Methodology

The drastic changes in news production experienced since the multi-channel and post-network era brings with it questions surrounding legitimacy and the ability of the news media to properly educate and inform news audiences. Kellner (1990: 64) argues that prior to deregulation, the news media operated under the same rules associated with the professional journalism era - news was considered a

democratizing tool and the broadcasters were public trustees. But according to Baym

(2010: 170, 171), since the multi-channel era and the infiltration of entertainment and popular culture in news, television networks have all but abandoned their aspirations for fulfilling a fourth estate role to inform viewers about the world or holding power to account. Kellner (1990: 67) and Hallin (1994: 177) concur, adding that the re-crafting of news led to a drastic reduction in hard news and public affairs

programming, and a rise in popular tabloid cultures of partisan entertainment and sensationalist topics.

The evidence provided suggests that popular culture has had a detrimental effect on the democratic role of the news media. There are a number of reasons why scholars have firmly reached this conclusion. Popular culture is, after all, a text marketed for profit, and tends to follow a standardised and formulaic approach, which Strinati (1995: 10) argues “denies intellectual challenge”. Indeed, this is an argument that has been aimed at television news content in particular and has been echoed by a variety of scholars. Bob Franklin (2003: 12) for example, asserts that in an attempt to keep audiences interested, infotainment news has had to adhere to a standardised format to keep audiences interested. Consequently, journalism has morphed into

“McJournalism”, which offers audiences a relentlessly dull, consistent and staple diet of news programming (Ibid). This staple diet is highlighted by McChesney (2004: 61) as sensationalism, with a focus on crime, sex, scandal and celebrity in order to capture the audience’s attention. Coverage of political stories follows a similar formula in that the media focuses on exposing or embarrassing politicians (Lloyd 2004: 15, &

McChesney 2004: 61). Also, despite the duty of care that the media have in properly informing citizens with all the facts during election time, it appears that campaign coverage is also subject to entertaining elements. National policies are often ignored or marginalised (Oates 2008: 94) in favour of coverage that concentrates on the

‘hoopla’ of the campaign. This includes focus on personality, potential gaffs and scandals, or horse race which concentrates on which party is ahead in the polls (Dahlgren & Sparks 1997: 12). The ‘horse race’ has become a popular way in which to frame campaign coverage, as Farnsworth et al (2013: 133) argues that it has come to dominate election coverage in recent years. This was certainly the case in the 2008 election, where 80% of election coverage was devoted to who was winning in the polls (Rogers 2012). Without equal coverage on the political positions and policies of the candidates, excessive horse race coverage may contribute to the political divide

that Jon Stewart speaks of in his rally invitation. News in this instance is more about who is winning, rather than which candidate can better serve the needs of the public.

The examples above suggest that contemporary journalism, with its inclusion of popular culture traits, is in a state of crisis. Habermas (1974) described an informed citizenry as a collective who rely on information, facts and rational argument for political sense making. Yet the contemporary media’s thirst for ratings has resulted in a media system that is not living up to its democratic responsibilities because it often fails to provide audiences with important facts. The undesirable outcome of the news that follows this infotainment approach is a ‘media spectacle’³ that creates a citizenry that is uninformed, misguided and manipulated (van Zoonen 2005: 11). Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone thesis goes one step further, arguing that popular culture is detrimental to civic engagement, whether in the form of voting or general deliberation (Cited in Street et al 2013: 17). Neil Postman, another contributor to this field of research, has also made a similar assertion. On first inspection, his original thesis might be considered out-dated in the contemporary media landscape that relies on a multitude of media platforms. In his book Amusing Ourselves to Death, Postman (1985) argues that television’s fixation with entertainment restricts and therefore damages how media messages are decoded by its audience. Moreover, he believes that entertainment makes content less serious, less relevant and less coherent (1985:

67-80). The consequence is that audiences are provided with information that gives them something to talk about, yet it does not lead to any meaningful action (1985:

68).

Thus far, this section has examined a series of arguments on the limitations of popular culture and its negative impact on citizen learning and political participation. Other scholars however have challenged this interpretation of infotainment news, because while these formats might exclude the usual characteristics associated with hard news reporting, their effects can be positive for citizen learning. Temple (2006: 257), for example, argues that the “so-called ‘dumbing down’ of news is an essential part of engaging audiences”. This is because infotainment and popular culture can capture

3 Media spectacle is described by Kellner (2003: 1) as methods used by the media to seize audiences and to increase their power and profit.

audiences who are unresponsive to more conventional coverage of political issues (Ibid). Temple presents a valid argument because it is ignorant to assume that all citizens are interested in traditional or hard news programming - after all, people connect with media in different ways. Simons (2003: 17) and Bauman (1992: 14) concur; however, they relate the negative responses to popular culture in news as elite snobbery. Both assert that previously, intellectuals earned the “right to tell others”

what to do by establishing “universal standards of morality and taste” (Ibid). This is an argument that draws parallels with the work of Bourdieu (1984: 7) who writes:

The denial of lower, coarse, vulgar, venal, servile – in a word, natural enjoyment, which constitutes the sacred sphere of culture, implies an affirmation of the superiority of those who can be satisfied with the sublimated, refined, disinterested, gratuitous, distinguished pleasers forever closed to the profane.

The standards of taste highlighted by these three scholars suggest that popular culture is an indicator of vulgarity or low intelligence, thus elites argue that it should be separated from more refined and intellectually stimulating cultural texts. Or, in the case of this study, that popular culture has no place in the realms of political news reporting. Such judgements of superiority however are redundant especially when elite intellectuals are often professional academics or highly educated individuals (Simons 2003: 174), therefore they are more likely than most people to engage with hard political news. This certainly reflects Bourdieu’s (1984: 1) argument, that levels of cultural understanding and taste are markers of higher levels of education and class.

In their criticism of popular culture, intellectuals are failing to acknowledge different publics who want to raise their political awareness, but not through highbrow political programming. Cottle (2001: 76) and Temple (2006: 267) add further weight to this argument, affirming that people of all ages and backgrounds use a variety of genres to make sense of the political world. This, coupled with the idea of fragmented

audiences created by the advent of cable news, encouraged the broadcast media to become more inventive and democratic by reflecting the concerns and needs of the wider population, other than those expressed by the cultural elite.

This section has demonstrated how popular culture's emergence into news and public affairs is not necessarily an indicator of journalism and citizenship in crisis. Instead infotainment has made political news more accessible and inclusive to audiences who

are unresponsive to hard political news programming (Norris 2000: 13, 15).

Infotainment and popular culture certainly have democratic value by helping inform audiences, but it can also be a suitable terrain for democratic participation too.

Scholars including Norris (2000), Schudson (2009) and Street et al (2013) have recognised the potential in popular culture to encourage civic participation. Street in particular (1997 & et al 2013) has written extensively on this subject, where he attributes popular culture’s ability to connect people together on an emotional level with like-minded individuals and communities, which can then be a source of political action.

The central theme in Street's et al work is that popular culture has the ability to connect citizens from local and distant locales together through a shared idea. Street raises a valid argument that can be applied to scholarly research on fandom and activism. Brough and Shresthova (2010), for example, characterise ‘fandoms’ as groups of individuals who are drawn together through interest-driven affiliations, thus forming a sense of collective or sub-cultural identity around shared tastes. While fan approaches to activism may not be political in the traditional sense (e.g. changing legislation or provoking social change), it does encourage forms of action, including lobbying for a content-related outcome, such as a programme staying on air or the promotion of social themes in programme content (Brough & Shresthova 2010, Ross 2008). The infusion of popular culture in both hybrid satire shows like TDS and in partisan news programmes might work in a similar fashion in that they bring audiences together who identify with the same political views or satirical jokes.

Whether TDS in particular can inspire civic participation and action remains to be seen, but it is a question that will be explored later in this study. The remainder of this chapter explores the scholarly debates relating to partisan news specifically and its impact on citizen engagement with news and civic participation.