BARRERES I SEMIBARRERES TIPUS NEW JERSEY:
GR MESURES CORRECTORES D'IMPACTE AMBIENTAL I JARDINERIA GRZ ELEMENTS ESPECIALS PER A ESTRUCTURES
vigor.69 The use of light as a conceptualization of life (Job 3:20) is reserved for human per-
sons in particular, whereas the concept of breath is also used of animal life (Gen 1:30, 2:7; Eccl 3:18-21). This distinction suggests both continuity and discontinuity between human life and animal life in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, a distinction strictly maintained in the creation stories of both Genesis 1 and Genesis 2, although with a slightly different nu- ance in each. Genesis 1 reserves for human life only the description of being made in the im- age of God (Gen 1:26). Genesis 2 records all the animals being made from the soil of the ground, but only humanity is recorded as vivified specifically by the divine breath (Gen 2:7). In colloquial terms, the ancient Israelites confessed that there was something unique and spe- cial about human beings in contrast to animal beings, although all share the same quality of being alive.
The present investigation of the LIFEIS LIGHT metaphor begins with an examination of
the phenomenon which the OT calls "the light of the eyes." I will argue here that this specific phrase and the accompanying language of light in reference to human eyes refers not to light that strikes the eyes from outside the body but rather refers to a phenomenon pertaining to a person's internal self that is visible in their eyes.
66. Jer 10:14, 51:17; Hab 2:19; Psa 135:17; Job 7:7, 9:18, 19:17; Lam 4:20. 67. Prov 4:23, 13:14, 16:22; see comparison to wisdom in Prov 18:4.
68. Prov 18:21; see also references to the concept "tree of life" in Prov 3:18, 11:30, 13:12, 15:4.
֒ם ָע ָה־ת ֶא ֮וי ִב ָא ַעי ֣ ִבּ ְשׁ ַה ְבּ ע ַ֗מ ָשׁ־א ֹֽל ן ֣ ָת ָנוֹי ְו ו ֔ד ָי ְבּ ר ֣ ֶשׁ ֲא ֙ה ֶטּ ַמּ ַה ה֤ ֵצ ְק־ת ֶא ח ַ֗ל ְשׁ ִיּ ַו ֹשׁ ֑ ָב ְדּ ַה ת ֣ ַר ְע ַי ְבּ הּ ֖ ָתוֹא ל ֹ֥בּ ְט ִיּ ַו ׃ויֽ ָני ֵע ה ָנאֹר ָתּ ַו וי ִ֔פּ־ל ֶא ֙וֹד ָי ב ֶשׁ֤ ָיּ ַו ר ֶמא ֹ֗יּ ַו ם ָ֜ע ָה ֽ ֵמ שׁי ִ֨א ֩ן ַע ַיּ ַו ר ֹ֔מא ֵל ֙ם ָע ָה־ת ֶא ךָי ֤ ִב ָא ַעי ִ֨בּ ְשׁ ִה ַ֩ע ֵבּ ְשׁ ַה םוֹ ֑יּ ַה ם ֶח֖ ֶל ל ַכא ֹ֥י־ר ֶשׁ ֲא שׁי ֛ ִא ָה רוּ ֥ר ָא ׃ם ֽ ָע ָה ף ַע֖ ָיּ ַו ן ָ֔ת ָנוֹ ֽי ֙ר ֶמא ֹ֙יּ ַו ץ ֶר ֑ ָא ָה־ת ֶא י ֖ ִב ָא ר ֥ ַכ ָע ׃הֽ ֶזּ ַה שׁ ֥ ַב ְדּ ט ֖ ַע ְמ י ִתּ ְמ ַ֔ע ָט י ֣ ִכּ י ַ֔ני ֵע וּר ֹ֣א־י ֽ ִכּ ֙א ָנ־וּא ְר
Now Jonathan had not heard when his father made the people swear an oath: and he stretched out the end of the staff that was in his hand;
and he dipped it in a honeycomb of honey;
and he returned his hand to his mouth, and his eyes brightened. And a man from the people answered, and he said:
"Surely your father made the people swear an oath, saying, 'Cursed is anyone who eats bread today.'"
And the people were weary. Then Jonathan said,
"My father has troubled the land.
See how my eyes brightened because I tasted a little of this honey!" [1 Sam 14:27-29]
In the above translation, I have followed the Qere reading ה ָנ ְרֹא ָתּ ַו in v.27 in accordance with the strong tradition of translations over against the LXX, which more closely matches the Ke-
tiv instead (הנארתו). This is a significant textual issue for the argument I propose below, so
this translation decision must be justified. The verb is certainly a Qal wayyiqtol; the primary textual issue is whether the root lexeme is האר ("to see")––as suggested by the order of writ- ten consonants––or רוא ("to brighten"), as suggested by the context in v.29. The main prob- lem with the Ketiv reading here in v.27 lies in the attested verbal form, where the reader would expect to find a linking י (yod) consonant in place of the third radical ה when the ver- bal suffix is attached (as is seen with the Qal yiqtol of האר in Isa 29:18 and Mic 7:10). Puz- zlingly, the LXX translates both this verb and the Qal qatal verb וּרֹא in v.29 with different verbs of seeing (ἀναβλέπω and ὁράω, respectively); and without access to the LXX Vorlage
text, the modern scholar can only bluntly speculate why the LXX translators chose those par- ticular differing verbs. The fact that the same רוֹא + ן ִי ַע subject-verb construction appears in v.29 paired with the strong tradition of translation provides extremely compelling evidence for the superiority of the Qere reading in v.27. These two specific attestations of the lexical verb רוֹא are important because of the rarity of the Qal form in the OT, which suggests that the Qal form is used for a specific reason over against the prototypical Hiphil form.
In this narrative, the Israelite army under King Saul has embarked on a campaign to find and kill the Philistines. In a particularly non-lucid moment, King Saul orders the entire army not to eat any food until they have found them (v.24). Jonathan was not present when this order had been given, and later in the day he finds some honey and eats it (v.27). The text reports that "his eyes brightened" after he ate the honey. In the prototypical sense of the verb, the Qal form of the verb suggests that "eyes" are the indirect object of the shining action, meaning that light from some source is shining on the eyes, causing them to be in a brightened condition. This sense seems confirmed in the text itself, because Jonathan asks his friends to observe the fact that his eyes have brightened. Thus, this concept of bright- ening the eyes is not a purely abstract metaphor but is referencing some actual physical ex- perience. It seems clear from the context that the "brightening of the eyes" is not the effect
of some external light source; Jonathan's eyes did not brighten because the sun is shining
brighter than before, or because Jonathan has put a candle near his face. Rather, the bright- ening of the eyes is the result of some internal change that has taken place within Jonathan's body, as if some light from within Jonathan himself brightens his eyes, producing an ob- servable result (Ruark 2017:91-92, italics and underline added).
The Qal form of the verb in this specific context provides the key hermeneutical starting point for the structural metaphor LIFEIS LIGHT. In the ancient Israelite conceptual world, a person's inner life (having both quantitative and qualitative value) was conceptualized as light and is visible in a person's eyes. There are a precious few attestations in the OT that re-
fer to this inner personal life as a conceptualized light; yet, I argue that the data is sufficiently coherent and consistent to infer some conclusions. In the ancient Israelite conceptualization, a person's inner life had both quantitative and qualitative value. Quantitatively, this conceptu- alized "light" was visible in the eyes while a person was alive but was extinguished when the person died. Qualitatively, this conceptualized "light" had potential to wax and wane depend- ing on physical strength (Psa 38:11), emotional mood (Psa 13:4), moral comportment (Ezra 9:8), and perhaps other factors as well.
In Psa 38:11, I understand the psalmist to be using hyperbolic language to say that the light of their eyes was greatly dimmed, not literally extinguished; but this verse demonstrates that the concept of the light of the eyes being "extinguished" was an operative conceptualiza-
tion in the ancient Israelite conceptual world. I infer from Psa 13:4 (in tandem with Psa 38:11) that the ancient Israelites conceptualized the "light of the eyes" as being extinguished at the time of death. I hypothesize that this conceptualization is based upon observable changes that occur in a human person's eyes under various physiological and psychological conditions, i.e., when a person is happy or sad, guilty or innocent, energetic or fatigued, even alive or dead (Thomas 2014:267-270). As expressed in the somewhat sterile language of a scientific journal:
Recent studies have shown that the light response [of the human eye] is far more than a reflex, and reveals what you attend to, how you interpret what you see, and even what you think about....In summary, the pupillary light response reflects mental state in exquisite de- tail. It is truly a mind's eye (Mathôt & Van der Stigchel 2015:374,378).
The fact that this concept of inner personal life (conceptualized as light) includes actual em- bodied phenomena demonstrates that the metaphor LIFEIS LIGHT is not merely a structural
metaphor in the ancient Israelite conceptual world but is itself also a primary metaphor. Al- though proving this specific point goes beyond the scope of the current study, it seems likely that this specific primary metaphor underlies linguistic conceptions in modern societies and not only ancient ones.70 To offer one such example, in modern English, it is not uncommon
to speak of a person's eyes as "bright" or even "shining," which suggests that the same con- ceptualization is operative in the conceptual world of a typical English speaker. As with the previously-mentioned metaphor THE VISUAL FIELDISA CONTAINER, this primary metaphor sat-
isfies both the Generalization Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment and thus is plau- sibly applicable to all languages, both ancient and modern. At the very least, there is ample anecdotal evidence from other languages that the metaphor LIFEIS LIGHT is a legitimate pri-
mary metaphor based on the theories of embodied cognition and CMT.
70. For further discussion concerning the primary metaphor LIFEIS LIGHT, see: Lakoff &
Johnson 1980:56-60; Grady 1997:25-31; Ritchie 2013:23; Dancygier & Sweetser
2014:198-200. This particular metaphor has not yet been explored to significant cognitive depth within the field of CL, although Grady's brief discussion of the metaphor HAPPINESSIS
BRIGHTNESS relates to it obliquely (citation above). Kovecses treats HAPPINESS metaphors with
much greater depth, including the metaphor HAPPINESSIS LIGHT (Kovecses 2015:159-175).
The use of light and sight metaphors for the concept of LIFE is explored in depth by Avrahami
The primary evidence on which this claim is based is the coherency and consistency of the various operative metaphorical projections. I have shown already how, in the ancient Israelite conceptual world, the ICM of רוא in the physical domain is projected onto the perso- nal domain and is used specifically to organize the emotional subdomain and the moral sub- domain. Therefore, if the cognitive metaphor LIFEIS LIGHT is not simply a structural
metaphor but is also a primary metaphor, the reader would expect that the concept of inner personal life (and its conceptualization as light) both includes and organizes concepts in the emotional subdomain and the moral subdomain. Such is precisely the case in the OT; the inn- er life of a person operates in both the emotional subdomain and the moral subdomain.71
Prov 15:30 affirms that the luminary of the eyes rejoices the heart, and a good report fattens
the bones.72 The OT is replete with affirmations that morally righteous behavior has positive
qualitative effects for a person's life and happiness, but perhaps no affirmation is so explicit as Prov 12:28, In the path of righteousness is life, and in that pathway there is no death.
One specific extension of the primary metaphor LIFEIS LIGHT is shown in the linguis-
tic phrase found in the OT, the "light of the face" (Psa 104:15; Job 29:24; Prov 16:15). As with the conceptualization of the inner personal life as light, in the OT this linguistic constru- al is applied only to persons and not to animals. I contend that this conceptualization is a sec- ondary application of the primary metaphor LIFEIS LIGHT in the ancient Israelite conceptual
world, utilizing especially the metaphorical projection of the ICM of רוא into the emotional subdomain but certainly including the moral subdomain as well (Ruark 2017:93-95). The main point here is that while the concept of the "light of the eyes" in BH is fundamentally in-
71. Attestations of a person's inner life operating in the emotional subdomain include: Exo 1:14; Deut 28:64-67, 30:15-20; Job 3:20, 9:21, 10:1, 24:22; Psa 31:9-10, 13:12; Eccl 2:17, 9:9, 10:19. Attestations of a person's inner life operating in the moral subdomain include: Deut 28:64-67, 30:15-20; Prov 2:19, 4:13,22, 5:6, 10:11,16,17, 11:19,30, 12:28, 21:21; Ezek 33:15.
72. This attestation represents a possible exception to the cognitive model. It is possible, although not necessary, that the derivative noun here conceptualizes the eyes themselves as the illuminating object rather than the illuminated object. However, this seems very unlikely due to the lack of any other textual evidence in the OT to affirm this conceptualization. It is also possible that the unvocalized term was originally a Hiphil participle ריאמ ("illuminating of the eyes") rather than the derivative noun רואמ ("luminary of the eyes"). Finally, there simply is not sufficient evidence to conclude that this attestation deviates from the overall cognitive model, although it is possible in this instance. See also section 3.2.2b.
tra-personal, focusing on the person's internal state, the concept of the "light of the face" is
fundamentally inter-personal, focusing on a person's relationship to another person. This re-
lational application of the primary metaphor LIFEIS LIGHT serves as one of the primary bases
for the inter-dynamism of the concepts of wisdom and life in BH as well as the primary con- ceptual link between the physical domain and the metaphysical domain in the ICM of רוא in the ancient Israelite cognitive environment.