Medidas cautelares aplicadas a nivel nacional año 2014

outcome will be fostered by candidate A or candidate B.]

58

In real life, democracy and politics is marked by much mutual antagonism and contempt. The assumption of deliberative theorists that politicians and citizenry are committed to an open and fair

discourse in the hope of reaching fair and appropriate solutions is not in keeping with the world as we know it.

analysis has suggested that the benefit from democracy to individuals is the opportunity to contribute to a collective outcome. However, it is conceivable that democracy may offer freedoms to citizens other than the freedom to contribute to democratic outcomes and, for the sake of completeness, I consider these here.

We should consider whether voters gain satisfaction from having contributed to the outcome (i.e. the successful outcome – a satisfaction that would not have existed if the voter’s preferred option had been imposed by the diktat of some unelected person). We should consider whether voters gain satisfaction from voting for their preferred candidate (whether or not successful) and from the expressive power of voting (again, even if their preferred option/candidate does not win the ballot). We should consider whether voters gain a satisfaction having been shown respect in that his or her opinion has been or could have made a contribution to the outcome.

For similar reasons to those already rehearsed, the opportunity to have the satisfaction from having contributed cannot form the basis of a valuable freedom. There is no equitable division of this opportunity of satisfaction. The voters who vote for the winning candidate may derive a satisfaction but those who vote for an unsuccessful candidate will not. Voters are likely to experience a certain satisfaction because the voter prefers a particular outcome and the voter has helped to make that outcome slightly more

likely by voting, whether or not that outcome materialises. A voter may also derive some

satisfaction from the expressive nature of voting. Even if the preferred choice does not prevail, the voter may experience some satisfaction from having had the opportunity to

have their opposition to some outcome registered and counted.59 It is doubtful, though, whether such satisfactions are distinct from the satisfaction of having contributed to the successful outcome/candidate or the dissatisfaction of having contributed to the failed bid. Surely all the satisfactions/dissatisfactions of voting should be aggregated. If that is the correct approach, it is likely that the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of voting for the successful/unsuccessful candidate will always be sufficiently strong to render the aggregate satisfactions of voting unequal. The satisfactions of those voting for the winner will always be significantly greater than the satisfactions of other voters and, that being so, the satisfactions offered by democracy will not be morally significant.

Even if the moral significance of the satisfactions of contributing to a preferred outcome (whether or not the preferred choice is unsuccessful) and the opportunity to express a commitment are considered separately from other satisfactions, these satisfactions do not, themselves, appear to be distributed equitably. Even if assessed distinctly, these

satisfactions must be considered contextually. Voters who voted for the unsuccessful option or candidate may reflect upon the fact that democracy provides other citizens with the opportunity of voting in self-interested, shallow or perverse fashions. Indeed, given that those that voted for the unsuccessful option/candidate on a moral basis consider that the voters voting for the successful option/candidate were mistaken, they are quite likely to harbour doubts about the bona fides, integrity and insight of many of those other

59 _{This expressive satisfaction is likely to be greater for the voter who is morally opposed to the successful}

outcome than for the person voting for reasons of self-interest. But it should be noted that a voter may gain a satisfaction from voting in a fashion which is in some sense morally dubious or even reprehensible. A voter might be voting in favour of some militaristic adventure fuelled by an embittered nationalism. It seems doubtful that a satisfaction so derived should be viewed as significant and as a proper subject of some procedural fairness.

voters. Thus, unsuccessful voters are likely to feel that their contribution, their

expression, has been subverted by those who act out of self-interested motives and those who act without thought. This will surely undermine any satisfaction that the

unsuccessful voters would otherwise have experienced. Their expression of support based on moral integrity has been drowned out by those acting from more base motives. Now admittedly, those feelings are likely to be felt whoever loses. We all tend to flatter our own opinions and conclusions and tend to be disdainful of those who disagree with us – look no further than academic journals. The point I am making though is that there is an inequality: those that contributed to a losing venture are going to be troubled by the assumed attitudes and motivations of the contributors to the winning venture whereas those who contributed to the successful outcome are unlikely to be so troubled. I suspect that this difference in satisfactions is always likely to be present where there is a single practice but incorporating two or more competing collective activities. Consider, for example, a cup final which passes off without any suggestion of bias or incompetence by referees and officials (or spot-fixing by players). All players on both sides may take some satisfaction from having taken part. All players had the opportunity to contribute. However, the losing players are likely to reflect on the fact that the other side had better players or that their team was hampered by some weak players or some injury, etc. The satisfactions of taking part in a sporting fixture or an election are not likely to be equal and thus will not be of moral significance.60

60 _{Even if the satisfaction of taking part and expressing oneself had been of moral significance, it may be}

worth noting that such satisfactions may have been minimal. First, the extent of the contribution voters have is not generally very great and that contribution is but one of very many and, secondly, immediate satisfaction must be set off against the possibility of later dissatisfaction.

First, then, the effort involved in voting is fairly minimal and any beneficial outcome is only achieved in concert with many other voters. That suggests that the satisfaction from having contributed or having

Perhaps, citizens derive satisfaction from the fact that each is accorded respect by the electoral process. Democracy is often thought to be an expression of the equal value of each human being. On the face of it, the influence over decision-making given to each voter suggests that the view and opinion of each voter is equally important. Indeed, it suggests that the each voter is afforded respect. The respect is apparently distributed equitably. So could the respect for citizens implicit in democracy be morally significant? There are reasons to doubt this. Again, such respect is not likely to be distributed

equitably. The respect which a citizen may be conscious of, because the state allows for his contribution to the democratic process, is not felt simply when the citizen has voted for the winner. So the benefit from being respected is not distributed similarly to the freedom of being able to contribute to the successful candidate or the satisfaction of having voted for the successful candidate. However, the way in which that respect is experienced by individual voters will be related, to some extent, to the likelihood that that voter will contribute to a successful outcome. In the situation rehearsed above where