Metodología y estructuración de la Tesis Doctoral

In this section I will further introduce the various exchanges per type of logic, together with the related activities or ‘resources’. This discussion is summarized in table 5 and visualized in figure 7.

Each logic of exchange consists of four types of resources, and several environmental factors affecting the value of these resources. Interest organizations offer two types of resources that they have produced in exchanges with actors in other environments, and may gain resources that they could use in exchange relations in each of the other fields. This related nature of exchanges is visualized by connecting the arrows in figure 7 (which in other approaches would be separated arrows instead of connected arrows).

Further, as discussed earlier, each of these logics has a different conceptual rationale. First, the logic of support assumes that activities are driven by the need for organizational survival. As Lowery (2007, 46) notes ‘the most fundamental goals of organizations must be to survive as organizations’. Second, the logic of influence assumes that interest organizations exist in order to pressure the policy process, or, as Schattschneider (1960, 39) remarks, ‘the flight to government is perpetual’ (see also: Truman 1951, 104-106). Third, under the logic of reputation it is assumed that activities of interest organizations only matter when ‘perceived and projected’ by other relevant political actors or in public opinion. Otherwise, these activities are ‘like a tree falling unheard in the forest’ (Lipsky 1967, 1151). For each logic, I first discuss the types of resources offered, and then the relevant contextual factors.

2.6.1. the logic of support

A critical and substantial part of the activities of interest groups is related to organizational survival and maintenance.44 _{Primarily this includes recruitment of members or the}

mobilization of an existing supporters base. Salisbury (1969, 2) classically argued that

44_{Only part of the activities of many interest organizations has directly to do with politics. Obviously, this} depends on the type of organization. For example, for companies or bureaucratic agencies lobby tasks or public affairs activities represent only a marginal share of their total activities. For others, such as employers’ associations or environmental campaign groups, political action takes a more central role.

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‘interest group origins, growth, death, and associated lobbying activity may all be better explained if we regard them as exchange relationships (…)’ between group leaders and their members. As discussed earlier, it is not only citizen groups that are engaged in such exchanges, but organizations such as think tanks or companies that also need to justify their lobby priorities and strategies ‘internally’ (Heinz et al. 1993; Wilts 2006). For example, as said before, a Public Affairs department in a corporation needs to defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the organization. All types of organizations need to evaluate their political position in relation to their ties to society – sometimes balancing preferences of clients, employees, and peers. The activities that ensure continued collective action or the survival of Public Affairs functions are understood to be guided by the logic of support.

The supporters’ environment creates opportunities for the exchange of institution- and reputation-related resources provided by and for supporters. These are: (1) constituents’ compliance, (2) leadership control, (3) members’ public action and (4) the public visibility of a political issue.45 _{Two important contextual forces affect this exchange. First, the exchange}

depends on the type of supporters and the nature of their interest. This produces variation between organizations in the effort required in mobilizing constituents. Second, the composition of the interest community itself affects the opportunities for lasting supporters exchanges. In this section I will discuss these resources and the context that affects their exchange.

45_{Salisbury (1969) and other scholars distinguish even more types of membership contributions in this} regard. For two reasons I focus on the mentioned types. First, unlike Salisbury, I focus on goods that could be used by leaders in the context of exchanges in other domains. Money is then only relevant in specific political systems (US) where financial contributions to politicians/parties could be understood as an exchange relation. Second, I am interested in activities, so what matters is what organizations do with the financial and political support of their members.

FIGURE 7 Exchange model of the activities of interest organizations. Numbers refer to table 5

political institutions

members or social- economic base

public opinion and news media context: democratic control

and group system context: function of media, salience / popularity public opinion

context: mobilisation and population political activities of organizations logic of support logic of influence logic of reputation 11 12 10 9 5 7 6 8 1 2 3 4

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2.6.1.1. the exchange relationship with supporters

In a first flow of valued behavior members or supporters provide the leadership with resources that may be used in exchanges within the influence environment. These are: compliance with policies and political support for governing parties, or, framed negatively, non-compliance or political opposition. This exchange relationship manifests itself in, among other things, in strategic adaptations on the part of members’ organizations or, in other cases, the socialization of individual members (Beyers 2008, 1202-1204). For example, in the context of CO₂ reduction policies, the European Automobile Manufacturers Association may choose to organize expert meetings on new technologies in this area. This could facilitate a strategic adaptation on the part of car manufacturers along the lines envisaged in EU policy documents (thus providing political support). As a different example, LTO-Nederland, the Dutch farmers’ association, may choose to include a favorable interview with the Agriculture minister in its members magazine, thus supporting the political position of the governing party.

Second, in return for their compliance or political support, members are supplied with mechanisms to control their representatives. This control, which helps to aggregate individual interests of supporters, could take various forms, most broadly understood as varying between active ‘voice’ mechanisms to more passive ‘exit’ mechanisms (see the horizontal dimension in figure 5). The first entails associational features such as referendums, annual meetings, and leadership elections. Among other things, such organizational structures allow self-regulation for business sector associations on issues such as market entry, product quality, and standards. This is what Streeck and Schmitter label ‘private governance’ (1985). Second, even without such ‘traditional’ active organizational mechanisms, supporters control the scope of action of their leaders. This means that, as elaborated by Jordan and Maloney (2007) on the basis of Hirschmann (1970), leaders have to act according to the preferences of their constituents so as to prevent them from leaving. According to Jordan and Maloney, this threat of ‘exit’ is an even stronger control mechanism than the organizational ‘voice’ mechanisms mentioned first.46

Third, supporters participate in the (public) activities of interest organizations such as conferences, campaign events, and demonstrations. This contributes to the articulation of interests, provides cheap labor in the case of voluntary work, and fosters loyalty among members (solidary benefits).47 _{Such activities are often crucial for the survival of the}

organization and could contribute to positively evaluated notions of citizenship, social capital, and political engagement more in general. Membership participation forms the basis of exchange relationships in the institutional (loyalty fosters compliance) and the news- media environment (participation could create ‘events’). At the same time, however, there are two organizational mechanisms that undermine the long-term survival of the organization.

46_{Selective benefits such as insurance services or specific information are thus usually supplied in order} to keep members. While important for organizational survival, I assume that these types of goods are of less relevance in exchange relations in institutional or public domains.

47_{While for example voluntary work seems restricted to citizen groups, business interest associations also} make widespread use of forms of payments in kind. For example, employees of companies are part of expert committees of associations or lobby on behalf of the sector.

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First, members’ participation could lead to radicalization of the political position of interest organizations, thus undermining the broad membership base that is needed for survival. This is so because the more radical or activist supporters or members are more likely to participate in activities (Ware 1992). This leads to ‘biased signals’ to organizational leaders (Lohmann 1993), who consequently choose strategies that are against the preferences of the majority of constituents. Furthermore, this effect is strengthened because leaders often have to compensate more active members by giving them additional influence in the organization. Also, even in the absence of such compensation, in contrast to bureaucratic organizations with traditional authority structures interest organizations relying on voluntary work have only weak control over followers and supporters, who, on their own, may claim to voice the position of the organization (e.g., Gamson 2004, 253).

Second, research has shown that supporters now seem decreasingly interested in participating in group activities (Jordan and Maloney 2007), which strengthens the previous point. This decrease leads to only a small pool of constituents willing to participate, who are likely to be increasingly less representative of all constituents. Consequently it is not surprising that leaders sometimes consider (active) members to be a ‘nonlucrative distraction’ (Skocpol 2003, 134). Organizations thus have to find additional ways to get information on the preference of their supporters and find other activities in order to engage and socialize members.

Fourth, organizational entrepreneurs develop activities aimed at members so as to highlight the leaders’ success in news media and other public venues. The public visibility of the organization is, for instance, often emphasized via internal media. Interest organizations often use web page links to press coverage or summarize media performances in their other publications, so that members see that their concerns and interests receive recognition in the public debate. Depending on the preferences of supporters, mass media access could be more important than political institutional access. News media coverage affects the exchange relation between constituents and leaders. However, interest organizations could find the mass media too risky an arena in which to pursue influence, but still want a good public reputation. The leadership could then provide for other types of public activities that promote the public image of the sector or cause, such as funding for academics in the field, sponsoring, and professional PR.

2.6.1.2. the environment of exchange relations