6. Contexto, metodología y resultados
6.2. Metodología
‘Where the weaker side is forced to fight against the odds, its lack of numbers must be made up by the inner tension and vigor that are inspired by danger. Where the opposite occurs, and despair engenders dejection instead of heroism, the art of
war has, of course, come to an end.’ - von Clausewitz, On War 1
‘We were dog tired and had inadequate arms and ammunition.’
- E.G. Smith, Platoon Commander, 21 Battalion2
After the battle at Platamon, 21 Battalion withdrew to Tempe at the western exit of the Pinios Gorge in order to establish a further block position astride the route to Larisa.3 They were joined at Tempe by elements of the Australian 16 Brigade. The Pinios Gorge, or the Vale of Tempe as it was also known, was the second and most significant of two major natural chokepoints between Katerini and Larisa. It had been the site of battles as far back as 480 B.C. when the Greeks used it to defend against invading Persians.4 The Pinios Gorge was a constricted route of approximately eight kilometres length from the eastern entry point to where the gorge opened onto a plain between Tempe, Evangelismos and Makrykhorion. The Pinios River was ‘30 or 40 yards’ wide and flowing ‘deep and swift.’5 The gorge was ‘ideal for defence, sheer walls each side, railway running parallel on the right, river in centre and road on the left against other wall of gorge.’6
This chapter analyses the battle of Pinios Gorge, but only from the perspective of 21 Battalion and Battlegroup 2. It does not examine the part played by 16 Brigade other than
1 von Clausewitz, On War, p. 337.
2 E.G. Smith to J.F. Cody, letter, undated. Correspondence 21 Battalion historian. WAII 1 DA 54/10/20,
NA.
3 Some documents and account use Peneios rather than Pinios. The Germans used Larissa rather than
Larisa.
4 ‘The forgotten Anzacs’, Sunday Star Times, 24 April 2011, p. C8.
5 Narrative: Ch 7 Greece, p. 14 (page number on left marine is p. 22) 21 Bn War History. Shaw T.R., 21
Battalion Unit History: Chapter 7 Greece-Preliminary Draft and Chapter 6- move to Greece. WAII 1 DA 54/15/3, NA.
The purpose of analysing this battle is to establish why such a short time after 21 Battalion had held off the considerably stronger Battlegroup 2 at Platamon, it was rendered ineffective by a much smaller force, even though the unit was now in a brigade setting, had been reinforced with anti-tank guns and was deployed in suitable defensive terrain in a natural chokepoint. This chapter examines, in particular, the effects of terrain (this time in dissipating combat power), the impact on combat effectiveness of the loss of key equipment, and the psychological effect of 6 Mountain Division’s operations.
Map 4.1: 21 Battalion defensive positions at Pinios Gorge7
7 Cody, 21 Battalion, p. 59. The two arrows indicating the direction of approach of Battlegroup 2 ands 6
Mountain Division and the blue oval have been added for this study. 21 Battalion’s positions are indicated by the small labelled goose-eggs (of the original) within the blue oval.
Battlegroup 2 approach 6 Mountain
Div approach
Battlegroup 2
21 Battalion was opposed by elements of Balck’s Battlegroup 2 at the Pinios Gorge. They approached the gorge from the north east (from the top right corner of Map 4.1) and were immediately impeded by the Pinios River which prevented them entering the gorge. The troops closing on the Pinios Gorge consisted of two ad-hoc groups rather than the formal battalion and regimental organisations they had faced at Platamon. The northern group of (dismounted) motorcycle troops, supported by tanks initially, advanced west along the northern bank of the Pinios. The southern group, consisting of tanks and infantry, crossed the river eventually and followed the road into the gorge, where they confronted elements of 21 Battalion. The northern group consisted of:
Cycle Squadron (Company) of 112 Recon Unit, 6 Mountain Division8 Panzer Company, I/3 Panzer Regiment
The southern group consisted of:
Six tanks of I/3 Panzer Regiment9
No 7 Company, II/ 304 Infantry Regiment (following the panzers)
Two patrols, 8/800 Brandenburg Regiment (advancing along the hilltops)
8 I. McL Wards, Campaign Narrative- 2 NZ Division, Volume IV- Campaign in Greece- Part IV, December
1953, KMARL, p. 470. This Mountain Division unit had attempted unsuccessfully to find a mountain crossing to Gonnos and after descending towards the east end of the Pinios Gorge had been taken under command by I/3 Pz Regt and used as scouts on the northern bank of the Pinios.
9 W.E. Murphy, 2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery, Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1966, p.
61. Entry for 18 Apr and annotated on sketch map. A.A. Yeoman, Activities of 21 NZ Bn during Greek Campaign, Apr 1941. WAII 1 DA 54/10/2, NA. Yeoman, whose platoon was located on the high ground above the gorge, recorded in that he saw 18 tanks advancing along the gorge road. Wilson reports that he saw ‘several tanks and half-track troop carriers.’ It is possible that Yeoman, from his vantage point, mistook some half tracks for tanks. Yeoman’s location is marked on Map 4.1 as ‘Patrols 11 Pl B Coy.’ Wilson to Shaw, letter, dated 4/11/49. Wilson EG Tempe to Cyprus Apr- May 1941. WAII 1 DA 54/10/17, NA.
were, however, three key differences, all to the advantage of the Germans. First, the northern group was able to bring high volumes of direct fire against the New Zealand defences from across the river, whereas there had been no direct fire support from any flank at Platamon. Second, German tanks were able to penetrate the New Zealand defence because there were no terrain barriers to block the panzers from entering the gorge. Third, 21 Battalion was threatened with being cut off by 6 Mountain Division from the direction of Gonnos. This added to the psychological pressure on CO 21 Battalion and his men, who were now no longer novices, but still not veterans, and who were tired and much less prepared for defensive operations than they had been at Platamon.
21 Battalion
General Thomas Blamey, commander of the ANZAC Corps in Greece, decided that a brigade sized force was required to defend the Pinios Gorge area in order to prevent the Germans reaching Larisa. 16 (Australian) Brigade was given the task. The formation, of which 21 Battalion was to be a part, was designated “Allen Force” after the brigade’s commander Brigadier Arthur “Tubby” Allen. Allen’s instructions were to prevent the Germans occupying Larisa from the east through the Pinios Gorge. 2/2 Australian Infantry Battalion was the first of Allen’s battalion’s to reach the gorge. They were veterans of fighting in Bardia and Tobruk in December 1940 and January 194110. On arrival at the gorge, Macky and CO 2/2 Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Fred Chilton) confirmed 21 Battalion’s responsibility for the defence of the western end of the gorge, just as the Greeks had decided two millennia before.11 2/2 Battalion would be positioned further to the west again, to cover the rear of 21 Battalion and the approach from the north across the Pinios River. 2/2 Battalion’s company positions are visible in Map 4.1 as the “goose-egg” shaped markings with broken lines lining the south bank of the Peneios River from Tempe to almost Parapotamos. 21 Battalion was now part of a brigade defence, although the brigade commander and his staff had yet to arrive and so the two
10 Kevin Baker, Paul Cullen, citizen and soldier: the life and times of Major-General Paul Cullen AC,
CBE, DSO and Bar, ED, FCA, Dural, NSW: Rosenberg Publishing Pty Ltd, 2005, pp. 52- 58.
themselves.
On the morning of 17 April, Chilton and Macky, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Parkinson (Commanding Officer 4 Field Regiment- Major Stewart’s commanding officer), Major Stewart, Lieutenant Williams and Lieutenant Longmore conducted a reconnaissance of the western section of the gorge. There was some disagreement between the two infantry COs over who was in overall command of the force until Brigadier Allen arrived. A further point of difference between the two was over the disposition of the anti-tank guns. Macky wanted them sited to the west of the battalion where they could fire on tanks emerging from the gorge. Chilton wanted the anti-tank guns sited in the valleys towards the rear of the 21 Battalion position where they could fire enfilade (flank) shots at the tanks before they emerged from the gorge.12 As the anti- tank guns had reported to Chilton, he sited them within the 21 Battalion location. Such a disagreement was natural, for opinions would be divided over where best to position the guns, and neither man was an expert.
For the period that 21 Battalion defended at Pinios Gorge, they came under command at different times of Anzac Corps HQ, 2nd New Zealand Division and 16 Brigade. This led to confusing command arrangements and left the battalion fending for itself.13 There is no record of the battalion having received Anzac Corps Operations Instruction Number 1 of 16 Apr 41, NZ Division Operation Order Number 3 issued on the same day, or 16 Brigade orders. The Corps instruction was distributed to the NZ Division and to 16 (Australian) Brigade, but not to 21 Battalion. It is doubtful therefore that 21 Battalion was aware of the bigger picture and the overall scheme of defence, or plans for withdrawal.
12 Wards, Campaign Narrative- Campaign in Greece- Part IV, p. 464.
13 G.A. Dutton, to J.F. Cody, dated 16/7/50. Correspondence concerning 21 Battalion’s part in Greek
Campaign. WAII 1 DA 54/10/20, NA. Captain Garth Dutton was the battalion’s Adjutant. He recalled that at Platamon ‘we were transferred to Australian command and then back to N.Z. command and so on, every day or so, just nobody’s baby in fact.’ The confusion is amplified further in Narrator’s Note; Para 55. Wards, Campaign Narrative- Campaign in Greece- Part IV, facing p. 485.
east. B Company was deployed forward and ‘somewhat dispersed’ into platoon locations that could not give each other mutual support.14 10 Platoon (Lieutenant Rose) was placed well forward, opposite the railway tunnel on the north side of the river, guarding a large crater demolition which blocked road access for vehicles and tanks through the gorge. 11 Platoon (Lieutenant Yeoman) was tasked to patrol forward of Ambelakia village, so was well above the gorge, forward of D Company. 12 Platoon was sited on its own, covering the road ahead of C Company. The 10 and 12 Platoon positions are the forward “goose- eggs” in Map 4.1.C. As 11 Platoon was dispersed, it’s general location is indicated in Map 4.1 by the arrow to the right of D Coy, marked “Patrols 11 Pl B Coy.”
C Company was located centrally while A Company, located behind it, was designated reserve, and held in rear behind a ridge. D Company was allocated high ground
overlooking the gorge. The company positions are clearly visible on Map 4.1.
The four anti-tank guns deployed towards the western end of the gorge were sited where they could fire side on shots at enemy tanks from behind high ground, and would
theoretically be protected by the infantry positioned forward of them.15 Anti-tank shots into the side of the panzers would strike the weaker armour and therefore be more likely obtain a kill. Further, positioning the antitank guns to a flank placed them in the panzer’s blind spot, outside the arc of fire of its main gun.
The artillery gun line was established just south of Evangelismos. The guns were dug in and the position camouflaged. Three artillery Observation Posts were established on high ground in order to observe enemy and call in fire. 21 Battalion was part of a combined arms defence although a number of factors which will become evident, prevented the defensive battle being executed on a combined arms basis.
14 Wards, Campaign Narrative- Campaign in Greece- Part IV, p. 466.
strengthened by the allocation of supporting artillery and by the siting of four anti-tank guns towards the rear of its position. It was weakened by the 36 casualties sustained at Platamon and loss of key equipment, particularly the battalion’s only wireless, all of its telephone cable, its digging tools, and its mortars. 2/2 Australian Battalion of 16
(Australian) Brigade was able to produce sufficient spare cable, much of it acquired from the Italian’s they had been fighting in Libya.16 This enabled a single telephone line to be connected between the two battalion headquarters. Communications were tenuous at best. The organisation of 21 Battalion at Pinios Gorge was:
21 Battalion: (Lieutenant Colonel Macky) A Company (Captain McClymont) B Company (Captain Le Lievre) C Company (Captain Tongue) D Company (Captain Trousdale) Carrier Platoon (Captain Dee) In location: 17
L Troop, 7 NZ Anti-tank Regiment, four 2 Pounder Anti-Tank guns (Lieutenant Longmore)
Artillery Observation Post (Captain Nolan) located in the high ground towards Ambelakia18
In Support: 19
26 Battery, 4 NZ Field Regiment (Major Stewart) A Troop, 5 NZ Field Regiment (Lieutenant Williams)
Macky understood the need to prevent enemy movement towards Larisa. On arrival at Tempe, the direction given to him by Brigadier Clowes, Commander Corps Royal
16 Baker, p. 53.
17 ‘In location’ refers to units not under command of 21 Battalion, but sited within the battalion’s area in
order to perform their function and to be protected by the infantry elements.
18 Murphy, 2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery, p. 59. Nolan located his OP on high ground on the
Tempe- Ambelakia track overlooking the gorge. He had telephone communications to the artillery only.
19 Refers to units not under command of 21 Battalion, but whose task was to support it (usually from the
deny the gorge to the enemy till 19th April even if it meant extinction.’20 Brigadier Allen arrived at Tempe on the afternoon of 17 April. He approved the 2/2 and 21 Battalion dispositions.
SUMMARY OF KEY EVENTS
Battlegroup 2 approached the gorge from the east in two groups on 17 April. The Cycle Squadron of 112 Recon Unit (moving dismounted), followed by a tank company of I/3 Pz Regt approached along the railway line on the north side of the river. 10 Platoon fired from across the gorge at the northern group as the Germans attempted to bypass the blocked railway tunnel. The tanks following behind the dismounted motorcyclists then engaged 10 Platoon from across the river. The weight of this tank fire from the other bank forced the New Zealand platoon 200 metres back up the ridge away from the gorge, highlighting at this early stage in the battle the vulnerability of New Zealand infantry positions to tank fire generally, and to direct fire from across the river. Macky withdrew 10 Platoon, ‘the men having been three days without rest.’21 They were not replaced, so the demolition was then unobserved.22 As a result the eventual German breaching of the obstacle was not opposed or even known to 21 Battalion.23 This was a fundamental error which Macky later admitted when he wrote the obstacle was ‘rendered unobservable when this platoon had to be withdrawn… had we created an effective block which could be held under observation and preferably by artillery then the tanks would never have got out of the gorge.’24
20 McClymont, To Greece, p. 251. General Blamey, ANZAC Corps Commander, dispatched Clowes to
visit 21 Battalion at Platamon and ascertain the situation because of the reports received. By the time Clowes was able to get forward, 21 Battalion was already crossing the Pinios River. Gavin Long, Australia in the War of 1939- 1945 Series 1 (Army), Greece, Crete and Syria, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953, pp. 95- 96.
21 McClymont, To Greece, pp. 321- 323.
22 Narrator’s Note: Para 33. Wards, Campaign Narrative- Campaign in Greece- Part IV, facing p. 475.
23 Wards, Campaign Narrative- Campaign in Greece- Part IV, p. 475.
24 Macky to L. McL Wards, letter, dated 9th February 1954. The letter is Macky’s comment on Ward’s
Map 4.2: Detail of 21 Battalion dispositions, Pinios Gorge25
At first light on 18 April, the Cycle Squadron continued its advance along the north bank to a point opposite C Company and 12 Platoon where it was halted by machine gun, mortar and artillery fire from the south bank.26 From first light until at least midday on 18 April, the Germans on the north bank were 21 Battalion’s focus. One commentator wrote ‘We were happy in our work as we felt well able to deal with infantry.’27 Morale was good- the men had plenty of targets across the river but were not under direct threat
25
Wards, Campaign Narrative- Campaign in Greece- Part IV, facing p. 461. The map original is in colour, no additional symbols have been added. This map from the campaign narrative clearly shows the tunnel demolition and the crater (the latter being labeled road block). 10, 11 and 12 Platoon are clearly widely separated. C Company is shown as a single goose-egg, although its platoons are known to have been sited in individual locations within the area indicated. 21 Battalion’s headquarters location is indicated by the small flag-like symbol between C and A Companies, just south of Tempe village.
26 Wards, Campaign Narrative- Campaign in Greece- Part IV, p. 475.
towards the rear of 21 Battalion, but on the opposite side of the gorge.
Balck’s southern group had been halted by the Pinios River on 17 April, unable to cross into the gorge itself, for there was no bridge, and the New Zealanders had destroyed the only barge. However, German reconnaissance parties, actually two officers ‘in underwear and high boots’,28 located a small island in the Pinios River that offered the possibility of assisting in a tank crossing. The approximate crossing point is indicated on Map 4.2 by the words towards the top right, in red font, “I/3 crosses here, 17-18 April.” Balck
decided to risk one tank in a trial crossing.29 It got across. Each tank crossing took 30- 60 minutes thereafter. Once three tanks had crossed they closed up on the crater where they were successfully blocked by the extent of the unguarded demolition.30 At dawn on 18 April, No 7 Company of 304 Regiment crossed the Pinios on kapok floats. While one platoon provided local security, two platoons worked to clear the crater demolition, without interference, so the tanks could proceed into the gorge itself.31 Figure 4.1 shows panzers wading the Pinios River.
Although 21 Battalion’s fighting at the Pinios Gorge on 18 April was largely against
Battle Group 2, it was conducted against the back drop of the much larger movement towards the Pinios River by troops of 6 Mountain Division whose thrust was directed behind 21 Battalion against the remainder of Allen Force, primarily upon Chilton’s 2/2 Battalion. This threat behind the Battalion, from the direction of Gonnos to the north, started to shape 21 Battalion perceptions. From first light on 18 April, enemy were seen at Gonnos. German infantry were reported moving into Itia, immediately across the river