Next, we show that there is a trade-off between the constant in front oflogn/n and the fraction of nodes that can win a single-elimination tournament. The proofs are based on the following result by [Erd˝os and R´enyi, 1964]. Let B(n, p)
denote a random bipartite graph onnnodes in each partition
such that every edge between the two partitions appears with probabilityp.
Theorem 5([Erd˝os and R´enyi, 1964]). Letcn be any func-
tion ofn, then considerG=B(n, p)forp= (lnn+cn)/n.
The probability thatGcontains a perfect matching is at least 1−2/ecn.
For the particular casecn = Θ(lnn),Gcontains a perfect matching with probability at least1−1/poly(n).
Lemma 2. LetC ≥ 64be a given constant. Letn ≥ 16. LetGbe a GBM tournament forp= Clnn/n. Then with probability at least1−2/nC/32−1,Gis such that one can efficiently construct a winning single-elimination tournament bracket for the node ranked 1.
Proof. We will call the top ranked node s. We will show
that with high probabilitys has outdegree at leastn/4and that every node inNin(s)has at leastlogn inneighbors in
Nout(s). This makes s a superking, and by [Vassilevska Williams, 2010],scan win a single-elimination tournament.
The probability that s beats any node j is > 1/2, the expected outdegree ofs is > (n −1)/2. By a Chernoff
bound, the probability thatshas outdegree< n/4is at most
exp(−(n−1)/16) << 1/nC/32−1. Given that the outde-
gree ofs is at least n/4, the expected number of inneigh- bors inNout(s)of any particular nodeyinNin(s)is at least
(n/4)·(Clnn/n) = (C/4) lnn.
We can show that each node in Nin(s)has at leastlogn inneighbors fromNout(s) by using a Chernoff bound and union bound. By a Chernoff bound, the probability thaty
has less than(C/8) lnninneighbors fromNout(s)is at most
exp(−(C/32) lnn) = 1/nC/32. By a union bound, the prob-
ability that somey ∈ Nin(s)has less than (C/8) lnnin- neighbors fromNout(s)is at most1/nC/32−1. Therefore,s
is a superking is with probability at least1−2/nC/32−1where n≥16,n/4≥logn, C >64,and(C/8) lnn≥logn.
Lemma 2 concerned itself only with the player who is ranked highest in intrinsic ability. The next theorem shows that as we increase the noise factor, we can fix the tourna- ment for an increasingly large set of players. As the noise level increases, we can argue recursively that there exists a matching from n 2 + 1. . . nto1. . . n 2, and from 3n 4 + 1. . . n ton 2+ 1. . . 3n
4 and so forth. These matchings form each suc-
cessive round of the tournament, eliminating all the stronger players.
Theorem 6. Let n ≥ 16, i ≥ 0 be a constant and p ≥
64·2ilnn/n
∈[0,1]. With probability at least1−1/poly(n), one can efficiently construct a winning single-elimination tournament bracket for any one of the top1 +n(1−1/2i)
players in a GBM tournament.
Proof. Let G be a GBM tournament for p = C2ilnn/n,
C ≥ 64. LetS be the set of alln/2i−1 playersjwithj > n(1−1/2i−1). Letsbe a node with1 +n(1−1/2i−1)≤ s≤ 1 +n(1−1/2i). The probability thatswins a single- elimination tournament on the subtournament ofGinduced
bySis high: there is a setXof at leastn/2i
−1nodes that are
afters. By Lemma 2,swins a single-elimination tournament onX∪ {s}with high probability1− 2
(n/2i)C/32−1.
In addition, by Theorem 5, with probability at least 1− 2
(n/2i)C−1, there is a perfect matching fromX ∪ {s}toS \ (X∪ {s}). For every1≤k≤i−1, consider
Ak ={x|1 +n(1−1/2k)≤x}, and
Bk ={x|1 +n(1−1/2k−1)≤x≤n(1−1/2k)}. ThenAk−1 =Ak∪Bk,Ak∩Bk =∅, and|Ak|=|Bk|=
n/2k. Hencep
≥Cln|Ak|/|Ak|for allk≤i−1. By The- orem 5, the probability that there is no perfect matching from
AktoBkfor a particularkis at most2/(n/2k)C2
i−k
−1.This
value is maximized fork=i, and it is2/(n/2i)C−1.Thus by
1−1/poly(n), there is a perfect matching fromAktoBk, for everyk.
Thus, with probability at least 1 −1/poly(n), s wins a
single-elimination tournament inGwith high probability, and the full bracket can be constructed by taking the unions of the perfect matchings fromAktoBkand the bracket fromS.
For the BM model we can strengthen the bound from The- orem 3 by combining the arguments from Theorems 3 and 6.
Theorem 7. There exists a constantn0such that for alln > n0 the following holds. Let i ≥ 0 be a constant, andp = 64·2ilnn/n
∈[0,1]. With probability at least1−1/poly(n), one can efficiently construct a winning bracket for any one of the topn(1−1/2i+1)
−(80/2i/2)√nlnnplayers in a BM tournament.
As an example, forp = 256 lnn/n, Theorem 7 says that
any of the top7n/8−40√nlnnplayers are winners while
Theorem 6 only gives3n/4 + 1for this setting of pin the GBM model.
Proof. As in Theorem 6, for every1≤k≤i, considerAk =
{x | 1 +n(1−1/2k)
≤ x}, and Bk = {x| 1 +n(1−
1/2k−1) ≤ x ≤ n(1−1/2k)}. ThenA
k−1 = Ak ∪Bk,
Ak ∩Bk =∅, and|Ak| = |Bk| =n/2k. By the argument from Theorem 6, w.h.p. there is a perfect matching fromAk toBk, for allk.
Consider Ai. By Theorem 3, with probability 1 −
1/poly(n/2i) = 1
− 1/poly(n), we can efficiently
fix the tournament for any of the first n/2i+1
− 5 · 16p(n/2i) ln(n/2i)nodes inAi. Combining the construc- tion with the perfect matchings betweenAkandBk, we can efficiently construct a winning tournament bracket for any of the top
n−n/2i+n/2i+1−80p(n/2i) ln(n/2i)≥
≥n(1−1/2i+1)−(80/2i/2)√nlnnnodes.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown a tight bound (up to a constant factor) on the noise needed to fix a single-elimination tourna- ment for a large fraction of players when the match outcomes are generated by the BM model. As this model is believed to be a good model for real-world tournaments, this result shows that many tournaments in practice can be easily manipulated. In some sense, this sidesteps the question of whether it isNP- hard to fix a tournament in general by showing that it is easy on examples that we care about.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for the detailed comments from the anonymous reviewers. The first author was supported by the National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fel- lowship, the National Science Foundation Graduate Fellow- ship and partially supported by the National Science Founda- tion Grant CCF-0830797. The second author was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant#0937060
to the Computing Research Association for the CIFellows
Project. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recom- mendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Sci- ence Foundation or the Computing Research Association.
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