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As stated above, I call my theory of metaphor, which accommodates both clausal and phrasal implicatures, “extended Gricean”. Now the question is why I believe that the Gricean framework with some revisions can explain phrasal implications. What licences such a revision? In order to answer this question, what I need to do is to demonstrate how Gricean reasoning, principles (maxims) and linguistic tests for implicatures can be adapted to phrases.

First, let us see how a Gricean definition of utterance meaning can be adapted to phrases (x is a phrase below):

pBy uttering x, U (the utterer) meant e_q is true if and only if for some audience A,U uttered x intending:

(a) A to entertain e,

(b) A to recognize that U intends (a), and

(c) A’s recognition that U intends (a) to function, in part, as a reason for (a).

(4) Non-denumerability of indirect meanings

(5) Contextuality of indirect meanings (Clark 1983, p.320)

This parallelism, according to Clark, suggests that a model designed for indirect illocutionary acts can be applied to contextual expressions (Clark 1983, p.321). A speaker utters a sentence with a goal (or an intention). Similarly, we can think the utterance of each word as subgoals (Clark 1983, p.324). For instance, the subgoal of uttering an innovative denominal verb is formulated as follows:

ln using an innovative denominal verb sincerely, the speaker means to denote: (a) the kind of situation

(b) that he has good reason to believe

(c) that on this occasion the listener can readily compute (d) uniquely

(e) on the basis of their mutual knowledge

(f) in such a way that the parent noun denotes one role in the situation, and the remaining surface arguments of the denominal verb denote other roles in the situation.

Here ‘situation’ is a cover term for states, events, and processes. (Clark 1983, p.321) In conclusion, I can say that Clark’s suggestion on the pragmatics of certain subsententials is along the similar lines as what other theorists I discussed in this section suggest and what I will suggest below. The common motivation behind these suggestions is that a speaker utters a phrase with certain goals and intentions and the hearer tries to analyse the pragmatic significance of the uttered phrase by inferring the speakers’ goals and intentions with the help of the context.

Here, the only change we needed on the original definition is to replace “believe” with “entertain” in (a) since belief is a propositional attitude. The rest of the original definition remains intact (except using a different variablee for phrase meanings).

Next, we can continue with Gricean reasoning. A general formulation of a hearer’s reasoning is given by Levinson (1983, pp.113-4):

(i) S [speaker] has said that p.

(ii) There’s no reason to think S is not observing the maxims, or at least the co-operative principle.

(iii) In order for S to say that p and be indeed observing the maxims or the co- operative principle, S must think that q.

(iv) S must know that it is mutual knowledge that q must be supposed if S is to be taken to be co-operating.

(v) S has done nothing to stop me, the addressee, thinking that q.

(vi) Therefore S intends me to think thatq, and in saying that p has implicatedq. This formulation is given in terms of utterance meanings (p in the above defini- tion) but I see no difficulty in applying this reasoning to phrase meanings (e in the following definition):

(i0) S [speaker] has used a phrase to mean e.

(ii0) There’s no reason to think S is not observing the maxims, or at least the co-operative principle

(iii0) In order for S to use a phrase to mean e and be indeed observing the maxims or the co-operative principle, S must entertain f.

(iv0) S must know that it is mutual knowledge that her intending to meanf (instead of e) must be supposed if S is to be taken to be co-operating.

(v0) S has done nothing to stop me, the addressee, entertaining f.

(vi0) Therefore S intends me to entertain f, and in using a phrase to mean e has implied f.

In the original formulation small revisions are needed so as to adapt the steps to the phrasal reasoning. One change is substituting “to entertain” with “to think” in steps (iii0), (v0) and (vi0). Since thinking is generally considered to be thinking of a

proposition, I preferred a looser but essentially similar concept. For the same reason I replaced “say” with “using a phrase to mean”. Other changes are the obvious ones required in switching from the proposition talk to the subpropositional talk.15

I should emphasize that phrasal reasoning does not mean that phrases are taken in isolation. Phrases, in this type of reasoning, are evaluated against the surround- ing linguistic environment. The linguistic environment restricts the set of possible implications.

The form of clausal reasoning nicely matches with that of phrasal reasoning. In one case, a sentence meaning implicates another sentence meaning, whereas in the other case a phrase meaning is implying another phrasal meaning. At two differ- ent linguistic levels the reasoning steps are parallel. Now the content of the steps should be examined. The crucial question concerns the reference to the Cooperative Principle and maxims in the third step. How are they adopted to phrases?