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Chapter 25. Is There a Principle That Mediates between the One and the Ineffable?

■ In this chapter, Damascius proceeds fi rst by demonstration, then by analogy, and fi nally by negation, to examine the possibility of the One’s functioning as an object of knowledge. In the conclusion to the chapter, he introduces the method of unitary knowledge, or as he also terms it, the concentration of all knowledge. At this point in the argument, Damascius does not fully explicate the theoretical concomitants of this method, though later, especially in chapters 105–108, he discusses the supermundane abyss, unifi ed substance, and the intellect in light of Iamblichus’ view, that at root, the identity of the Intellect is the One. ■

(I 62) Again, let us initiate our inquiry concerning the One from still another premise, and ask whether the One must be situated after that which is completely Ineffable or whether, as in the case of other intervals, something should be placed in between the Ineffable and the expressible. In a certain way, the Ineffable is negative—I say in a certain way not because it is at all positive, but because this name or reality is not denial or attribution but complete removal, though the removal does not mean that it is not something, since “not

something” is among things, nor is this removal itself anything at all. If we defi ne the term “Ineffable” so that it is not even a term, all that is prior to the One then has such a nature because we can have no conception concerning what is beyond the One. And yet if this is the fi rst thing that can be conceived in any way at all, why do we seek for

more things that are prior to the Ineffable, where there are neither this more nor the One? When dealing with the Ineffable, we must rid ourselves of our own hyperactive doubt and helplessness, and go back to our search for the One, to see whether it is capable of expression in language at all, or whether it must be sought as something in between the Ineffable and that which is capable of expression.

Much has been said above concerning the nature of the One, of necessity, owing to the principle that is even beyond this. For [only by] attaching to the One can we attempt to (I 63) speak concerning that to which attachment is not possible. But nevertheless it is time to develop our principal doctrine concern- ing the One. This, in fact, must be studied before all, namely, whether the One is in any way knowable or whether it is entirely unknowable.

[First argument for the knowability of the One:]: if we are able to dispose ourselves for the resolution of reality1 from the lowest levels back up to the simplest or to the most encompassing of all, [namely,] to that which it is only possible to conceive as the One, then it is entirely clear that we do know this about the One, and a fortiori, we know that a higher form of knowledge [than the knowledge belonging to us] attains to the One.

The second [positive argument for knowledge of the One]: if we conceptu- alize the One as a distinct reality and the many as distinct from and opposed to the One, we then have a conception of the One. For example, if the one we have in mind exists on the level of Form, can we then also conceive the uncircum- scribed One that is prior to the forms, as for example the all-One,2 which exists at the level of the absolutely simple.3 [Another argument for knowledge of the One: given that] each of the forms is also a one that is, though it is not the same to be one and to be a form, (just as Being and One are not the same) we can compress each of these, as we bring together the forms into one form that consists in the uncircumscribed essence of the intellect, just as [we compress] the real beings into the single undifferentiated unity of Being, and again [we compress] the ones into the single unity of the One. And just as you make one point by synthesizing [an] indefi nite [number of ] points, so by gathering the indefi nite [number] of ones together, you make the [One] that is the most comprehensive of all ones.4

Moreover, it is necessary that all that is available for our thought be either the many that do not participate in the One, in which case, the many will not cease from becoming indefi nitely plural, and consequently, it will not even be possible for us to conceive (I 64) them at all, or the many as participating in the One and thus the One also will become an object of knowledge simultaneously with the realization of the many, since it halts the dispersal of the many into infi nity, or else [it is necessary that] that be available as the sole One in a way that is as dis- tinct as possible from the thought of the many. And even if it is not easy to detach ourselves from the many entirely, we are brought closer to the One, and we nev- ertheless can succeed in purifying our own conception concerning it.

As for knowledge, either it comes about through [intellectual] intuition,5 or [progressively] by means of syllogism, which is a kind of weak vision and con- sists in a dim view from far away,6 and rests on the necessity of logic; or else [knowledge arises] in accordance with a spurious reasoning7 and does not even achieve contact from afar, but is simply a thinking about something on the basis of other thoughts, which is, for example, also the way we are accustomed to thinking about matter or depravation and non-being in general. So if this is a particular method of knowledge, perhaps we can know the One beyond all things in this way, as Plato informs us, as when he sometimes brings us near by analogy to that which transcends essence, and sometimes reveals that nature to us by means of negations, the nature that, in the end, he denies is, but is instead One, unique, without participation in Being.8 From this nature Being arises. And since name, defi nition, opinion and knowledge are [all relative to] Being, he removes these, too.9 If intellection is of the intelligible, and this is the real, intellection also must be removed because it is composite and cannot accord with the absolute.

(I 65) If there is a unitary knowledge, such as the gods have, a cognition that accords with the One and is beyond the Unifi ed, this knowledge will con- verge with the One in an intuition, whereas the duller sort of thought, such as our own thought, will attempt to grasp the One by means of a false conception. But if ever we too attain an intuition, it will be when, as Plato says, we lift the eye of our soul in its direction,10 and cast the very fl ower11 of the cognition that belongs to us and is uniform with the One. But that Plato posits the One as knowable, he clarifi ed by calling it the greatest study,12 and in the Sophist as well, by representing it as before Being, confi ning his demonstration to the sole conception of the One.13

Apart from these considerations, if there is a unitary cognition, as the ora- cles reveal,14 then just as the knowledge [whose object is the] many beings is divided [among these] can be compressed into a single conception of the One-Being, so also can we compress the knowledge that is parceled out among the many unifi ed beings that are available for knowledge. Clearly we correlate unitary knowledge and the unitary object of knowledge; for surely deity, insofar as it is participated, will not know other things, and yet be ignorant of itself, or know itself only in terms of Being, but not also in terms of the One, especially [when it knows] by means of that unifi ed intellection that the deity has in itself. (I 66) For, in fact, the intellect on which [individual intellects] depend has the same relationship [to others] as has that which is prior to intellect [with Intel- lect]. Therefore it knows itself, but it is the One, and hence it will know the One. And in general, just as the intellectual is twofold, so we affi rm that the intelligi- ble is twofold, with one aspect that is unifi ed, another that is unitary, one aspect that is beyond substance, and one aspect that shares substantial being. The intelligible is that which is knowable by means of intellection, and therefore the unitary is knowable, and therefore a certain one is knowable, and there are

therefore many unitary realities that can be known. And what I just now sketched, I will state: let the there be a concentration of these many distinct forms of knowledge into a single, complete knowledge that [apprehends] the complete One, which is the simple concentration of the many henads.15

And let us say further, that if a particular one is knowable, then the nature of the One is not such that it refuses all knowledge. As therefore absolute form is knowable, because this particular form is knowable as well, and absolute Being, because this particular being is knowable, so also the absolute One would be knowable, because this [one] is knowable. In fact, in each case if there is something that belongs to a class then it does so insofar as it is a member of that class, as for example, a certain form is such but only as Form, and a par- ticular being such, but only as Being, and a particular one is such, but only as One. If the compression [of knowledge] transcends us, because we have been dispersed in the war of the Titans,16 what wonder? For we do not even know the forms in the intellect, as Plato himself says in the Epistles,17 but nevertheless, we think that we are correct in ascertaining many things about (I 67) them, though our contact with them is not unmediated, but through, so to speak, transparent bodies, that is, forms that awaken themselves in us.18

Moreover, surely the knowable originates from the One, as the philoso- phers tell us (for all things come from the gods, they say), and as we shall demonstrate shortly, when we come to this topic.19 Consequently, the fi rst object of knowledge can be found among the gods, since the fi rst knower is found there too; where one member of relative term is, there too the other rela- tive belongs inherently. Thus if the fi rst object of knowledge is one, then the fi rst One must be an object of knowledge, since among the real beings, the fi rst object of knowledge is itself the fi rst intelligible reality.

The absolute One is, after all, the all-One. The all-One is not some one, but rather it is [the] One as all, as Linos and Pythagoras20 say, and hence it is also knowable. For the knowable is also one among all things, and therefore this, [the knowable] is anticipated in the One. It is from these and similar considerations that one might assume that the One before all things is itself knowable.21

Chapter 26. The One Cannot Be Known

■ In this chapter, Damascius disabuses the reader of the notion that any form of argu- ment, whether by analogy, negation, logic, or based on intellectual intuition, can dem- onstrate that the One is knowable. At the heart of the chapter lies a deeper argument, based on a discussion of Plato’s analogy of the sun and the form of the Good at Republic VI 508. For Damascius, the One cannot be known, since (if we are to take seriously Plato’s equation of the sun with the Good, which Damascius then transposes to the One) it is that by which all is known. In the fi nal section of the chapter, Damascius tries

to show that the henads (or primary triad variously conceived as the Unifi ed, as Being, as the all-One) are actually the objects of an argument or method of knowledge based on the simplifi cation or concentration of intellect, rather than the One itself. ■

(I 68) Then again, someone might call the doctrine [of the One’s knowability] into question after examining the preceding arguments, of which [we shall treat] fi rst the last mentioned: if the One is all things, why would it be knowable rather than unknowable? In fact, there the unknowable is fi rst. Even this, the unknowable, is a certain one among the things that come after the One, since it is logically opposed to the knowable and is a one among the multiplicity, whereas that which is beyond even the One is neither knowable or unknowa- ble. Therefore the One is unknowable, at least in the terms of this kind of argu- ment. Moreover, if [the One] is the fi rst to spring out of the Ineffable, clearly it is least distant from the Ineffable and is still overshadowed by the unknowabil- ity of that.

Moreover, if as the One it is all things, then nothing in it can be separate; therefore it is neither knowable nor unknowable, but as One it is simply all and One. If, because it is all things, it is knowable for this reason, then it will turn out to be capable of knowledge as well; this too is one among all things. And yet what could it know? It could not know what came before it, for that is by no means knowable. Nor could it know itself. For then it will possess a duality in reverting on itself and so no longer be one, and in addition, that which is prior to all act and potential will be engaged in act; for [act and potential] arise be- cause of their differentiation from substance, but what is above all differentia- tion is just this One alone. But neither will it know what comes after it. For it will both be engaged in actualization (I 69), and its actualization will be di- rected toward the inferior, and this, though it is the fi rst of all actualizations, although even in the lower world the fi rst knowledge is of what is higher, and the second is of the thing itself, and third, of that which comes after itself.

Another consideration is that, if a certain one is knowable, it is insofar as it is a “certain” one, but not as the the absolute One. Let there be knowledge of the Unifi ed as the intellectual, or the vital, or as the super substantial one that illuminates Being; still, the absolute One is beyond these as well.

Hence both the arguments taken from compression and those taken from the analogy of Being lead to this One that is seated above Being. For just as Being is the fi rst intelligible among beings, so also the supersubstantial One is the fi rst intelligible among supersubstantial beings. Therefore that which tran- scends [them] would be unknowable. As for that spurious argument taken from negation and from analogy, as well as the syllogism which forces its conclusion through logical necessity, [to the effect] that someone knows what he does not know––all of these belong to the thought that walks on the void, [a thought that claims] that it knows some things on the basis of others. In general, (I 70) if someone does not know the simple term, he cannot know

the entire premise, and therefore cannot know the complete syllogism. Anal- ogy, too, can treat things that have no being whatsoever, as for example:22 what the sun is to the seen and the seer, the One is to the knower and the known. We know the sun but we do not know the One, and the negative statement takes away what we know, but what it allows we do not know. Thus even Plato does not think that the One is completely knowable. First in the Parmenides he says: “therefore it is not known,” thereby removing knowledge [of the One] altogether.23 Also in the Republic, although he appears to make it knowable, nevertheless, he says that the knower and known require the light in order to be illuminated by light.24 But [the knower] grasps25 the object of knowledge, which becomes so to speak transparent upon its illumination. In fact, the object known acts upon the knower, as if it awakened it toward its native act. And so, if the One is knowable, it must be illuminated by the light [of knowledge]. And yet, how could its own light illuminate the One? It is from the One that the light of truth in those [objects that come to be known] emanates.

Now our thought, in attempting to grasp the One, tries to get hold of it as already determined with respect to all other things, and this is why (I 71) thought imparts [to the One] its grasp of plurality, so that even if we compress our thoughts, we still proceed upon the very same conception that is opposed to plurality, whereas our thought ought to [conceive] the One as without opposi- tion, and as a single entirely perfect reality. Moreover, compression [of thought] toward the Unifi ed or toward the all as one is not adequate to the one so con- ceived, since Being, too, is all things at the level of the Unifi ed, and since the simplest absolute is what is prior to and just adjacent to the plurality (which is why the nonmultiple is called the single), whereas the One transcends the plu- rality of henads, since distinction arises after it.26 Just as, among the unifi ed beings, that which is completely unifi ed and undifferentiated is the most sim- ple, so too the simplest of the ones is that which in its unity transcends Being, and is unifi ed as a unity, if one is permitted to put it this way. But that which is called One without qualifi cation is also beyond this simplifi cation, so that even the ultimate result of that simplifi cation would be Being, which we can call the Unifi ed.

Chapter 27. Cognitive Reversion Does Not Bring about Knowledge of the One

■ Again, this chapter anticipates major themes in the treatise as a whole. Damascius gives several arguments against knowledge of the One based on a more general critique of knowledge, a topic that he explores more fully in chapter 97 below. For the sake of this argument, Damascius defi nes knowledge as a kind of reversion (cognitive reversion, in keeping with the Iamblichean differentiation between three kinds of reversion, vital, ontic, and cognitive). But the separation between knower and known

entailed by knowledge is impossible if the One is the object of knowledge. More gen- erally, Damascius briefl y considers the possibility of any differentiations arising in the One. Again, the question of the origination of multiplicity, duality, or differentiation within the One is a much larger question that Damascius treats at length throughout