Metodología de Test/Pruebas Software

An extensive cross-cultural and developmental research project used open- ended interview studies with children, adolescents, and adults from America, Israeli kibbutzim and Israeli cities to map the dimensions that constitute the meaning of, and reasons for, having possessions (Furby, 1978a, 1978b, 1980; see 1991 for a summary). These three cultures have different values with respect to possessions, with kibbutzim highly collective and non-materialistic in contrast to the individualist culture in US and Israeli cities. In considering the developmental origins of the possessions–self link, Furby proposes that infants reach for and handle objects because of “effectance motivation or the need for control” (Furby, 1978b, p. 60), which has been proposed as a universal motivation in humans (White, 1959). Such explorations are bound to come into conflict with the infant’s social environment, particularly from the age of 1 year when physical mobility increases rapidly. Adults and older siblings have to prevent the child from touching and handling many objects in order to avoid damage. The result of these interactions is that children will gradually learn to identify with those objects that they can explore and control and come to view them as theirs, whereas objects that occasion restriction and interference will become defined as belonging to somebody else. In this way, possessions are used to draw a boundary between what is self and what is other. The distinction between self and not- self is thus closely linked to the infant’s behavioural control over material objects. This developmental account is not only interesting, but also very plausible.

However, the proposal that the psychological significance of posses- sions resides mainly in the control they afford owners as quasi-physical extensions of the self becomes more problematic when Furby extrapolates it also to adolescents and adults. She singles out two related themes that: (1) possessions are important because they afford control over the physical and social environment; and (2) they are closely linked to self for precisely this reason:

I propose that the central feature of possession—its principal defining

characteristic . . . seems to lie in the very high degree of control it entails.

The magnitude of control I exert over my possessions is of the same order as the control I exert over my body. Thus, possessions are included in one’s concept of self . . . That over which I exercise . . . control becomes a part of my sense of self.

The first part of her claim, that possessions are psychologically important to people because they help them exercise control and experience a sense of mastery, is well supported by research. For example, an experimental study on self-completion, a process of compensating for aspects of self perceived as inadequate, examined the link between possessions and control motivation through manipulating people’s sense of personal control and then collecting their judgements of the extent to which their possessions give them control and mastery (Beggan, 1991). Those who suffer control deprivation (being told that they had failed on an experimental task) should overemphasise the control their possessions give them, compared to those who experience control gain (being told that they had succeeded). The findings showed that this was indeed the case, but only for people who believe that, in general, they have control over their life (internal locus of control). A further intriguing example of research that can be interpreted as support for the mastery argu- ment comes from the mortality salience literature, which shows that when people are confronted with the highly threatening inevitability of their own mortality (by writing a short essay about their own death), their focus on material possessions and resources is enhanced (Kasser & Sheldon, 2000; Sheldon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004).

In contrast, the second part of Furby’s claim, that the control and mastery function of possessions accounts primarily for their close link with people’s sense of self, is more controversial. Even in her own interviews, the complexity of the functions that material objects fulfil for adolescents and adults clearly emerges: they symbolise social power and status, and are used as means of self-expression, individuation, and individuality.

A social psychological model linking attitudes, values, and possessions proposes a major dichotomy whereby material possessions fulfil instrumental purposes, such as providing control, entertainment, or activities, but also serve as symbolic expressions of aspects of self, such as personal and social identity (Prentice, 1987, 2004). Typical instrumental possessions include tools or means of transport. Symbolic possessions can be subdivided further into symbols of the historical continuity of self (e.g. photographs), expressions of artistic or intellectual interests (e.g. book collections), and signs of status or wealth (e.g. yacht). On the basis of this classification, respondents were divided into “symbolic” possessors and “instrumental” possessors, depending on the types of possessions they had listed as important to them. The main finding was a link between possessions, attitudes, and values in the sense that individuals showed a general outlook that was dominated by either a symbolic or an instrumental orientation. However, this leaves important questions unaddressed: Are people always either “instrumental” or “sym- bolic” possessors? Does their emphasis on one or the other change? Are there systematic differences between cultures or genders? But before I can address these questions, the symbolic dimensions of material possessions need more detailed examination.