How would one best integrate state weakness in a Wendtian-constructivist version of RSCT, based on notions of embedded rationality and rump materialism? The three-tier view of state structure presented in the previous chapter provides a useful starting point. The state is composed of material, institutional and ideational elements, with institutions as the primary source of agency, at the crossroads between ideas and matter, society and the state itself. This material/institutional/ideational structure stands in a complex relationship of exchange with society. On the one hand, as implied above in the mainstream literature, its purpose is the provision of public goods – above all, security – to groups within its underlying society. On the other hand, this underlying society – part of the state‟s physical base – is instrumentalised to a certain degree (through, among others, the extraction of resources) in order to provide this security. The provision of public goods is, thus, not a one-way street: resources are extracted from society by the state in return for its services.
For the purposes of this discussion, aimed at conceptualising state weakness in RSCT terms, I shall put forward two initial, preparatory arguments. Firstly, that state incoherence can in fact be described in terms of only the provision of security through a monopoly of legitimate force, which, in the context of RSCT, and in a wider context as well, is the only public good provided by the state directly relevant to its cohesion and continued existence as a state, and hence, wider, region-level security. The provision of other public goods is either not essential to statehood per se, or ancillary to the central aim of providing security. An important consequence is that state incoherence could be conceptualised in terms of securitisation, of unstable and incompatible, dissensual security discourses within state and society, which leads me to my second point. A state performs its essential purpose of providing security through institutions that hold a monopoly of legitimate force over a given territory and population. This latter characteristic – the monopoly of legitimate violence – is what makes a state a state and differentiates it from other arrangements that social groups may use to enhance their survival. The strength/weakness, (in)stability, collapse or fragmentation of states will depend on a complex relationship between that monopoly, these components of legitimacy and force, and the ability of the state to provide security, a relationship visible in the patterns of securitisation that pervade underlying society.
According to the authors writing from a functionalist perspective (Fukuyama, 2004b;
Rotberg, 2004), the state exists to provide a variety of public goods to its citizenry. All agree on the centrality of security, both from external and internal threats. Most add the provision of socio-economic goods: transportation, communications, education, healthcare, et cetera. Some extend the state‟s function to the provision of political
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freedoms as well. However, the fundamental purpose of sovereign statehood can be seen as residing only in the provision of security at an individual or sub-state group level through a monopoly of legitimate violence. In theory at least, states could exist as states without providing socio-economic goods or without being remotely democratic: it is, admittedly, to stretch the imagination, but in the ideal-type, libertarian night-watchman state, a situation could be envisaged where many of the above-mentioned functions are carried out entirely by the private sector18. The thoroughly Westphalian states of early modern Europe in fact did not provide many of the socio-economic functions attributed to contemporary statehood (Birnbaum, 1981; Van Creveld, 1999);
their involvement in society was truly minimal by today‟s standards, and freedom and democracy were certainly not seen as their „raison d‟être‟. In Fukuyama‟s (2004a, pp.
22-26) terms, their „scope‟ was extremely limited. This did not diminish their status as states.
Sovereign states are ultimately endowed with a monopoly of legitimate force precisely in order to provide security for groups within their underlying societies; at core, they can still be seen as contemporary expressions of Hobbes‟ Leviathan and Locke‟s social contract, remedies against the insecurities of anarchy. The fact that they have taken on a multitude of functions that apparently go beyond this fundamental purpose is based on a shift in the interpretation of what security exactly entails. Whereas prototypical 18th and 19th century states were concerned almost exclusively with the provision of military and political security – often to a narrowly defined elite – this concept has now been expanded to include the economic, environmental and societal issue-areas (Thomas & Meyer, 1984, pp. 467-469). „Security‟ is not constructed as simply entailing merely security of life and limb for the limited number of people who matter („society‟ in the restrictive, 18th-century sense of the word), it encompasses all individual citizens of the state, and implies much more than mere physical survival.
And while it may involve the provision of a raft of public goods, it is clear that many, if not most of these goods are in fact directly linked to the primary purpose of providing security at a collective and individual level.
To a certain extent, this echoes the Wendtian notion of state survival encompassing more than the mere existential continuity of institutions, territory and population; as the state is composed of both matter and ideas, defining its „survival‟ goes beyond the purely material (Wendt, 1999, pp. 233-238). In almost analogous fashion, the socialised individual defines his „survival‟ in terms that go beyond the merely physical
18 Nozick‟s “Anarchy, State and Utopia” (1974) was one notable attempt to construct just such a minimal, night-watchman state.
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(Wendt, 1999, pp. 130-138). Man cannot be content with simple survival in a physical sense, but also craves, indeed necessitates, social and cultural continuity, the stable existence of the reference-points that give meaning to the world around him: he defines his personal well-being in terms of socially constructed expectations that form part and parcel of the sense of self that is to be safeguarded from harm. Security, for the individual like the state, consists of a physical rump surrounded by socially constructed outer cultural and civilisational layers. Thus, when one says that the state must safeguard the security of its citizens or subjects, this goes beyond their mere corporeal integrity – the latter is merely the hard core of a complex concept – whose complexity and „layeredness‟ increases in tandem with society‟s as the latter modernises and raises individuals‟ expectations to ever-higher levels in a world of increasing
„disembeddedness‟ and „time-space distantiation‟ (Giddens, 1990). The provision by the state of a greater number of public goods to societies therefore to some extent masks its continued focus on an albeit much-expanded notion of security, which makes securitisation particularly relevant in discussions of state weakness, a point that will be amplified below19.
If security is taken to be a complex, socially and intersubjectively defined concept, and this fundamental exchange between the state and its underlying society – resources for security, broadly defined – is seen as the core, irreducible purpose of statehood, how can one conceptualise state survival or failure? The obvious functionalist or institutionalist reply would place it in the states‟ inability, or ineffectiveness, in performing their central task: providing security20. That is, however, a very superficial answer. States are but one in a plethora of alternative institutions capable of providing security to groups: empires, tribes, clans, feudal relationships. The objective here is to describe the incoherence and failure of states as states, to describe state failure and incoherence, not the general inability of societies to maintain their security through social „institutions‟, broadly defined. The one substantial characteristic that makes
19 This relates to the Copenhagen School‟s sectored view of securitisation (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 27-31).
Indeed, from historical political sociology, it would appear securitisations in the military and political sectors were the driving force behind the complex relationships of exchange that created the modern state. While every society will include a differing set of expectations as to the role (and legitimacy) of state action in each of the Copenhagen School‟s sectors, it does appear the military and political are of particular importance, directly linked as they are to the survival of the core physical, institutional and ideological aspects of statehood (Buzan, 1991, pp. 116-134). The linkages between the state and the societal, environmental and economic sectors, on the other hand, are more indirect and also quite recent, resulting from the expansion of state functions already mentioned above. The provision of security by the modern state in the societal sector, and the complexities attendant thereto, are of particular importance in view of the role of modern state nationalism in incorporating the state within the identities of its citizenry;
securitisations occurring in this sector will therefore be of particular importance in states where competing, alternative identities – ethnic, religious – are securitized by the state as political threats, and state ideology is securitized as a societal threat by sub-state groups.
20 Lake (1996, p. 2) even uses the metaphor of the state as a security-producing firm, while Tilly‟s conception of state formation is largely based on its role in war-making, with the latter at one point comparing the state to a protection racket (Tilly, 1985, 1990).
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states states and differentiates them from other security-enhancing institutional arrangements must thus be brought into play: Weber‟s (1984, p. 37) „monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force‟.
The answer to the question as to why states fail is contained in this very term: the continuity of states is determined by three distinct variables contained within this concept, monopoly, legitimacy and force. Each of these elements relates, to some extent, to one of the three components of „statehood‟ posited by Buzan. Force can be tied relatively easily to the state‟s physical base, while legitimacy is related to its ideational-ideological foundation. The sovereign monopoly, meanwhile, is a key qualitative attribute of the state‟s institutional-administrative features. Viewed from this angle, Buzan‟s approach seems to tightly link into Weber‟s definition of statehood, for while many authors tend to prioritise one of the elements by emphasising state capacity, institutional effectiveness or legitimacy, this particular approach most clearly acknowledges the complexities underlying Weber‟s definition.
Three questions must be asked when approaching the overall coherence of states: do they retain a monopoly of legitimate force by exercising effective sovereignty over their territories and populations? Are they capable of efficiently applying force to their respective societies? And, finally, in how far is this force accepted as legitimate by these underlying societies? The overall cohesiveness of states depends on, and can be conceptualised according to the complex relationship between these three elements of legitimacy, force and monopoly. Furthermore, the deficiencies and imbalances within and between these elements will be clearly visible within the patterns of securitisation that pervade a state‟s underlying society. In societies where the state does not carry out its core function – providing security – efficiently, securitisations will inform protective measures that circumvent the state; conversely, where a state lacks legitimacy, it will be securitised as a threat as its attempts at imposing or enforcing its authority collide with the disobedient mistrust of ordinary citizens.