Summary of the Case
In the early hours of 29 May 1980, 58 members of the security forces and the Second Infantry Brigade arrived at San Francisco Guajoyo cooperative in Belén Güijat canton, Metapán district, Department of Santa Ana, dragged members of the cooperative from their homes in the adjoining houses and took them to the central area of the farm. That same morning, the bodies of 12 victims were found, covered with a blanket on which were written the words "killed as traitors". Shortly afterwards, the justice of the peace carried out the requisite procedures.
The Commission finds the following:
1. On 29 May 1980, two employees of the Salvadorian Institute for Agrarian Reform (ISTA) and 10 members of the San Francisco Guajoyo cooperative were executed with large-calibre firearms in the central area of the
cooperative, after having been dragged from their homes. 2. The deaths did not occur during an armed confrontation.
3. Members of the Second Infantry Brigade and of the security forces having jurisdiction in the Department of Santa Ana were responsible for the incident. 4. The Salvadorian State bears full responsibility for the execution of the
and international human rights law, and for having taken no action to identify and punish those responsible.
Description of the Facts129 General background
The San Francisco Guajoyo cooperative was founded in 1977 and there were some 260 families who were members. The organization did a great deal of educational and advocacy work.
The army and security forces launched a smear campaign against members of the cooperative, accusing them of being guerrillas. In 1979, the threats increased. There were constant army patrols and persecution was stepped up. Most members of the cooperative used to sleep in the hills for fear of being dragged from their homes in the night.
The operations were carried out by troops from the Second Brigade and by security forces, often accompanied by civil defence members. The accusation was always the alleged ties between cooperative members and the guerrillas, but cooperative
members believed that the real motive was to block their demands. The military operation
In the early hours of 29 May 1980, between 50 and 80 members of the Second Infantry Brigade, the National Police, the Treasury Police and the National Guard, including some National Guard members who were responsible for guarding the Guajoyo CEL, approached the San Francisco Guajoyo cooperative building.
The military contingent entered the cooperative from two equidistant points, moving in on the stable and dwellings located near its centre. They dragged cooperative
members from their homes and took them to the central area of the farm. People were arrested according to a list, "although towards the end, they were taking anyone to the courtyard of the house".
Soldiers simultaneously burst into the cooperative offices, seizing three members of the cooperative who were looking after the premises. The group that entered the
offices was headed by Adán Figueroa, 130 known as "calache", of the Treasury Police,
originally from Tahuilapa canton. They took the three to the central area of the farm. One of the survivors observed that "the others had already been made to lie face down, ready to be killed". Everyone was asked who they were and where they were hiding the weapons. A few minutes later the shooting began.
On realizing the operation was under way, particularly on hearing the noise of houses being searched, other members of the cooperative ran from their homes. One
witness stated that a member who was on guard in the cooperative's tobacco storeroom came to his house to warn him that a military truck had arrived. He was able to hide in time, but he heard the shots and "the cries and suffering" of those who had been arrested.
The executions
Twelve people were executed. According to the records of the Metapán Second Magistrate's Court, the bodies were found in the central area of the farm. Seven bodies were found in the farmhouse courtyard, lying at intervals of about half a metre apart. The remaining five bodies were lying at a short distance from the first group. According to the forensic examination, all the wounds were caused by large-calibre weapons.
They executed people who apparently were not on the list. This was true of José Angel Mira, a mentally handicapped person who was arrested. When his father asked them to let his son go, the officer told him to lie down next to his son so that they could die together. This is what in fact happened.
Members of the cooperative who had fled to the hills found the bodies when they returned after the attack. Near the bodies they found a blanket on which were written the words "killed as traitors". According to witnesses, combined forces often did this to create confusion as to who was responsible.
Public version of the incident
The next day, a press source reported that a guerrilla camp had been discovered in an area close to Metapán "hours after alleged left-wing guerrillas killed 12 peasants, members of a cooperative which was working a farm taken over as part of the
agrarian reform, in the area where the camp was discovered". It went on to say that "the Armed Forces Press Committee told ACAN-EFE" that some 30 guerrillas had joined the battle with the members of the National Guard who discovered the camp. According to the source, there had been no military casualties; however, it did not specify the number of guerrilla casualties either.
Another source, under the headline "12 killed at farm in subversive attack", reported an armed confrontation in which 12 people had been killed; "mostly peasants, and two ISTA employees wounded, at the San Francisco farm in Metapán district". It also reported that troops had been deployed: "men in olive-green uniforms entered the farm at Guajoyo in La Joya canton, Metapán district".
Action taken by the judiciary
On the morning of the executions, the competent justice of the peace went to the cooperative with his secretary and two forensic doctors to carry out the requisite legal procedures. The main findings in the record are as follows:
(a) Twelve people were shot and killed in the early hours of that day; (b) Witnesses stated that a group of individuals in olive-green uniforms accompanied by civilians, who had dragged the victims from their homes, were responsible for the execution;
(c) According to the forensic examination, a number of the victims had been
shot in the back and several of the bodies had been shot at close range. 131
Furthermore it was not possible to determine where the bullets had entered
and exited the bodies. 132 Several of the victims were barefoot and only half
dressed.
Having completed the preliminary inquiries, the justice of the peace transmitted the information to the ordinary court to institute the corresponding judicial investigation. That court took no further action and filed the information.
Findings
The Commission finds the following:
1. There is full evidence that, on 29 May 1980, two employees of the
Salvadorian Institute for Agrarian Reform (ISTA) and 10 members of the San Francisco Guajoyo cooperative were executed with large-calibre firearms in the central area of the cooperative, after having been dragged from their homes.
2. There is sufficient evidence to attribute responsibility for the incident to members of the Second Infantry Brigade and of the security forces having jurisdiction in the Department of Santa Ana.
3. The Salvadorian State bears full responsibility for the execution of the
cooperative members, which was a violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and for having taken no action to identify and punish those responsible.
(b) The Leaders of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario Summary of the Case
On 27 November 1980, Enrique Alvarez Córdoba, 133 Juan Chacón, 134 Enrique
Escobar Barrera, 135 Manuel de Jesús Franco Ramírez, 136 Humberto Mendoza 137 and
Doroteo Hernández, 138 political leaders of the Frente Democrático Revolucionario
(FDR), 139 representing an important sector of Salvadorian society, were abducted,
tortured and, after a short period in captivity, executed in San Salvador.
The abduction was carried out during the morning at the Colegio San José by a large number of heavily armed men.
The climate of violence and insecurity prevailing in the country at the time was such that, had it not been for who the victims were, the place and time of the abduction, the type of operation and the public outrage it caused, it would have been just one more in the long list of abuses that were occurring at the time.
The Commission on the Truth concludes that it was an operation carried out by one or more public security forces and that the Treasury Police were responsible for the external security operation which aided and abetted the perpetrators. By commission and, in failing to properly investigate the incident, by omission, the State failed to comply with its obligations under international human rights law to protect and guarantee the enjoyment by individuals of their most elementary rights.
Description of the Incident
The six victims were abducted from the Colegio San José, a Jesuit School Society in the very heart of the capital city, San Salvador, between 9.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 27 November 1980. In the immediate vicinity of the school, there are other educational centres, a number of hospitals and, to the north, the former United States Embassy, which at the time was under heavy guard.
The ground floor of the central building housed the rector's office, the administration and the Christian Legal Aid office, which had been in existence since 1975 when the school had started working with the neediest social sectors.
The workload of Christian Legal Aid had increased appreciably because, in addition to the normal stream of people coming to seek assistance, other entities which had been doing the same kind of work had closed their doors because of the prevailing
climate of terror. 140
Despite the large numbers of people going in and out of the school, the building had no security system. There were just a few unarmed porters at the central entrance to the educational complex. That morning there was only one porter at the main
entrance. The facts
The operation was carried out between 9.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. Initially, an unspecified number of men seized the porter, took him some 500 metres from the entrance and radioed to other people that they could go in.
They opened the gate and let in a number of vehicles carrying people who were
heavily armed with machine-guns and "G3" rifles. 141 The group went swiftly over to the
central entrance of the main building and placed people against the wall ordering them to lie on the ground and close their eyes. Members of the group also stationed themselves at the entrances to the school and dealt in similar fashion with anyone who approached. Reports at the time put the total number of men who participated in
the operation at between 13 and 200. 142 According to the information received, the
speed with which the bodies were dumped in the street in full view of passers-by was clearly intended to ensure that they were readily identified, so as to lessen the political pressure on the case.
The first four bodies and that of Alvarez Córdoba were found on the outskirts of the resort city of Apulo, in Ilopango district, approximately one hour by car from San
Salvador. The Ilopango justice of the peace made the legal examination and opened a dossier which was later sent to the Fourth Criminal Court in San Salvador.
The Commission did not find that any judicial, police or administrative remedy had been sought to preserve the physical integrity of the abducted men. In its view, this was because people were very afraid and distrustful of using judicial bodies. The Court dossier which the Commission studied shows clearly that the organ entrusted with investigating the case did not conduct a proper investigation; it finally closed the case on 8 October 1982. In fact, only bureaucratic measures were taken; no autopsy was performed, nor was anything else done to clarify the facts and find out
who was responsible. 143
Analysis
Once the news broke, a war of communiqués ensued over who had committed the deed, whether part of the security forces or else the death squads acting without the direct participation of government forces. The possibility of it being the work of left-
wing groups was also considered. 144 The government Junta, for its part, urged that
the physical and psychological integrity of the abducted leaders be respected. 145
At the political level, the abduction of the opposition leaders closed the door to negotiations and fuelled demands for armed confrontation against the third Revolutionary Government Junta. It is worth recalling that the very day the incident occurred, the former Foreign Minister, Fidel Chávez Mena, was in Washington, D.C. at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), talking with church and opposition circles in an effort to secure a negotiated outcome to the crisis. 146
The Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG) offered to carry out an exhaustive
investigation into the incident and emphatically denied that security forces under its command had participated. The investigations that were carried out were purely a formality. For example, although a considerable number of people had been present when the incident took place, only four of them were interviewed. The Commission
requested, but was not given, the report of the National Police. 147
The incident outraged public opinion, prompting the armed forces and the Office of the President to interview some of the eyewitnesses. All political sectors in the country disclaimed responsibility for the incident, accusing other sectors.
FDR turned the funeral into a political rally, introducing the organization's new leadership and asserting that paramilitary groups, with the complicity at least of the
security forces, were responsible for the murders. 148
From all the evidence which the Commission has gathered, it is clear that the purpose of the operation was to arrest the FDR leaders. It does not seem possible that the operation and its outcome could have occurred by chance or that it could have had any other purpose. The manner in which those participating in the operation
entered the building and the surrounding area leaves no doubt that it was, indeed, an operation designed specifically to capture the leaders.
According to the various theories that have been put forward, the operation was carried out by paramilitary groups, by security forces or by a combination of the two; it may also have been an independent operation by members of those State organs. For example, the Brigada Anticomunista General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez claimed responsibility for the murders. This group has been identified as one of several which the extreme right-wing used to claim responsibility for such actions. One witness told the Commission that, at the time the incident occurred, some soldiers in active service were members of the Brigade.
In the Commission's view, the characteristics of the operation show that, while there may not have been unified planning by some security forces, the coverage provided for the execution of the crime was centralized and, without it, the operation would have been highly risky or very difficult to carry out. In any event, it is unlikely that the
operation could have been carried out so openly without at least the complicity of the security forces which, moreover, were keeping a close watch on the political leaders and on the school itself because of the activities that were going on there.
Indeed, the time, the place, the number of personnel, the radio equipment, vehicles, weapons and uniforms used, the slang and the chain of command, the fact that the participants withdrew without any problem and the absence of a proper investigation by the security forces indicate the extent to which those forces were involved.
According to diplomatic reports, it was widely believed that the crime had been committed by security forces including, possibly, the Treasury Police. The testimony given by several people points in this direction. The Commission has substantial evidence that the Treasury Police carried out the security operation on the school's perimeter. The Commission summonsed several officers who held positions of responsibility at the time in that institution. The few who did appear roundly denied having had anything to do with the incident.
Other information received by the Commission concerning the activities of the security and intelligence forces indicates that the National Guard carried out the operation, acting independently of the General Staff.
As indicated earlier, the Commission cannot, in any case, accept the idea that the operation was carried out without the cooperation of senior commanders of one or more security forces, which at the time were headed by military officers.
Based on the available information, it is difficult to determine whether the operation was planned at the highest level of the armed forces or whether, instead, it was instigated by middle-ranking commanders of the security forces, resulting in de facto situations that were difficult to reverse.
Lastly, the Commission tried in vain to establish who gave the order to kill the FDR leaders and whether that was part of the original plan or was decided upon
subsequently. Given the conditions of violence prevailing at the time, an operation of this kind clearly involved a very high risk that the persons captured would be
eliminated.
The Commission received reliable information that the final execution order was discussed at the highest level of right-wing sectors. It is alleged that there were telephone calls between those who carried out the murders and those who planned them. According to the testimony received, the latter allegedly decided to act as swiftly as possible in order to reduce the political pressure created by the capture of the victims.
Findings
The Commission finds that:
1. The abduction, torture and subsequent murder of the political and trade union leaders was an act that outraged national and international public opinion and closed the door to any possibility of a negotiated solution to the political crisis at the end of 1980. It was a very serious act which warranted the most thorough investigation by the Commission on the Truth.