II. WRIT OF AMPARO III. HABEAS DATA
I.
Habeas Corpus
ART. III. SEC. 15. 1987 CONSTITUTION.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
ART. VII. SEC. 18. 1987 CONSTITUTION.
The President shall be the Commander-in- Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may: 1) review, 2) in an appropriate proceeding; 3) filed by any citizen, 4) the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and 5) must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
Villavicencio vs. Lukban (1919):
"A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited
them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.
Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased.
The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right."
"We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue.
Lansang vs. Garcia (1971):
Petitioners were arrested without warrants and detained, upon the authority of Proclamation 889 (Which suspended the privilege of the Writ of
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C O N S T IT U T IO N A L L A W IIHabeas Corpus) and subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, assailing the validity of the said Proclamation and their detention.
The Court upheld the violation of the Proclamation and dismissed the petitions. The Supreme Court held that the authority to
suspend the privilege of the writ is
circumscribed, confined and restricted, not
only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised.
Thus, the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual bases for the proclamation in order to determine its constitutional sufficiency. The test for such judicial inquiry is whether or not the Executive acted arbitrarily in issuing the Proclamation. The
test is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
For the suspension of the privilege of the writ to be valid, (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or, pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present, and the Supreme Court agreed. The President did not act arbitrarily; the Court acknowledged the existence of a sizeable group of men (Communists and the NPA) who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
Moncupa vs. Enrile (1986):
It is not physical restraint alone which can be inquired into by means of the writ of habeas corpus. In this case, the petition is valid as petitioner’s temporary release from detention is accompanied with restrictions w/ the ff effects: 1) curtailed freedom of movement by the condition that he must get approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila, 2) abridged liberty of abode because prior approval of respondent is required in case petitioner wants to change place of residence, 3) abridged freedom of speech due to prohibition from taking any interviews inimical to national security, and 4) petitioner is required to report regularly to respondents or their reps.
Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons (1971):
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, is habeas corpus the appropriate remedy?”
YES. In Cruz vs. Director of Prisons (1910), "The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess,
The rule is that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid." xxx “While the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the
accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners
clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their release.”
Sombong vs. CA (1990):
Sombong claims that she is the mother of the child Christina, who is under the custody of Neri, and filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court denied the petition.
In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. However, habeas corpus may still be resorted to even if the restraint is voluntary in cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the child is in the custody of a third person of her own free will. Sombong does not have the right of custody over the child, because the evidence adduced does not warrant the conclusion that Christina is the same person as her child Arabella.
Velasco vs. CA (1995):
Larkins was arrested after a certain Alinea filed a complaint-affidavit for rape against him before the NBI. There was no warrant. A complaint for rape was subsequently filed before the RTC. His common-law wife filed a petition for habeas corpus.
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C O N S T IT U T IO N A L L A W IIThe Supreme Court held that even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. The court must thus look into the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events are:
The issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.
Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained.
By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available.
Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted an offense in the Philippines." It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction.
II. Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data
QUERY WRIT OF AMPARO HABEAS DATA
What is the writ of amparo?
Remedy
Available to any person
Whose right to life, liberty, and security
has been violated or is threatened with violation
By an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity.
The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Remedy
Available to any person
Whose right to life, liberty, and security
has been violated or is threatened with violation
By an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity Engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
What rule governs petitions for and the issuance of a writ of amparo?
It is governed by The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC ), which was approved by the Supreme Court on 25 September 2007. This Rule also governs existing cases involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC), which was approved by the Supreme Court on 22 January 2008. That Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
What is the Supreme Court’s basis in issuing the Rule?
The Rule was drafted pursuant to the Supreme Court’s constitutional power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights (Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]).
(Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]).
When does the Rule take effect?
The Rule takes effect on 24 October 2007, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
The Rule takes effect on 2 February 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation. Who may file a petition
for the issuance of a writ of amparo?
the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order:
The aggrieved party.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
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C O N S T IT U T IO N A L L A W IIQUERY WRIT OF AMPARO HABEAS DATA
Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;
Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
disappearances, the petition may be filed by
o Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
o Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
Where can the petition be filed?
The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with:
The Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred,
the writ shall be returnable before such court or judge. or with the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Appeals, or any justice of
such courts.
The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. It may be returnable before
such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
The Supreme Court, or any justice
The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. it may be returnable before such
Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or
respondent resides,
or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals;
Sandiganbayan: when the action concerns public data files of government offices.
How much is the docket or filing fees for the petition?
There is NO docket and other lawful fees for the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket the
No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner.
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C O N S T IT U T IO N A L L A W IIQUERY WRIT OF AMPARO HABEAS DATA
petition and act upon it immediately.
The petition of the indigent shall be
docketed and acted upon
immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than 15 days from the filing of the petition.
What is the
required burden of proof?
The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that
ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
Instead of having the hearing in open court, can it be done in chambers?
Yes. It can be done when the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character
Can the respondent invoke the legal presumption (Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3[m]) that official duty has been regularly performed?
No. The respondent public official or
employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo (2008):
The Manalo brothers were abducted, detained, and tortured repeatedly by the military. After their escape, they filed a petition for the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. The Supreme Court granted the petition and held that there was a continuing violation of the Manalos’ right to security. Considering that they only escaped from captivity and have implicated military officers, there is still a threat to their lives, liberty, and security. The threat vitiates their free will and they are forced to limit their movements and activities. The government also failed to provide them protection because the military themselves perpetrated the abduction, detention, and torture. The
government also failed to provide an effective investigation.
As regards the relief granted, the Court held that the production order under the Amparo rule is different from a search warrant and
may be likened to the production of
documents or things under Rule27.1, ROC. They also said that the disclosure of the
present places of assignment of the
implicated military officers would not
jeopardize the exercise of the military
functions of the officers. Such disclosure is
relevant in ensuring the safety of the Manalo brothers.