Medio ambiente

A sso cia tio n is an extern al r e la tio n sh ip in the sense th at the in d iv id u a l nature of the ob ject is not conditioned by the other o b jects in the r e la tio n sh ip or the r e la tio n sh ip i t s e l f . The claim here i s that emotions and percep ts are not d iffe r e n t types of conscious con ten t, but d iife r e n t a sp ects of a u n ifie d agen tive con scio u sn ess. To e s ta b lis h t h is , we have to show th a t fe e lin g and se n sa tio n are both r e la te d to a c tio n , and show that they are in te r n a lly r e la ted as asp ects of a ctio n . In th is s e c tio n , then, we are concerned w ith th eories of f e e lin g and em otion. There are two th eo ries of emotion which dwarf a l l others both in terms of the range of phenomena they hand le, and the rich n ess of the d e sc rip tiv e schemata they employ. These are the th eo ries of S t. Thomas Aquinas and Sigmund Freud. Of cou rse, i t i s not p o ssib le to d e sc rib e , d isc u ss and defend th ese th eo ries h ere. We s h a ll con ten t o u rselv es with showing that they are both com patible w ith the views being expressed h ere.

The phenomena exem p lified in ca ses (1 ) to (7) seem to lend them selves to d e sc rip tio n in terms of concepts which f a l l n a tu r a lly in to two c a te g o r ie s; the f i r s t has to do w ith such co n stru cts as d e s ir e , m o tivation , and a p p e tite , and the second i:d.th value and reason . In the

examples above, (1 ) and (2) would be described in terms of a p p e tite and (5 ) and (7) in terms of v a lu e. This d is tin c tio n cu ts across th a t between c a te g o r ia l and co n crete, th en . I t a p p lies to dynamic asp ects of the p ercep tion and i t presupposes two d iffe r e n t s e ts or sources of em otions in humans. Of cou rse, in the v ersion of dualism cu rren t at t h is time a p p e tite i s seen as p ertain in g to the body, or the animal nature of man, and value to the s o u l, or d iv in e n atu re. T r a d itio n a lly , the two are s e t a g a in st each o th er. A common theme in medicA-val . lit e r a t u r e , for in sta n c e , is the need to d is c ip lin e the im agination and so ehsure that i t , and hence the se n se s, are the servan ts of reason or value and not of a p p e tite or p a ssion ( e .g . Richard of S t. V icto r, c l 180). The same d iv is io n appears in Aquinas, but we s h a ll see th at i t i s not c o n s is te n tly m aintained fo r one so rt of v a lu e , a e s th e tic v a lu e . This i s the so rt of value most relev a n t to th e o rie s of v isu a l p ercep tio n . Aquinas ch a ra cterised im pulse as c o n sistin g of two p a rts, in t e lle c t u a l impulse or w i l l and sensual impulse or a p p e tite . I n t e lle c t u a l impulse was d irected towards u n iv ersa l q u a lit ie s , and towards what Kant would have ca lle d ideas of reason , lik e God, im m ortality, tru th . A ppetite was d irected towards immediate s e n s itiv e good, lik e food or se x . A p petite g iv es r is e to emotions of two kinds, c o n cu p iscib le and ir a s c ib le . C oncupiscible emotions were th ose which in volved th e ir ob ject as being something good in i t s e l f , lik e d e s ir e , s a tis fa c tio n and

disappointm ent. I r a s c ib le em otions were those which rela ted to th e ir o b je c ts as providing d i f f ic u lt y , danger, support fo r an a c t iv it y o r ig in a lly m otivated by con cu p iscien ce; f e a r , anger, hope and d espair are ir a s c ib le em otions. In terms o f the exam ples, (1) and (2) would be d escrib ed in terms of co n cu p iscib le em otions, and (3 ) and ( 4 ), in terms of ir a s c ib le . These emotions can become organised in to h a b its, a ttitu d e s , and in t e r e s t s , and. th e se more long-term d isp o sitio n s can also'* be said to underly any p a r tic u la r m a n ifesta tio n of emotion, whether co n cu p iscib le or ir a s c ib le , and whether the ob ject o r ig in a lly p erta in s to w ill or a p p e tite . Aquinas cannot lo c a te a e s th e tic p leasu re w ith in reason fo r i t s o b ject i s c le a r ly sen su a l and p a r tic u la r . Y et, i t is c le a r ly not a form of a p p e tite . In the end, he lo ca te s i t w ith in n e ith e r d iv is io n , but w ith in what he c a lls 'th e s e n s it iv e pow er', which serves both reason and a p p e tite . The Thomist theory of p ercep tio n , lik e many modern th e o r ie s , sees p ercep tion as occurring at two le v e ls , an i n i t i a l , b a sic process of p a ssiv e r e g is tr a tio n , and ah a c tiv e , sy n th e tic p ro cess. The a c tiv e process i s c a lle d 'th e s e n s it iv e power' and has i t s own dynamics sep a ra te, in the case of a e s th e tic percep tion at le a s t , from the co n cu p iscib le and ir a s c ib le em otions.

T ranslated in to p sych oan alytic term s, reason , in so fa r as i t is ^ fa c u lty of mind th at determ ines the m orally good, has given way to the superego.

in te r n a lise d s o c ia l norm. The a p p etites form the b a sis of the id , which togeth er w ith th ese in te r n a lise d con trols c o n s titu te s the m otivation al base of our action s and ex p erien ce. C oncupiscible and ir a s c ib le emotions correspond approxim ately to the fu n ctio n s of the id in p rovidin g in s tin c t or energy d ir e c te d towards the s a tis fa c t io n of b io lo g ic a l n eed s, and to the fu n ction s of ego in coming to grip s w ith the world as i t thwarts or enables the s a tis fa c t io n of th ese n eed s, “r As in Thomlsm, h a b its and a ttitu d e s can be formed which serve th ese b io lo g ic a l needs only in d ir e c tly i f a t a l l .

Modern p sych oan alysis allow s the e x is te n c e of e g o -in s t in c t s , a b i l i t i e s and ten d en cies to acquire knowledge of the e x tern a l w orld, to fin d s ig n ific a n c e in events and a ctio n s ou tsid e th e ir immediate relevan ce to our needs and n eu roses. These do not depend on the id fo r th e ir energy, but are v ir tu a lly autonomous. They are a more ela b o ra te v ersio n of A quinas's sensory powers. The b asic stru ctu re in Aquinas i s very sim ila r to that ou tlin ed a t the end of the la s t ch a p ter. There i s a b asic le v e l of m otivation and w ith in th is b a sic o r ie n ta tio n towards a c tio n , there is or develops a se t of str u c tu r e s, a ctio n schemata, aimed a t s a tis fy in g these b a sic m otivation s again st the w orld. These stru ctu res have th e ir oxra autonomous dynamics, the ir a s c ib le em otions. They a lso require knowledge of the w orld, i . e . sen se knowledge. At f i r s t th is i s embedded in p a rticu la r a c tio n , but ev en tu a lly i t becomes

autonomous, and a third le v e l of stru ctu re d ev elo p s. This too has i t s own autonomous dynamics, in clu d in g a e s th e tic em otion. Both Freudian and Thomist th eo ries are i n t e l le c t u a li s t - d u a l is t . Thomism has i t s a p p e tite /r e a so n o p p o sitio n , and p sych oan alysis i t s p le a su re / con scien ce or id / superego o p p o sitio n . As

regards v alu e in gen era l, Aquinas, as we know, has a