Metodología cualitativa versus cuantitativa

At present we work in a world where two forms of manufacturing are rivals – ‘where elements of Henry Ford production and Peter Faberge craftsman-

ship coexist’, as a writer in The Economist expressed it. Automation is

driven further at the same time as dependence increases on the skills and personal responsibility of autonomous work-teams. Manufacturing facili- ties must provide work environments that fulfil both human needs, the need for technical change and development of the work organization. The large, all-purpose production shed has serious problems from an environmental point of view, problems that are ominous in a situation where production

is becom-ing increasingly dependant on workers’ skill, commitment and

versatility. The tailor-made factory, formed around a specific production concept is not an alternative when fluctuating market demands and stiff competition make flexibility, automation and new forms of work organiza- tion imperative.

It is clear that the turbulent economies and social climates of today (and tomorrow) can best be addressed through flexible organizational behav- iors, supported by those tools and production facilities that are themselves adaptive to change and turbulent conditions. Kalmar and Uddevalla were designed to provide adaptive workplace conditions for the new ways of working developed at Volvo for more than twenty years. Over that period of time Volvo made steady, incremental departures from its traditional ways of assembling at Torslanda. Over an even longer period of time, Japanese companies were gradually/incrementally perfecting the just-in-time and lean production approach to manufacturing.

The spatial cultures of Kalmar and Uddevalla represent the two milestones

in Volvo’s development of its flexible process of automobile production. In

principle, both facilities provide the process, tools, materials handling and inventory systems to make other kinds of consumer products. In the case of Uddevalla, the vast sheds of the materials workshop and its computer system, the geographically separated product assembly workshops, each

with 80–100 skilled workers, provide small group assembly potentials that could be developed.

It may be that in its own way, Uddevalla is more adaptive to the demands of changing market forces than the parent company and its strategic plan- ners and market researchers. Of the two facilities, perhaps Uddevalla offers more possibilities for production alternatives because of its more distributed,

radiating plan, compared with Kalmar’s closed hexagons. On the other hand, Uddevalla’s site and ‘customized’ configuration places limitations on reuse

as a traditional assembly plant. Pysical and social distances have also proved to be a disadvantage of the Uddevalla layout. It could be possible, however, to extend the potentials of production flexibility, not only to varied product lines, but also to occupancy by multiple owners and small companies or incubators. This is not the case with Kalmar, or some of the single umbrella or shed designs of the conventional production facility, despite the process line flexibility these may offer in their uninterrupted floor space.

In its relatively short life span, Uddevalla has demonstrated a new way of working, with the radical and primary objective of building the whole car. Earlier experimentation with team built subassemblies at Kalmar made the

later development comprehensible and feasible. Yet one may aski, did the

Volvo company go far enough in its own strategic thinking about the global marketplace and competition that it would face in the 1990s? Slow to react to the new product needs of the marketplace and slow to adapt to volatile business conditions, Volvo now finds itself reverting to a more traditional

form of production. Why? A loss of corporate nerve? Powerful outside influence and events? A fear of having gone too far in its pioneering new

ways of manufacturing?

Just how flexible and how broad in function the factory of the future must be, has been outlined by Chase and Garvin (1989) in their article The Serv- ice Factory. Flexible factories offer flexible and changing services and are

adaptive to new customers’ needs. These factories offer customers timely

feedback on the manufacturing of new products; they produce prototypes rapidly, and involve customers in evaluating new products. Factories of the new kind often act as demonstration devices that promote new and more effective ways of making products, pulling potential customers into the factory and making them an important part of the process. This type of production facility can act as a laboratory for new ideas suggested by end users. Such a facility links up with the after market service and life of the product produced to make sure that changing needs are addressed.

3M Medical Electronics Systems Manufacturing Division is a current example of this type of factory. The 3M factory provides a full scale simulation complex and classrooms in the plant where surgical teams from hospitals around the country are invited to simulate and devise new types

of equipment for new procedures. 3M staff and customers codesign new products with medical professionals who take these new products back to the hospitals for trial. Staff and users watch and critique the codesigning from adjacent classrooms. 3M is a leader in adapting its manufacturing to

meet its users’ needs.

The service factory of the future involves all employees in generating high

quality products. As Peter Drucker has pointed out, knowledge work in the

factory of the future will allow workers to interact in all stages of product development from the design concept to the servicing the product in use.

Did Kalmar and Uddevalla, as the most progressive components of the Volvo culture have this potential? Perhaps. But not without more progres- sive product strategies and market know-how. Do such production cultures

exist, or are they merely aspirations? According to Chase and Garvin (1989),

many companies are on the way to realizing these potentials, namely Hewlett

Packard, Allen Bradley and Caterpillar. It may well be that the most progres- sive cultures for such development are not to be found in the auto-mobile industry at all. In a study of over 200 factories by the IBM Consulting Group, researchers rated factories according to the best available international standards for such criteria as product quality, logistics and manufacturing, lean production and state of the art tools and facilities. Those scoring over 80% on the resulting scale were defined as world class. The best perform- ing industries were those of electronics, information technologies and food manufacturing. The worst performers were those manufacturing automo- biles and aerospace components.

There is little doubt that automobile industries around the world are at a critical stage in their evolution, of which the choices between modes of production, as well as the role of machines and the role of people are cen- tral issues. Uddevalla is closed at the precise moment when the Japanese manufacturers are seriously reconsidering the culture of their way of work- ing, and the negative effects this work culture is having on the attitudes of

Japan’s younger generation.

Urban metaphors in factory design