Zealand (see Bollard 1993: 1 9 ; Easton 1999: 1 9 ) . The models tabled at the hui and discussed below offer the means by which this concentration of power, which has often worked to the disadvantage of Milori, could be modified. They aim to ensure Milori hold a guaranteed position in governmental decision-making processes, while at the same time redesigning Aotearoa New Zealand's constitutional arrangements so that state legitimacy no longer relies on a defence of the nation-state.
Kilwanatanga, a model advocating a national Milori assembly, is the first of the three proposals presented at the 1 995 hui discussed here. This model is based on the assumption that Pakehil majority rule under the Westminster parliamentary system is an irreversible reality, but that a new constitutional arrangement is necessary to balance the concepts of kilwanatanga and tino rangatiratanga found in Article's One and Two of the Treaty of Waitangi. It has been proposed that this could be achieved through an elected, national Milori assembly, based on groupings of tribal districts, which could provide a united Milori voice direct to the state . The assembly would occupy a position similar to the current Milori Council (a government-funded, pan Milori body) , but be based on the authentic Milori political units of whanau, hapu and iwi and thus report to them rather than the Minister of Milori Affairs (Walker
1999: 1 18- 1 19). It would, however, be merely an appendage to the current mainstream
system.
The second model discussed at the constitutional hui, Tikanga Rua (literally, Two Customs) , is also based on a balancing of the principles of kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga, but through bicultural legislatures instead of a national Maori assembly. There is more than one version of the Tikanga Rua model (see Royal 1998:84; Vercoe 1998 : 1 1 5- 1 16), but the most common form is that articulated by Winiata (2000:205-206) . He has advocated a Maori assembly to produce legislation based on Maori tikanga and a Pakeha assembly to make law based on Pakeha tikanga. Legislation from the two houses would then go forward to an upper Treaty of Waitangi House, comprised of twenty-one Pakeha and eleven Maori, to assess laws from the lower houses for compatibility with the Treaty before giving approval for their enactment. This model makes major modifications to the current system so that Aotearoa New Zealand would be governed 'biculturally', with legislation produced under both Maori and Pakeha cultures. It highlights the obligations of both partners of the founding document, the Treaty of Waitangi (Royal 1 998:84; Walker 1999 : 1 19). The Anglican Church has provided a working example of this Tikanga model in practice since 1992 (see Te Paa 1995: 168- 169) .
The Mana Motuhake or Maori parliament model was the third proposed at the hui and has been articulated elsewhere. This entails a form of parallel government, as attempted by Klngitanga and Kotahitanga in the nineteenth century. It is possible that this might be a mobile Maori parliament, which sits a few times a year at different locations and is paid for by iwi and Maori, so as to avoid co-option by any one group (Vercoe 1 998: 1 00) . Maori could use this parallel parliament to negotiate self government through a political settlement with government.
Mead ( 1997: 1 50- 1 5 1) has suggested that the Mana Motuhake model be achieved through a number of progressive steps. First, Maori would need to be considered a 'nation within' the existing Parliament, with a particular number of guaranteed Maori seats based on the Maori population and a chief minister for Maori.
As a second step, Maori would gain limited autonomy at the local level, with rates and other local revenue being shared between iwi and Trust Boards given local government powers. Finally, a Ruling Council of the Maori Congress, made up of appointed elders and acting as a policy-making/deciding body, might eventually lead to a separate Maori parliament to make laws and decisions affecting Maori.
Proposals reflecting a form of binationalism, such as Mead's ( 1997), have demonstrated that the majority of proposals concerning constitutional reform have advocated progressive change rather than immediate revolution, although the constitutional changes described above are nonetheless revolutionary to many New Zealanders. Aside from the rhetoric of a few Maori 'radicals', it is clear that Maori
proposing constitutional reform have accepted the retention of the current single political state. Maori aspriations for self-governance have thus been consolidated at the
local, regional and national, rather than state, levels (M . Durie 2000:420-42 1 ) .