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Metodología de producción de software educativo 40

4. El software educativo 36

4.1 Metodología de producción de software educativo 40

I have argued that a hotel chain can choose from four different modes for overseas expansions, including three contractual modes and one equity mode. Under the three contractual modes, the respective ownership rights to the software systems and hardware facilities of an international hotel are assigned to two specialist firms, while the full rights to brand the hotel can be assigned between those firms in three different ways. A hotel chain can also use the equity

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mode to expand abroad, by concentrating the ownership rights and branding rights to the overall software-hardware bundle in a single integrated firm that consists of two specialist divisions.

In treating the right to brand a hotel as the right to claim the reputation residuals of the hotel brand, I identify an agency issue called branding agency—which differs from the

conventional agency problem based on ownership rights. The nature of the branding agency issues and the principal-agent roles of a manager and developer vary across the four branding options (i.e., three contractual mode options plus one equity mode choice).

In the cases of manager branding and developer branding (Figure 3.5 and 3.6), a single brander claims all of the reputation residuals of the software-hardware bundle and hence can be seen as the full principal. The non-brander sells all its reputation contributions at a fee without claiming any reputation residuals and thus can be seen as the full agent.

Figure 3.5: Branding principal-agent relationship in manager branding ( reputation contribution; reputation residual)

In these two branding options, the full principal must incur positive agency costs to monitor the actions of the full agent in building and protecting the reputation of the hotel brand. The choice of manager vs. developer branding is determined by the relative agency costs that

would be incurred by each party in the role of full principal to monitor the full agent. Fee (Full Principal ) (Full Agent) Hotel Manager Hotel

Developer

Hotel Software

Hotel Hardware

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Figure 3.6: Branding principal-agent relationship in developer branding ( reputation contribution; reputation residual)

If the agency costs of manager branding and developer branding are both high, the two parties can retain their rights to brand the software systems and hardware facilities of the focal hotel through manager/developer co-branding (Figure 3.7). In the absence of reputation interaction (that is, the action of one party does not alter the reputation of the other), the two hotel specialists both act as full principals who claim separate streams of reputation residuals based on their brands. As a result, they are fully motivated to build and protect the reputation of the manager/developer co-branded hotel and do not need to incur any costs to address the issue of brand agency that occurs when one party (agent) sells its reputation contributions to the other party (principal) at a fee.

However, the presence of reputation interaction means that the action of one co-brander affects the reputation of the other. In such cases, the two co-branders claim a stream of reputation residual that depends in part on each other’s actions. As such, their reputation contributions to the manager/developer co-branded hotel can be divided into two portions—one that they can claim as a principal directly from hotel guests, and the other that they must sell as an agent to the cooperating partner at a fee. Because the two co-branders are not rewarded solely by reputation residuals claimed from guests, they are both partial principals. Because the two co-

Fee (Full

Principal) (Full

Agent) Hotel Manager

Hotel Developer Hotel Software Hotel Hardware

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branders sell only a portion of their reputation contributions to each other, they are both partial agents. Therefore, under manager/developer co-branding, brand agency occurs in a two-way manner—where both parties are principals and agents at the same time. This differs from the one-way brand agency in manager branding and developer branding—where one party is a principal, and the other is an agent. Owing to the presence of reputation interaction, the two co- branders still have to incur positive agency costs to coordinate their joint efforts in building and protecting the brand reputation of the focal hotel.

Figure 3.7: Branding principal-agent relationship in manager/developer co-branding ( reputation contribution; reputation residual)

When the three contractual-mode branding options (i.e., manager branding, developer branding, and manager/developer co-branding) all fail due to high agency costs, the full right to brand the software systems and hardware facilities can be concentrated in a single firm that integrates hotel management and hotel development, as shown in Figure 3.8. In such cases, the integrated company is the full principal that claims all reputation residuals in the focal hotel directly from guests. The integrated company consists of two specialist divisions, hotel management and hotel development, that abide by hierarchical fiats from their common boss. All

Fee

(Partial Principal/ Agent)

Fee

Hotel Manager Hotel Developer Hotel Software Hotel Hardware (Partial Principal/ Agent) Reputation Interaction

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salaried employees in the two specialist divisions are agents who do not claim residual profits from guests.

Figure 3.8: Branding principal-agent relationship in integrated branding ( reputation contribution; reputation residual)

A comparison of the four branding options is summarized in Table 3.1. To begin with, each of the branding options corresponds to a particular governance mode for organizing manager-developer cooperation. The ownership rights to hotel software and hardware remain the same across all three contractual modes, but the branding rights are allocated in different ways. Under the three contractual modes, the allocation of branding rights also determines the nature of the principal-agent relationship between the two hotel specialist firms. All else remaining constant, the selection of the optimal contractual mode to govern manager-developer cooperation thus depends on two types of agency costs incurred by the parties to harmonize their joint efforts to build and protect the hotel brand: the agency costs of manager branding represent the costs of addressing branding agency when the manager is identifiable to hotel guests, and the agency costs of developer branding represent the costs of addressing branding agency when the

Integrated Firm (Conventional Principal) Development Division Hotel Software Hotel Hardware Management Division

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developer is identifiable to guests. When the agency costs are high under all three branding options, the integration of hotel management and hotel development becomes the only feasible option for establishing an international hotel.

Table 3.1: Comparison of international hotel branding options Manager Branding Developer Branding Co-branding Integrated Branding

Governance mode Franchise contract Management contract Co-brand Contract Hierarchy Allocation of ownership rights

- Software Manager Manager Manager Integrated firm - Hardware Developer Developer Developer Integrated firm Allocation of branding rights

- Software Manager Developer Manager Integrated firm - Hardware Manager Developer Developer Integrated firm Role of manager Full branding

principal

Full branding agent Partial branding principal & partial branding agent

Conventional agent

Role of developer Full branding agent Full branding principal Partial branding principal & partial branding agent Conventional agent

Control of manager Consumer market Contractual restraints Consumer market & contractual restraints Hierarchical directives

Control of developer Contractual restraints

Consumer market Consumer market & contractual restraints

Hierarchical directives

Agency costs of manager branding

Low High Low High

Agency costs of developer branding

High Low Low High