METODOLOGÍA

2. Containerisation International Year book 1991

Another consequence of the increased landbridge usage is the removal of restriction re vessel size which was formerly dictated by the limits of the Panama Canal. Thus ships with capacity in excess of 3,000 TEU are gaining in popularity and it is significant that over 96% of such existing vessels belong to these operators ^ and this could further explain

Containerisation International.

64

the preference for landbridge usage. What this means as far as KTO is concerned however, is that a new approach to the marketing of the Terminal will be required, since the available business based on the port’s proximity to the Canal is no longer a decisive advantage and there are precious few mega carriers still utilizing the Canal service to get from the one ocean to the next.

Increased Port Competition

Although the unit of measure in table 5.2 below is not uniform among the ports being reviewed, the trend is nevertheless obvious. While port activity at the Terminal has suffered a decline over the 1988/89 period (and up to the present) the trend among her major competitors has been that of steadily ' increased traffic - with the exception of Cristobal which dipped from 128,000 TED in 1987 to 82,000 TEUs in 1988 (most likely due to the political crisis at the time), but has managed to stage a recovery in 1989.

TABLE 5.2

Containers handled at selected ports

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

* Reported in TEUs not containers.

Source: Extracted from Bremen Institute of Statistics 1990

It may be said that each of these ports, to varying degrees, are also well located to carry out a transhipment function. The argument also exists that Kingston has lost her competitive edge due to the proliferation of ports in the Caribbean now equipped to accommodate larger vessles, whereas

as recent as 1985 Kingston was the only port with su-F-ficient dra-Ft to accommodate the larger mainline vessels. However, there is strong evidence pointing to the -Fact that competition

is now, and will continue in the -Future to be, not so much •From other Caribbean and 6ul-F ports but from an entirely new range of ports, that is those on the West Coast of North America.

This is particularly evident when it is borne in mind that Kingston’s major transhipment business stemmed from cargo which originated in the Far East and destined for the Caribbean and this, based on the discussion above, has largely been siphoned off by the rail services operating between both coasts of North America.

Port facility and timing of investment

As hinted at earlier, the loss of Evergreen's 80,000 transhipment moves per annum was purportedly a result of the rather costly inconvenience of having the Line’s ships seized and fined by the US Customs, following the discovery of illicit drugs in containers originating from Kingston. However, based on discussions with a former associate of that company it would seem that the finding of drugs onboard the vessel was merely the proverbial 'last straw’ - a culmination of the general dissatisfaction with the level of service and perceived commitment of the Terminal’s management as manifested by the slow development of facilities.

This dissatisfaction may have had its origins not only in

■^Kingston Port Development Study, 1985. Table IV-5, page IV-21.

® Prof. E. Frankel was responsible for designing Evergreen’s feedering network in the Caribbean and had occasion to visit Kingston. The Author held discussions with him when he came to WMU in May, 1991 as a visiting professor.

the relatively low productivity levels ( to be discussed later on) but in the severe congestion experienced at the Terminal during the 1986/87 period when Evergreen's activities were at a peak. The situation occurred where containers were being stacked on every available pocket o-f space, which obviously played havoc with their eTTecient retrieval and thus impacted negatively on vessel productivity, translating into high operating costs to the carrier. On a RTW service, a delay by a vessel resulting in missed Canal appointment, is even more costly than -for other services, since each ship and leg is dependent on the other to ensure a high degree of cargo and route linkages.

The rapid throughput growth experienced at the Terminal no doubt would present difficulties for management to remedy in terms of stacking space in the short term. However, the fact that space for redevelopment was earmarked in the Terminal's longterm development plan meant that it should have been far easier for the Terminal to respond to this increased demand. This was however not the case. After innumerable petitions by the Terminal’s management to the PAJ (who it will be recalled from chapter 4 has sole rights and responsibi1ty for Terminal development) work was finally started on a new area and completed in 1989. By this time however. Evergreen had already withdrawn its transhipment business from Kingston, not favour^ing any other Caribbean ports, but instead using the

land bridge service for its eastbound service, using Kingston as a feeder port though making direct mainline calls on its westbound service before proceeding through the Panama Canal.

Thus with the now completed transit area the Terminal has found itself swinging form a position of congestion to one of underutilization.

5.1.2 SERVICE

According to the UNCTAD Monograph on Port Management port per-Formance should best be assessed -For each area 0"F

activity. The major ones being: (i) ship operations

<ii) cargo operations, and (iii) inland transport.

Since the interest o-F this paper concerns the transhipment activities o-F the Terminal and Jamaica is an island, no assessment of the performance of the Terminal re its inland transport (receiving and delivery) function will be made.

The most important indicator of the quality of ship’s operations in port, is the duration of their stay (Turnaround time). It was mentioned in chapter 4 that the PAJ retains the responsibility for such services as pilotage and towage. Thus it has direct control over the time it takes the ship to reach berth following its arrival at the pilotage station. That is, phases 1-4 and 7-8 of the diagram displayed in figure 5.3. KTO’s control is therefore at the point when the ship is at berth. An analysis of the number of hours ships spent alongside for the period 1988-1970 are presented in Appendix 5.2. This can, in the absence of further data, effectively be regarded as the vessel service time of the Terminal, even though it is more probable that service was completed before this time, but ship was awaiting outbound pilotage. Thus each vessel spends on average, roughly 9.8 to 11.8 hours alongside.

Based on PAJ statistics, for the final quarter in 1989 (see Appendix 5.3) vessel turnaround time averaged .56 of a day or nearly 14 hours. Assuming their definition of turnaround time takes into consideration both waiting and

Measuring & Evaluating Port Performance & Productivity, by G. De Monie. UNCTAD/SHIP/494(6), 1987. Para. 5.

FIGURE 5.3