Matriz de Marco Lógico

The Supreme Court, realizing the limitations of the notice, consent, and

presence frameworks, attempted a new articulation in International Shoe

Co. v. Washington that focused on the “minimum contacts” necessary to

render the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation just.

Justice and due process, under the new minimum contacts test of personal

jurisdiction, do no longer require that a defendant be “present within the

territory of the forum.”

_{Instead, for personal jurisdiction to be proper, the}

defendant must “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that

the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice.’”

To determine if the defendant does so, courts would probe the “quality

and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of

the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”

Justice “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment

166. Id. at 141–42 (“Possibly the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation of business will serve without more. The answer made in Green v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 916, and People’s Tob. Co. v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 587, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 537, perhaps becomes somewhat doubtful in the light of International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479, and, if it still remains true, it readily yields to slight additions. In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., supra, there was no more, but the business was continuous and substantial. Purchases, though carried on regularly, are not enough (Rosenberg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372), nor are the activities of subsidiary corporations (Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 364, 27 S. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 841; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 45 S. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed. 634), or of connecting carriers (Philadelphia & Read. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61 L. Ed. 710). The maintenance of an office, though always a make-weight, and enough, when accompanied by continuous negotiation, to settle claims (St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486), is not of much significance (Davega, Inc., v. Lincoln Furniture Co., 29 F.(2d) 164 (C.C.A. 2)).”).

167. Id. at 142.

168. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 169. Id.

170. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 171. Id. at 319.

in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the

state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”

In this analysis, courts may include an “estimate of the inconveniences”

to the defendant.

_{Courts may thus exercise personal jurisdiction over}

a defendant regardless of the defendant’s physical presence within the

forum state’s territorial boundaries.

Presence was no longer sufficient

or essential for jurisdiction.

Later cases refined the meaning of minimum contacts. For personal

jurisdiction to be proper under the minimum contacts analysis, “all

assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the

standards [of fair play and substantial justice] set forth in International

Shoe and its progeny.”

_{Here, the court asks for the quantity and quality}

of the defendant’s contacts with the forum,

whether the defendant had

fair warning that she or he might be haled to that jurisdiction, whether the

exercise of jurisdiction foreseeable,

and to what extent the contacts

exhibited purpose.

If the defendant’s contacts with the forum are

sufficiently continuous and systematic, then the state may justly exercise

general jurisdiction over any claim against the defendant, regardless of

where it arose.

If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are

isolated and sporadic, the state may exercise specific jurisdiction only over

claims that arise out of the defendant’s specific contacts with the forum

state.

Next, the court asks whether the defendant can rebut the presumption

arising out of the minimum contacts analysis that the exercise of jurisdiction

172. Id.

173. Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

174. See id. at 316–17.

175. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1977). 176. Id. at 212.

177. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that merely placing an item into the stream of commerce is not purposeful enough).

178. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 179. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (testing for purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the forum state); see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).

180. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16 (1984). General jurisdiction is also sometimes called “all-purpose jurisdiction.” E.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).

181. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478–82 (1985) (concluding that Florida had jurisdiction over the defendant in a contract dispute where the defendant performed actions related to the contract in Florida). This type of personal jurisdiction is sometimes called “case-linked jurisdiction.” E.g., Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.

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Rights Come with Responsibilities

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

would be reasonable.

A defendant can do so by arguing that the

assertion of jurisdiction is not in accordance with fair play and

substantial justice.