Matriz de la legislación ambiental del Ecuador 23

The distinction between interpersonal and intergroup relations is central to the work of Henri Tajfel. His concern is with

The social psychological processes which intervene between the

existence of various kinds of intergroup conflicts and the construction of widely diffused systems of belief about the ingroups and outgroups ...{which then]... become an inherent part of the intergroup social situation. (1981, p225).

Tajfel suggests that behaviour can be located along a continuum between the two ideal-hypothetical poles of interpersonal and intergroup (1981, p238ff).

'Interpersonal' refers to any encounter between two or more people in which the interaction that takes place is determined by the personal relationships between the individuals and by their respective individual characteristics. 'Intergroup' refers to behaviour which is determined by their membership of different social groups or categories. The position taken up on this continuum is not static: it varies according to social situation and to the strength of group identity. As Tajfel (1981, p238) says, 'There is a reciprocal (or 'dialectical') relationship between social settings and situations on the one hand, and the reflection or expression in them of subjective group memberships on the other'.

A graphic illustration of this key distinction between interpersonal and intergroup relationships can be found in Walker's (1988) study of male adolescent youth groups of different ethnicities in Australia. Walker reports an argument between the 'Aussies' - of Anglo descent - and the 'Greeks' - of Greek background - over nationality (p86). Two of the Aussies are speaking.

Reevesey ...we’re still y' mates, even though y' nothin' better

than...

Fred You're just greasy wogs. [Laughter.]

Tajfel identifies three components of 'groupness':

(ii) Evaluative: the positive or negative value connotations placed on the group and its attributes;

(iii) Affective: the emotions (of like/dislike etc) that may accompany group recognition;

Tajfel argues that one main function of social groups for their members is to engender social identities, and that this meets a postulated basic human need for a positive self-concept (1981, p254). His definition of social identity is 'that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his [s/c] knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (1981, p255). Groups exist only in relation to other groups, and the values ascribed to groups arise in comparison with other groups. In other words, society consists of a complex and stratified network of social groups which serves as 'a system of orientation which creates and defines the individual's own place in a society'.

The crucial pivot, and perhaps the critical flaw, of Tajfel's theory is the notion that positive social identities arise inevitably at the expense of other social groups. Tajfel conducted a series of experiments - the 'minimal'intergroup experiments - which attempted to establish the minimal conditions under which an individual would distinguish between an ingroup and an outgroup. In order to create such conditions, Tajfel eliminated from the experimental situation all the variables that normally lead to ingroup favouritism or discrimination against the outgroup. When the experimenters then introduced the notion of group into the situation, the subjects

acted on the basis of competition between their own group and the other, even to the extent of prefering behavioural strategies that accentuated group differences even if they led to reduced benefits for the ingroup, rather than strategies that resulted in greater benefits for both ingroup and outgroup but minimised intergroup differences. Tajfel concluded that 'It is the assumed need for differentiation (or the establishment of psychological distinctiveness between the groups) which seems to provide, under some conditions, the major outcome of the sequence social categorization-social identity-social comparison' (1981, pp273-4). Tajfel summarises his thesis as follows:

The argument presented here postulates that the reason for this

cognitive, behavioural and evaluative intergroup differentiation is in the need that the individuals have to provide social meaning through social identity to the intergroup situation, experimental or any other; and that this need is fulfilled through the creation of intergroup differences when such differences do not in fact exist, or the attribution of value to, and the enhancement of, whatever differences that do exist. (1981, p276)

In other words, there is a postulated need for a positive self-concept, which in part at least takes the form of positive social identities derived from the membership of positively evaluated social groups. The ascription of a positive identity to the ingroup arises from the evaluation of outgroups as inferior. While this process may trade on existing social categorisations made available by the wider society - and Tajfel refers in some detail to racism in this context - it is an autonomous cognitive

process in its own right. Social identity, in these relational terms, is never 'secure'. It has to be continually remade in cultural (and possibly economic, political etc) struggle between inferior and superior groups (1981, p278ff). Ethnicity is one of the main criteria that British society makes available for social categorisation, resulting in the acquisition by white group members of racist attitudes integral to group and therefore personal identity.

With regard to children, Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations takes us beyond explanations dependent upon a simple passive structural-functionalist socialisation into adult norms by introducing the active notion of 'identity-wa/t/Vig' by the child through group membership. But it is a profoundly pessimistic theory, in which the strength of a child's positive identity is seen as necessarily proportional to the negative identity ascribed to outgroup members. It is also a highly determinist theory which does not seem capable of explaining dissidence from group norms: for example, in racist societies, members of the dominant group who hold anti-racist attitudes.

A number of criticisms have been made of Tajfel's theory. Aboud (1988) questions the proposed causal relationship between positive social identity and negative outgroup evaluation. She refers to research evidence showing that among young white children there seems to be no relation between self-esteem and racial prejudice. White children seem to derive and maintain their self-esteem through comparisons with their own group on performance and status, and not by disliking a minority group' (p94).

Caddick (1982) poses the question: 'under what conditions will a group which holds an illegitimately ascendant position within a web of intergroup relationships accept or actively work towards an improvement in the standing or circumstances of a group (or group) less well placed?' (p i50). In a specific response to Caddick's question, Tajfel (1982) locates the possible dynamic of change not within social identity theory at all (i.e. to the development of more equitable social identifications based on newly recognised dimensions of comparability) but in power relations. The only source of dominant group change is 'when the ascendant group is not entirely sure of its power to impose its decisions on the outgroup' (p488). This opens up the issue of what the relationship is between social identity theory and power relations. It also appears to rule out the possibility of anti-racist change in schools with a small minority of Black pupils.

Caddick offers an alternative solution by drawing on 'equity theory'. Equity theory 'asserts that the perception of injustice or unfairness in social relationships leads the perceiver to feel distressed. Such distress is uncomfortable and motivates attempts to alter the conditions which promote it. One such alteration is action aimed at redressing the injustice by restoring actual equity to the relationship' (pi46). Caddick poses equity theory from outside social identity theory, as a countervailing psychological principle. It is the contention of this study that children certainly have strongly developed notions of fairness and justice, of equity, but that these arise primarily not from an 'equity principle' as a psychological universal but, as suggested earlier, from reciprocity within the peer-group.

The book Changing the Subject (Henriques et al 1984) advances a radical critique of the dominant social constructionist paradigm in psychology from a post-structuralist standpoint. In the chapter by Henriques (1984) on racism he criticises a 'cognitivist' explanation: it 'locates the responsibility for prejudice with particular individuals by theorizing its cause in terms of defects in the information available to, and the information-processing capacity of, the interpreting subject' (p24). He specifically criticises Tajfel's 'cognitivist explanation' of prejudice 'as error based on arbitrary mistakes' (p81). His conclusion is the charge that 'the racist status quo is maintained to a large extent not only through coercive and blatantly racist practices, but through the liberal position which criticizes these as aberrations I have thus argued that it is important to recognize the part played by social psychology's explanation of racism as residing within the information-processing mechanisms of individuals' (p88). In short, he charges Tajfel with objectively promoting racism. This charge is misconceived because Henriques attacks Tajfel for a position he doesn't hold. Tajfel states explicitly: 'I do not believe that 'explanations' of social conflicts and social injustice can be mainly or primarily psychological' (1981, p7),