Matriz de análisis

It is ethic of care theory that has mainly influenced a resurgence of interest in care as it pertains to the social work profession. Therefore, it is important to outline this theory and explain what ethic of care theorists have to say about care as an ethical stance. The ethic of care was first proposed as a viable moral theory in the 1980s by feminist theorists Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984), who questioned whether something was missing in the traditional Kantian approach to morality. According to ethic of care theorists it is always through relationship that care occurs (Held 2006; Gilligan 2002, 1982; Noddings 1995, 1984; Tronto 1993). Noddings’ (1984) account places great importance on listening when engaging in a caring relationship and refers to this type of listening as ‘engrossment’ which requires the carer to put aside his or her own biases and judgments and to attempt to understand the other’s point of view, emotions and particular circumstance. According to Noddings (1984) understanding another person entails positioning oneself in a place of care, love, empathy, compassion and emotional sensitivity. She argues that understanding requires respecting the unique experience of the other rather than assuming that it is the same as if the carer were in the same situation. Of equal importance in

Noddings’ (1995, p. 26) view is that the carer takes care of themselves and receives care and support from others, as without self-care it is difficult to maintain care for others. Both Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984) view care as necessarily moving beyond concern and connection with the cared-for to taking action of some kind.

20 Tronto (1993) suggests that following an ethic of care comprises four phases and five ethical dimensions. The four phases consist of, caring about, taking care of, care-giving and care-receiving (Tronto 1993, pp.105-107). Caring about involves the recognition of suffering or need and making an assessment of how needs may be met. ‘Taking care of’ involves recognition of actions required to meet caring needs. ‘Care-giving’ is carrying out those actions, and ‘care-receiving’ involves recognition of responses to care. Tronto claims that observing and seeking responses to care is important as it provides a way of evaluating whether caring needs have been met.

Tronto’s (1993, pp. 127-137) five ethical dimensions of an ethic of care consist of attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness and integrity.

‘Attentiveness’ requires the carer to suspend one’s own goals and concerns in order to recognise and be attentive to others (Tronto 1993, p. 127). Tronto (1993, p. 132) distinguishes between ‘responsibility’ and obligation, arguing that obligation arises from a sense of duty, whereas responsibility comes from an inclination to do ‘the right thing’. From a perspective of responsibility care is viewed as an end in itself, rather than simply as a means to achieve certain outcomes (Tronto, 1993, p. 133). ‘Competence’ involves drawing on knowledge, skills and abilities to meet caring needs whenever possible (Tronto, 1993, p. 133). ‘Responsiveness’ necessitates considering the position of the other and remaining aware of the power held by the carer and possibilities for abuse of that power (Tronto 1993, p. 136). Finally, integrity demands that the four phases of care and the first four dimensions of an ethic of care are integrated into a complete whole (Tronto 1993, pp. 136-137).

A special issue of the Ethics and Social Welfare journal, published in 2010, includes articles from authors that highlight the relevance of considering care as a concept of value in political and welfare contexts (Held 2010; Lloyd 2010; Robinson 2010; Tronto 2010). In this issue, Robinson (2010) challenges current neoliberal

approaches that dominate international political theory. She contends that replacing a focus on individualism with an international political theory of care that considers relationality, interdependence and responsibility to others will better address the needs of vulnerable citizens. Tronto (2010) argues a similar point, suggesting key features of an ethic of care be applied in institutional contexts. These features

21 include an awareness of the purpose of care, recognition of power relations, and the need for tailoring care to meet individual needs.

Lloyd (2010) links the political context with practice implications of caring. She uses the example of policies aimed at ‘caring’ for the aging population, arguing that they fail to take into account the importance of interdependence, relationships and responsibilities towards addressing individual circumstances. Finally, Held (2010) considers how broadening caring relationships beyond family and friendship could supplement and sometimes replace the need for justice approaches when dealing with family violence and terrorism. The frequently discussed distinction between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice is presented next.

Contrasting an ethic of care with an ethic of justice

The ethic of care contrasts with the more traditional Kantian ethic of justice which has been the most influential moral theory since the time of the Enlightenment. Kant’s ([1785] 1964, p. 67) approach viewed ethical principles as abstract and universal, applying equally and impartially to everyone in the same situation. Kant proposed an ethical theory in which everyone is their own moral agent and should be respected as such. Certain principles should be followed, not in order to achieve particular means or to serve self-interest, but as a moral end in itself ([1785] 1964, p. 91). It is from Kantian ethics that formalised codes of ethics have been developed which along with rational scientific principles are a defining feature of most

professions (Hugman 2005, p.6). The valuable contribution of Kantian ethics cannot be overlooked as it resulted in an enhanced humanitarian concern, an

acknowledgment of the rights and needs of the lower classes and the recognition of slavery as a moral wrong (Tronto 1993, p. 58).

The ethic of justice has been criticised for failing to take into account the relational ontology of human beings – that individuals exist in relation to others, and that care and responsibility are a part of human interaction (Sevenhuijsen 1998; Tronto 1993; Gilligan 1987). Hankivsky (2004, p. 25) maintains that care is a necessary

component of all peoples’ lives. She argues that while requirements may change depending on circumstances, age and health status, care remains a constant

22 a society that is more plural and fragmented than ever before (Bauman & Tester 2001; Bauman 1995, 1993). This argument also supports Kroeger-Mappes’ (1994) strong stance on the value of care. Kroeger-Mappes (1994, p. 115) contends that ‘solely following an ethic of rights would amount to the physical, psychological and emotional neglect of virtually everyone’.

As argued by Tronto (1993), an ethic of care is based on relationships, whereas an ethic of justice is based on abstract principles and rules. An ethic of care is founded on the belief that people are interdependent, whereas an ethic of justice promotes independence and autonomy. An ethic of care focuses on emotions and an ethic of justice focuses on rights. An ethic of care is associated with femininity, whereas an ethic of justice is associated with masculinity. An ethic of care is contextual and concrete, tailored to each individual, dependent on unique problems and

circumstances that are only understood through relationship. An ethic of justice is abstract, and problems are categorised and approached according to broad, universal principles. Finally, an ethic of care is guided by a sense of responsibility, whereas an ethic of justice is guided by a sense of duty (Tronto 1993).

Table 1 summarises the key differences between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice approach as argued by Tronto (1993).

Table 1: Key differences between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice

Several theorists contend that care and justice are logically compatible and indispensable to one another (Held 2006; Heckman 1999; Jagger 1995; Tronto

Ethic of Care Ethic of Justice

Relationships Abstract principles and rules

Interdependence Autonomy

Emotions Rights

Feminine Masculine

Contextual approach Abstract approach

23 1993). Tronto (1993)believes that an ethic of care and an ethic of justice cannot be separated in the real world as the two moral philosophies are inextricably

intertwined. Gilligan (2002, p. 683) echoes this view, drawing attention to the fact that everyone is vulnerable to both oppression and abandonment. As Gilligan (2002, p. 684) explains, oppression results in a moral command not to act unfairly toward others and abandonment, a moral command not to turn away from someone in need.

Gender and an ethic of care

The first wave of ethic of care theorists promoted the idea that caring comes more naturally to women than men (Noddings 1985, 1984; Gilligan 1982). Gilligan (1982) found that when she spoke to women a different moral ‘voice’ was apparent to that of most men. When speaking about experiences of moral conflict and choice she describes the way in which women commonly define moral problems in terms of relationship to others rather than by a set of abstract universal rules and principles. Noddings (1984) believes care to be an innate female capacity that is linked to childbearing and nurturing. She argues that women are equally as rational about their moral decision making as men. Reasons often ‘point to feelings, needs,

situations, conditions, and sense of personal ideal’ rather than universal principles to guide caring actions (Noddings 1995, p. 23).

While Gilligan views women as the ‘caring’ gender, she argues that differences between men and women are due to the way in which they are socialised to perform caring roles in society (1982, p. 4). Gilligan (1982) contends that it is not that women are less moral than their male counterparts, but they have a tendency to view morality from a different perspective. The different perspectives can be likened to the way in which people perceive ambiguous drawings in Gestalt psychology experiments (Gilligan 2002, p. 683). A picture which can be seen as either a young woman or an old woman is believed to be primarily seen as one or the other

depending on expectations and past experience. Gilligan (2002, p. 683) argues that men have been socialised to perceive morality from a justice perspective whereas women have been socialised to perceive morality from a relational perspective. Like the ambiguous picture it is possible to shift the focus from one perspective to

another, however, one perspective tends to dominate. While all human relationships can be defined both in terms of equality and attachment, and everyone is vulnerable

24 to both oppression and abandonment, it is the emphasis that men and women give to these interdependent concepts that determines which one they focus on (Gilligan 2002, p. 683).

Tronto diverts from the essentialist stance one step further disputing the idea that women care more than men. She argues that while Gilligan’s work is important for highlighting a different perspective on morality, the idea that women have a different ‘moral voice’ to men is not conclusive. Tronto (1993, pp. 82-84) points to several studies that suggest that an ethic of care is equally evident in men as it is in women and that the reverse is also true in that women also display an ethic of justice. She argues that if differences lie anywhere it is more likely to be in regards to class and race than gender. African-Americans, for example, adopt a view of the self that stresses a sense of co-operation, interdependence and collective responsibility, all of which are more in line with an ethic of care than an ethic of justice (Tronto 1993, p. 84). This is echoed in Graham’s (2002) account of an African-centred paradigm for social work that emphasises values relating to the importance of interpersonal relationships, a holistic view of the interconnectedness of all things and the

collective nature of identity. Tronto (2013, pp. 68-70) claims that western men do care, although often the care that men provide is less intimate than that of women, and it is based more on protection, providing financial security and practical forms of care. Tronto (2013) argues that this is still ‘care’, nevertheless, and it is often motivated by a desire to demonstrate love. The main issue according to Tronto (2013, p. 69) is that generally men do not see themselves as particularly good at caring; they hold onto masculine ideologies that suggest ‘tough guys don’t care’, even when their emotions and actions often contradict this idea. As a result, this renders it difficult for care to be taken seriously in a male dominated public world that relates more to ideas of justice than to care (Tronto 2013, p. 70).

Trust as another dimension of an ethic of care

While trust is discussed as an element of caring relationships in the nursing literature (Adamski, Parsons & Hooper 2009; Montgomery 1993; Mayeroff 1971) relatively few theorists mention it as an important dimension of ethic of care theory.

Sevenhuijsen (2003) and Baier (1986) claim that mutual trust is crucial to caring relationships, and that it is an important dimension of care that is mainly missing

25 from ethic of care theories. Baier (1986, p. 105) defines trust as ‘letting other

persons take care of something the truster cares about, where such caring for

involves some kind of discretionary power’. Baier (1986, p. 235) in particular draws attention to how trust and vulnerability go hand-in-hand explaining that ‘trust on first approximation, is accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of goodwill) toward another’. Sevenhuijsen (2003, pp. 22-23) supports this view, arguing that trust always involves power. She argues that the trusted has a responsibility to use their power positively and creatively, in a manner that does not abuse the vulnerability of the other. Sevenhuijsen (2003, p. 23) maintains thatit is important to understand that genuine care cannot be experienced without trust and that trust cannot be built without care, hence the two values are inextricably linked.