2. Marco teórico:
4.10 Metodología de enseñanza que se aplicará:
and observations on induced loss of consciousness effected through centrifu- gation of selected aircrew, resulting in head-to-foot cerebral hypoxia and ischaemia through rapid Gz-force acceleration. The ‘z’ subscript refers to a force acting in the vertical body plane (head-to-feet), as opposed to a frontal (‘x’, back-front) or lateral (‘y’, through-shoulders) plane of applied force. Such acceleration-hypoxic forms of induced unconsciousness persist for up to 20 seconds, or about 40 seconds if the subsequent period of confusion is included. Importantly, a fairly invariant pattern of sequenced psychophysiologic events obtains. The experiential outcomes were related to the degree of centrifugal G force applied and sustained, and hence to those parts of the brain remaining functional, compromised and/or de-inhibited from higher centre control. ‘Dreaming’12occurred with the most strongly applied Gzforce, that is, with the greatest degree of enforced cerebral ischaemia, and was located to a precise 12-second window during these carefully timed experiments.
The dreams evoked by this experimental mode of inducing cerebral ischae- mia were of high emotional content, associated with detailed visual imagery, vestibular components of floating or other fictive movement, and illogical experiential sequences. Relatives or friends figured predominantly in these dreams, while memories and thoughts were specifically relevant to the in- dividual’s personal history, precisely as is witnessed with ECE. I quote:
I was floating in a blue ocean, on my back. . . asleep but not asleep. I knew the sun was up. . . like someone trying to wake me up. I woke up and was on the centrifuge. I did not want to wake up I could see myself on the water, and also look at the sun: the sky was blue and the sun very yellow.
Or:
I was being propelled by something like a magic carpet.13
11 Whinnery J and Jones D, Aviat Space Environ Med 58: 943 947, 1987; Forster E and
Whinnery J, Aviat Space Environ Med 59: 517 522, 1988; Whinnery J and Whinnery A, Arch Neurol 47: 764 776, 1990; Powell T, Aviat Med 8: 301 316, 1956; Burton R, Aviat Space Environ Med 59: 2 5, 1988.
12 Forster and Winnery, 1988.
13 Forster and Whinnery 1988, 520; Whinnery J, J Near Death Stud 15: 231 258, 1997,
specifically 245 246.
Here there are strong vestibular influences giving rise to powerful illusions of fictive movement accompanied by visual vividness, a profound sense of ecstasy, and a sensation of light before consciousness supervened.
It was also quite apparent that mnemonic function was one of the first cognitive functions to return, thereby permitting the subsequent phenomena to be remembered. Also, like ECE experiences and the Golden Gate survivors, the memories remained crystal clear and of high intensity for many subsequent years. Clearly, the persistence of memory for ECE subjects has no special relevance to their encounter with death. The sequence of experien- tial recall embodied ‘tunnel’ and vestibular phenomena, visual hallucinations, emotive feelings, audition, and finally motor competences. Moreover, the confusion attending the post-recovery period is clearly not a barrier to later detailed recall of the experiences undergone. Importantly, some of these pilots refused to accept that they had been unconscious until they viewed their video-recorded episodes of centrifugation. Moreover, some of their experiential accounts from ~50% of subjects contained confabulatory ele- ments, possibly associated with the desire to conceal the observed lapses in conscious-awareness as an attempt to maintain professional dignity and continue flying.
Here, we see a clear, reproducible cycle in brain reactivation as conscious- ness was re-established analogous to that accompanying ECE recovery. In- deed, Gz-enforced dreams seem to be microcosms of the ECE event. It is very noteworthy that the experiences remembered by centrifuged aircrew led the experimenters to conclude: ‘it is interesting that a coherent visual illusion can be generated within such a short period of time’.14Most interesting, indeed. And even more interesting that none of the authors I consider here made use of these striking evidential contributions towards a more balanced scientific understanding of ECE phenomenology.
There is, however, one subtle difference worthy of attention. Subjects recovering from induced syncope or centrifugation were clearly aware that they were not approaching death and therefore were not going to die, unlike the majority of ND subjects. Thus, despite the obvious neurophysiological similarities in the patterns of narrative recall, the former accounts lacked specific descriptive reference to ‘heaven’ or ‘heavenly bodies’ (i.e. God or Jesus Christ). The implication of this signal difference is further evaluated below in section 4.3.a.
14
And finally, in relation to ECE narratives, I should point out once more that for these experiences to be remembered and thus recalled, sufficient brain function has to be in place for the relevant new memory to be laid down. That strict requirement, noted by Whinnery and colleagues in the Gzstudies out- lined above, must always apply, even if it were insisted that the subject was experiencing extra-corporeal ‘free’ consciousness or spirituality. An ECE cannot occur when the brain is ‘dead’, ‘down’, or at its most hypoxic or ischaemic. If that were the case, then there could be no establishing of memories for the events that are later recalled. In fact, there would be no story to tell at all. Conversely, it is important to note, whether for dream-state modes or ECE, that while the illusion of having acquired vast knowledge and insights is remembered, the content of that new information is not.
I think the flaw with Dr Fenwick15 is his assertion that ‘consciousness’ escapes and exists independently of the brain when the latter is ‘dead’. On the contrary, using the timed data from the three examples cited above (Golden Gate bridge attempted suicides, loss of consciousness from hyperventilation/ forced Valsalva manoeuvres, and Gz-enforced centrifugal brain ischaemia), it is patently obvious that a great deal of subconscious mentation and imagery can be synthesized in a few seconds of cerebral real-time but only, as experi- mentally demonstrated, in those last few moments during which the brain is reawaking, contingent with restoration of a competent circulation. We need neither ‘dead’ brains nor the forced deus-ex-machina-necessity of ‘free con- sciousness’ to account for the illusions undergone and reported: that only adds confusion to circumstances amenable to a more convincing, neurophys- iologically based explanation.
I also think Dr Fenwick is wrong in supposing that the confusion exhibited by people on awaking after a cardiac arrest precludes vivid recall of brain- associated perception, as opposed to his notion of free-floating conscious perception. Subjects are confused after acute vascular occlusion to the brain, yet are perfectly able to describe vivid events which occurred while being unconscious. We can also be very drowsy after a dream, yet recall it with perfect memory once the post-awakening period of drowsiness has passed. Moreover, those memories persist, not only for ECE—and as if something ‘mystically’ exclusive therefore pertained to them alone—but with Gz- enforced experiments and for the Golden Gate bridge survivors, as well. These memories could be put down either in the prelude to the establishing of unconsciousness, as is more probable for OBE, or during an NDE experi- ence which is more the outcome of a brain rapidly regaining its former state of full conscious-awareness.
15
Fenwick P 2004a, b.
To be fair, Fenwick is talking only about cardiac arrest-induced ECE.16 However, his view again falters because subjects who do not lose their blood pressure or suffer acute circulatory shutdown experience identical forms of imagery. Fenwick’s proposal, based on such a shaky metaphysical founda- tion about free-floating ‘consciousness’ and ‘dying brains’, seems highly improbable. His proposals are also capable of other interpretations, and it is those other interpretations which I am in the business of exploring and articulating.
4 . 2 . G R A M M AT I C A L C R I T I Q U E O F E C E NA R R AT I V E : S E M A N T I C S A N D S Y N TA X
Having introduced the key element of my argument—that much of ECE phenomenology is a rapidly evolving accompaniment of waking brains abruptly ceasing as consciousness is regained—I now turn to consider the grammatical material of ECE narratives: this comprises another objectively based critical approach concerned with their semantic content and syntactic structure. In these approaches, I borrow and apply additional technical methods employed within the world of dream-state research. The inference will reinforce my claim that we are dealing with intra-cerebral, rather than extra-corporeal, circumstance. That is, ECE originate through direct synthesis from, or out of, the brain rather than being pointers to events occurring external to the brain as might be engendered by a sojourn in some type of other-worldly realm.