Los medios de comunicación entre la dimensión ideológica y el poder simbólico

The main aim of electricity sector reforms in developing countries has been to improve the socio-economic welfare of the population. The parameter estimates of the performance equation (access) are presented in Table 2.4. The estimated coefficient of cor is positive and significant, suggesting that, an increase in corruption (i.e., a decline in cor) decreases access to electricity services. This result is consistent with the findings by other studies on how

corruption reduces the quality and quantity of publicly consumed services (e.g., Fredriksson et al., 2004; Estache et al., 2009).

The coefficient of the IRA dummy is positive and significant, indicating that for the period covered by the study, countries that have created IRAs have increased access to electricity. This result contrasts with those obtained by Estache et al. (2009) who associated the creation of IRAs with reduction in electricity access. The coefficient of priv is not significant indicating that the privatisation policies have no significant effect on electricity access. The estimate also contrasts with the findings of earlier studies such as Sihag et al. (2007) and Bhattacharyya (2006) who find that reform steps (e.g., privatisation) have led to a decline in access rates in the State of Orissa in India.

The coefficient of the interaction term iraXcor is positive and significant indicating that, creations of IRAs have amplified the influence of changes in corruption levels on electricity access, i.e., IRAs have been effective in enhancing electricity access when corruption has declined. The estimate of the interaction privXcor, is not significant suggesting that private sector participation has not been effective in addressing the negative influence of corruption. It may also suggest that corruption has not constrained the efforts of privatised utilities to increase access to electricity.

Regardless of the impacts of individual reform policies, the coefficient of iraXpriv suggests that together they exert a significant decreasing effect on access to electricity. In other words, although the creation of IRAs has led to increase in electricity access while privatisation has no effect, their interaction has led to reductions in electricity access. This may be attributed to the conflicting objectives of independent regulators and private utilities. Independent regulation may be keen to extend the often-subsidised service to mostly unelectrified poorer areas. However, private firms have shown little interest to extend the service to new low-

income and low-usage consumer groups.

The coefficients of gdpper, urban and struc are all not significant suggesting that income level, the size, and the structure of electricity markets have no impact on electricity access.22 The electricity generation per capita variable (genper) is positive and highly significant indicating that further increases in electricity generation leads to increase in electricity access. The time trend is not significant indicating that there has been no improvement in the electricity access of the region over time.

The earlier results indicated that the implementation of electricity reforms in SSA countries can reduce the negative influence of corruption on the performance of the sector. Similarly, the implementation of reforms in developing countries was noted to have anticorruption potentials to reduce the effects of corruption on economic development (World Bank, 2000). Therefore, it is expected that the electricity reforms in SSA to enhance economic performance at two levels. First, by enhancing the performance of the sector by improving technical efficiency and extending the service to those without access. Second, as part of wider economic reforms, often underpinned by an anticorruption strategy, the reforms can reduce the effect of corruption on economic performance.

Table 2. 4: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Energy Consumption Equation

Welfare Impact (ln access)

Variable Est. t-stat.

ln access(t-1) 0.871*** 23.46 cor 0.093* 1.74 ira 0.270*** 2.86 priv -0.051 -1.00 struc 0.032 1.09 iraXcor 0.157** 2.06

22 _{The non-significant coefficient for gdpper could be related to an ambiguous relationship between per capita} electricity consumption and income. It is expected that higher levels of per capita income imply higher per capita electricity consumption. However, it is also expected a negative relationship between these two variables for high levels of per capita GDP. This derives from the acquisition of more energy efficient appliances and the subsequent energy efficiency gains. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

privXcor -0.106 -1.60 iraXpriv -0.209*** -2.97 ln genper 0.092** 2.17 ln gdpper 0.018 0.41 urban 0.001 0.92 time 0.001 1.13 intercept -0.167 -0.62 No of obs. 515 No of countries 47 Instruments 37

AR(1) test (p value) -4.04 (0.000)

AR(2) test (p value) -1.55 (0.120)

Hansen test (p value) 31.74 (0.134) Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.5.3. Economic Impact – GDP Per Capita

In Table 2.5, where gdpper is a dependent variable in the performance equation, the coefficient of cor is positive and significant indicating that a decrease in corruption augments national income. This is consistent with other well-established findings on the relationship between these two variables (e.g., Barreto, 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Thus, an increase in the corruption control index is associated with an increase in per capita GDP. The coefficient of ira is not significant; suggesting that creation of IRAs has not had impact on the level of income.

The coefficient of priv is positive and significant indicating that private sector investments have boosted economic performance of SSA reforming countries. A similar result was obtained by Chisari et al. (1999) who find privatisation of electricity generation and distribution assets led to positive economic performance in Argentina. Similarly, the estimate of priv confirms the argument by the IMF that ESR policies such as privatisation has the

potential to free up energy subsidies and thereby boost economic performance over the long run (IMF, 2013).

Do the electricity reforms reduce the negative association between corruption and economic growth? The coefficient of iraXcor is not significant suggesting, that, for the period of this study, countries that established IRAs have not exerted beneficial effects on the negative association between corruption and per capita GDP nor has corruption affected the relation between regulation and economic performance. This is inconsistent with Jalilian et al. (2007) who stressed the importance of credible and independent regulation on economic growth. The coefficient of privXcor is positive and significant indicating that countries that open their electricity sectors to private investments have seen reinforced the influence of corruption on per capita GDP. Thus, countries with lower corruption levels have had further success in boosting income levels through private participation in the electricity sector.

The coefficient of iraXpriv is not significant suggesting that the interaction of the regulator and privatisation does not exert an influence on the economic performance. One of the two control variables in the model, struc, is positive and significant. This suggests that unbundling impacted positively on per capita GDP, after controlling for the effect of corruption. The time trend variable is significant which indicates that per capita GDP has increased over the period covered by the study.

Table 2. 5: Two-step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Income Equation

Economic Impact (ln gdpper) Variable Est. t-stat.

ln gdpper(t-1) 0.565*** 7.20 cor 0.261*** 3.38 ira -0.050 -0.51 priv 0.140** 2.34 struc 0.237*** 4.32 iraXcor -0.185 -1.63 privXcor 0.238** 2.34 iraXpriv 0.006 0.10 urban 0.014*** 3.75 time 0.001 0.73 intercept 2.563*** 5.98 No of obs. 515

No of countries 47

Instruments 41

AR(1) test (p value) -2.57 (0.010)

AR(2) test (p value) -1.13 (0.259)

Hansen test (p value) 30.45 (0.443) Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1