challenge. It was less likely that the Antarctic "would become the scene or object or
international discord" (in the words of the Antarctic Treaty) and less likely that the
Treaty system, which protected their individual and collective interests, would be
undermined. The consultative parties addressed the question of minerals activity for
fear that if they did not the Treaty system would be challenged and undermined. The
43. This comment was made by Oscar Pinochet, in his opening statement on behalf of the Chilean delegation at ATCM-VII in 1972. France suggested that "the search for a solution to this problem must be subordinated to the solution o f the problem of how to avoid rivalries the consequences of which would inevitably be borne by the powers in possession of Antarctic territory" (A N T /2 ,1972). Argentina, urging caution in dealing with this issue, asked "should we ... let ourselves be carried away by the interests of economic concern ... to the detriment of the purpose of maintaining peace and avoiding conflict" (ANT/37, 1972).
44. This is based on the assumption that a claimant would not undertake minerals activity outside its claimed territory.
logic of this was summarised by the British (FCO 1988:5-6): the absence of a consensus on a permanent moratorium, they suggested, necessarily carried with it the need to negotiate a minerals regime. There was no guarantee that, even in the absence of rules and security of title to resources, risks would not be taken by operators. If such risks were taken, the Antarctic Treaty system would not survive. Consequently, the risks to the consultative parties attendant upon doing nothing were unacceptable. Therefore a minerals regime had to be negotiated. Such a regime would not, however, prejudice whether minerals activity in Antarctica would, or would not, take place.
The consultative parties were not unaware of the potential for adverse environmental impact as a result of mineral exploitation and the need to exercise their responsibility for the protection of the environment.45 However their concerns at this early stage were with the political and legal aspects of the issue. The potential for environmental damage did not translate into a philosophical debate about whether the Antarctic should be declared ‘off limits’ to mineral resource exploitation.
The internal differences raised by the minerals question reinforced the need for consensus which characterised the Treaty regime. Whatever was agreed upon had to have the support of all consultative parties in order that conflict could be avoided. There was consensus on the need to keep any negotiations which might be undertaken within the Antarctic Treaty forum. Caution and the need for consensus were keywords.
The incrementalism that characterised Antarctic decision-making generally was particularly in evidence in the consultative discussions on the minerals question in the 1970s. It took just over a decade for the consultative parties to progress to a point where they agreed to convene a special consultative meeting to negotiate a minerals convention.
The minerals issue was on the agenda of every consultative meeting from 1972 to 1981. A recommendation on this issue was adopted at each of those meetings. The principles and objectives adopted through those recommendations reflected the normative concerns of the Antarctic regime which focussed on political stability, the need for consensus and maintenance of the compromise on sovereignty. A number o f groups of experts were convened at consultative and preparatory meetings. Political and legal issues were always dealt with independently of scientific, technical and environmental issues.
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The following table sets out the tortuous eleven year process which led to the convening o f formal negotiations for a minerals convention. The discussion which follows focuses on those parts o f that process which were important in defining the principles and objectives and advancing the parties towards the final agreement.
Table 1
Progress in the 1970s on the question of mineral exploitation and exploration
Year Meeting/action
1970 ATCM-VI. Informal discussion
1972 ATCM-VII. Recommendation VII-6 adopted
1973 Nansen Foundation Meeting. Working Group on Legal and Political Questions; Working Group on Scientific and Technical Questions
1975 ATCM-VIII. Recommendation VIII-14 adopted.
1976 SCAR Secretariat paper "Antarctic Resources - effects of mineral exploitation" and SCAR Working Group on Geology paper "Mineral occurrences and mineral exploration in Antarctic; prepared in response to recommendation VIII-14.
1976 Special Preparatory Meeting, Paris. Legal and Political Working Group; Scientific and Technical Working Group.
1977 Report of the SCAR Working Group on the Environmental Impact Assessment of Mineral Resource Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica (EAMREA).
1977 ATCM-IX. Working Group on Legal and Political Aspects; Group of Experts on Exploration and Exploitation; recommendation IX-1 adopted
1979 Preparatory Meetings for ATCM-X. Group of Ecological, Technological and Other Related Experts on Minerals Exploration and Exploitation (held in accordance with recommendation IX-1); preparatory meeting on legal and political aspects of mineral exploitation.
1979 ATCM-X. Working Group on Legal and Political Aspects; Working Group on Scientific and Environmental Aspects; recommendation X-l adopted.
1980 Preparatory Meeting, Washington DC, December
1981 Report of the SCAR Group of Specialists on Antarctic Environmental Implications of Possible Mineral Exploration and Exploitation (AEIMEE)
1981 ATCM-XI. Claimant caucus meeting; no information on working groups; recommendation XI-1 adopted.
ATCM VII, 197246
The minerals issue was first raised, by New Zealand, at the preparatory meetings for ATCM-VI in 1970.47 An informal and off-the-record discussion was held at the sixth
46. ATCM-VII took place just after the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm which put environmental concerns firmly on the international agenda.
47. R B Thomson (of the New Zealand Department of Scientific and Industrial Research) was reported as saying that expected diamond and platinum finds would lead NZ to raise the subject of exploitation (Christian Science Monitor, 6-8 June 1970). New Zealand had also received an application to prospect and develop off the Ross Sea (Colson 1980:884). The issue was dropped at the third preparatory meeting which nevertheless confirmed a consensus understanding that without prejudice to the position of members concerned chiterritorial issues, no unilateral action should be taken with respect to the problem of mineral prospecting in Antarctica (Doc ANT/2, 1970). The US and UK delegations raised the question again as a possible agenda item, at the fifth preparatory meeting.