At bottom then, even as social forestry and other collective means of co-management developed to cope with the failures of conservation forestry, conservation represents control, largely because the overall model of development does as well. (Robbins 2004: 163 emphasis added) IUCN appeared on the scene as a supporter of the Ilkerin group in their fight against the County Council as early as 1993.52 It presented itself as an expert in modern conserva- tion practices.53 Later, they were invited by the Ilkerin group to assist in the develop- ment of a forest management plan (Ngece et al. 2007: 177).54 This eventually resulted in a project that was officially called the Loita Forest Integrated Conservation and Man- agement Project but was informally known in Loita as ‘the IUCN project’. The term ‘integrated’ refers to the idea that the project integrated indigenous Loita Maasai man- agement systems with modern conservation and forestry practices. Even though and as IUCN officials admit, ‘[a]t first glance there seems to be little reason for any interven- tion in Loita. There is no environmental degradation, no erosion, no serious rangeland degradation, no overstocking, no overgrazing, no large-scale agriculture, no severe for- est encroachment, no commercial exploitation of the forest resources, and no threat to the wildlife’ (Ibid.), it was deemed that Loita’s traditional management institutions were no longer adequate in the face of new pressures and demands on the forest (L/PNEFICDP undated: 4). IUCN’s technical advice was therefore needed to deal with this ‘modern’ situation (Ibid.: 18-20).
The IUCN project was planned as a project with two phases. The first was a one-year preparatory phase that was carried out in 1998-1999. It was funded by Bilance (formerly Cebemo and now Cordaid), which had long-term involvement in the Ilkerin Project. IUCN mediated and facilitated a participatory planning process involving the majority of the stakeholders in order to develop a management structure for the forest (Karanja et al. 2002: 9, 34). IUCN also commissioned a number of short-term studies. One of the effects of these was that the forest started to become defined as a distinct and separate entity that needed intervention. As it was being mapped, its features classified and its value more clearly described in a nationally and internationally understood discourse, it
52 See ‘Letter to the editor: IUCN & the Loita/Purko Naimina Enkiyio forest’:
www.culturalsurvival.org/news/dr-eldad-tukahirwa/letter-editor-iucn-loitapurko-naimina-enkiyio- forest accessed 25/2/14.
53 Information on the IUCN project comes from various documents obtained from Loita informants and
the Internet, including IUCN-commissioned studies of Loita as part of the IUCN project: ‘Loita Forest
Project proposal summary’ date unknown; www.unesco.org/most/bpik9.htm accessed 27/2/14; Survey
of Tourism Activities in the Loita Forest and Environs (Shelley & Lempaka 1999); Preliminary Biodiversity Assessment of Loita Naimina-Enkiyio Forest (Legilisho-Kiyiapi 1999); Loita/Purko
Naimina Enkiyio Forest Integrated Conservation and Development Project ‘Project Document’ date unknown; ‘Conflict Management and Community Development, Projects as Incentives for Partners to Participate In Participatory Forest Management (PFM) - The Case of Loita and Lembus Communities in Kenya (Ngece et al. 2007).
54 By the Trust Company according to IUCN, by the Loita Council of Elders, according to Zaal & ole
became increasingly ‘legible’ to outsiders (Scott 1998). For example, the biodiversity assessment by Legilisho-Kiyiapi (1999) championed the Naimina Enkiyio Forest as one of the few remaining and traditionally preserved indigenous forests in Kenya with great ecological and biodiversity value, and an important water catchment area for the re- gion.55 But it also described potential human-induced threats to its ecological integrity and put the forest on the (inter)national environmental agenda, justifying IUCN’s inter- vention. On a similar note, Shelley & Lempaka’s (1999) survey of tourism activities clearly show the forest’s growth potential as a tourist attraction and the need for donors, NGOs and private-sector partners to develop community-based tourist enterprises. As a result, the forest started to become better noticed in the tourism sector.
Phase 2 was planned as the implementation phase. There would be the formulation of a long-term management plan for the forest and an effective institutional structure and mechanism to implement the management plan would be developed (L/PNEFICDP un- dated: 4). After this three-year project, a sustainable and community-based forest man- agement structure would be in place and IUCN would withdraw. However, the second phase of the IUCN project never took off. Even though IUCN was invited by the Ilkerin group to develop a forest management plan and despite its role in bringing the different players in the conflict together to find common ground and its commitment to ensure local community participation in a joint management body (Ngece et al. 2007: 173, 177, 180; Maundu et al. 2001: 4, 31), resistance to the project had mounted when it was time to implement the second phase of the project.
People in Loita had initially welcomed IUCN and applauded its participatory and transparent method of working (Kantai 2001: 42). Nevertheless, opposition grew after news started to circulate in Loita about IUCN’s involvement in the Ngorongoro Con- servation and Development Project in Tanzania where it had collaborated with the Tan- zanian state in the 1980s and 1990s (McCabe et al. 1992).56 In spite of the area’s multi- ple land use policy and dual mandate of combining conservation with development, the relationship between the local Kisongo Maasai and the managing authority has been characterized by mutual mistrust and conflict (Homewood & Rodgers 1984; McCabe et al. 1992; McCabe 1997, 2003). Since the demarcation of the conservation area, the Kisongo have been restricted in their use of fire (Maasai burn grasslands to stimulate
55 Legilisho-Kiyiapi (1999) classifies the Naimina Enkiyio Forest as a moist to dry upland forest,
partially to closed canopy forest, with open glades, bush and small forest blocks along the edge of the core forest block. The forest is further characterized by three forest formations: ‘Afromontane dry conifer forest’ dominated by the African Pencil tree on the hilltops and lower down ‘moist mid upland semi-deciduous forest’ and ‘mixed species low upland forests’. Naimina Enkiyio has some of the largest trees of any species in Kenya. The core forest block constitutes 320 km². Its western edge is marked by the Olngarua Swamp. The highest hills in the southern part of the forest have an latitude of almost 2000 m, while they reach 2600 m in the north. The temperature varies from 17.7°C to 20°C and annual rainfall is between 600-1200 mm. The forest harbours a rich birdlife and a considerable diversity of animals, especially of megafauna (elephant, buffalo, hippo, antelopes, lions and leopards), and is part of the larger Maasai Mara wildlife dispersal zone. The Naimina Enkiyio Forest is a source of several rivers that drain south to Tanzania and east into the Ewaso Ngiro River that flows through the dry Magadi rangeland ecosystem providing fresh water to Lake Natron in Tanzania. This is extremely important for the East African flamingo, whose only known breeding site is Lake Natron.
56 ‘Maasai reject IUCN project in Loita forest’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed
the growth of new grass after rainfall), they have been prohibited from settling in certain areas, have experienced periodic bans on cultivation and have lost access to grazing areas and watering places (in some cases allowed under permit) including crucial dry- season forest refuges (Homewood & Rodgers 1984; McCabe et al. 1992, 1997: 58).
This news reached the Loita in Kenya through their fellow Loita in Tanzania who neighbour the Kisongo and through Kisongo labourers who are typically employed in Loita to prepare fields for cultivation. The unpopularity of IUCN among the Kisongo (McCabe et al. 1992: 362-363) raised doubts among the Loita who feared they would experience the same fate and share the predicament of the Kisongo. The studies com- missioned by IUCN during the pre-phase of the IUCN project recommended similar measures be taken with regard to the Naimina Enkiyio Forest: forest-use zoning with varying degrees of access, a wildlife sanctuary, boundary identification to control forest extraction, settlement and cultivation encroachment as well as possible settlement evic- tion (Shelley & Lempaka 1999; Legilisho-Kiyiapi 1999). These recommendations were incorporated in the Phase 2 project proposal (L/PNEFICDP undated) and confirmed Loita fears about IUCN intentions (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 11). The most problematic issue appears to have been the demarcation of the boundary of the forest, as suggested by IUCN, because it implied that those families living in it would need to relocate. Re- sistance in Loita started to build against IUCN.
Both Narok County Council and IUCN attempted to gain access to the forest, and ul- timately control over other people’s access to the forest. Narok County Council’s main purpose was to commercialize tourism and IUCN’s interest was biodiversity conserva- tion. In any case, their aims jeopardized the free access to the forest that the Loita had enjoyed since they had settled the area.57 The Loita majority’s opposition to Narok County Council and IUCN was, mostly, a fight to maintain that status quo. Recalling Ribot & Peluso’s definition of access as ‘the ability to benefit from things’ (2003: 153, 155), the Loita Maasai were afraid of losing the ability to benefit from the forest’s nu- merous resources that they needed for their livelihoods and ritual life. They therefore protested: firstly against Narok County Council and later against IUCN.