METODOLOGIA

What follows is a summary of the identity narratives surrounding the 2008 Danish Embassy bombing; given the unchanging nature of the discourse (and to save the reader from repetition), presentation of the four investigative phases was condensed to (1) pre-claims of responsibility (“no claims of responsibility”), and (2) post-claims of responsibility (“unverifiable claims of responsibility,” “tentative arrest of suspects,” and “formal arrest/indictment of suspects”).

Pre-Claims of Responsibility

Unlike the 1998 Embassy bombings, al Qaeda is identified as the primary suspect immediately following the 2008 attack (NYT116, AP125, AP126, AP131, DTT21, G25, G26, N4). The media retraces the group’s recent threats of violence (WP85, DTT20, DTT21, N4) and its “extensive justification” of revenge against Danish diplomatic facilities and personnel (AP125, AP126, AP131). Given the well-documented nature of these threats, the potential involvement of al Qaeda is assumed to be unquestionable (AP127, AP131, DTT21, N4); consequently, it is from this group that the perpetrators and general terrorists of the discourse borrow much of their narrative attributes. All three actors share a common geographic origin in Pakistan’s tribal areas (NYT116), fury over Denmark’s publication of the controversial Mohammed cartoons (AP131), and rely upon suicide bomber tactics (NYT117, AP131, DTT20, R128). It is significant that unlike the unclaimed attack narrative (in which unnamed terrorist actors are divorced from named counterparts), al Qaeda acts as a filter of understanding that presumes whomever is ultimately found responsible for the operation will be similarly well-understood by requisite authorities and thus able be subdued with existing tactics.

Consequently, the motivations attributed to perpetrators are reminiscent of al Qaeda’s ambitions to bring about the fall of Western governments and sympathetic regional autocrats. The bombers are motivated by a desire to avenge Denmark’s offense against the Muslim nation and to cripple Pakistan’s foreign relations and isolate its government (NYT116, WP84, DTT20, R130, CP2). Unlike the epic conflict between bombers and targets in the 1998 Embassy narratives, any truly damaging repercussions are confined to the target countries rather than the entirety of the human race, supposing both a limit to the perpetrators’ power as well as their desire to cause harm.

Tentative initial suggestions of a superhuman perpetrator—bombers that can “slip through” new security measures using mysteriously-acquired “inside knowledge,” leaving authorities unable to “explain at this moment why this is possible” (NYT116, NYT117)—are dispelled within the very same articles. Hardly otherworldly beings, perpetrators are simply skilled criminals who have taken advantage of Pakistan’s multitude of security failures. Though a sovereign nation in its own right, Pakistan is depicted as a struggling post-colonial society, an abortive younger brother attempting to emulate the thriving governmental models of Western nations whose patronizing assistance (NYT116) cannot compensate for domestic failures. Overcoming the security precautions of such a weakling is hardly a great accomplishment, particularly given the deterioration in the national security situation since 2007 (N2, N3, N5) and the provocation of terrorist activities by domestic policymakers (NYT116, NYT117, WP84, R128). Against the advice of Western allies (NYT116, AP125), the inexperienced and unstable Pakistani

Government (NYT116, AP125, DTT21, DTT22, R130, R132) entreated radical militants with peace agreements such mendacious persons could not be expected to uphold (NYT116, NYT117, AP125, G25, DTT20, DTT21, R128, R133). Under such circumstances, overtures to “illogical

fanatics” could only result in such an attack (N4, N5). Though talented, the perpetrators are not possessed of unnatural skills; rather, the Danes “have simply trusted the Pakistani’s ability to protect us too much” (AP131).

Though the recipient of the attack, it was furthermore Denmark’s foreign policy choices that constituted the nation as a knowing target for terrorist violence, particularly through the

reprinting of the controversial Mohammed cartoons (NYT116, NYT117, AP125, AP126, AP127, G25, G26, DTT20, R128, N4). Indeed, the state had already invested in precautionary measures and relocated foreign workers from the embassy structure (WP84, G24, G25, G26, N4), negating the bombers’ ability to render the desired lethal blow. Unapologetic for its presumed offense, Denmark strongly condemns the violence, and its subsequent refusal to capitulate wins it the admiration of the larger international community (NYT116, AP126, DTT21, R128, CP2).

Likewise, the attack was not unpredictable (N5) but rather part of an ongoing campaign against resident foreigners in Pakistan following the Government’s peace deals with Islamic militants (AP125, AP126, G25, G26, DTT21). Certain to increase unease in the foreign community (NYT116, NYT117, R130) and prompting the closure of the Norwegian and Swedish embassies (AP125, AP126, DTT20, DTT21, R130, CP2, N1), the retaliatory measures in response to blasphemous pictures (DTT20, DTT21, R128) constitute an “open and shut case of jihadis fulfilling an open-ended threat to attack the embassy” (R130). An Islamist suicide attack against Western targets on Pakistani soil is hardly unprecedented or unusual (R130, N1, N3, N4, N5); in fact, one might consider this embassy bombing odd given its realization in spite of its

Post-Claims of Responsibility

In spite of al Qaeda’s claim of authorship, the post-claim discourse varies little from the previous narrative in which skilled (but not unusually so) perpetrators overcome the security measures of a failed government to seek revenge against a nation contemptuous of Muslim values—a trope easily recognizable from previous public dissections of bin Laden’s group. Here, to, al Qaeda involvement is logical given the group’s threat posturing over the publication of the Mohammed caricatures (NYT120) and oft-repeated oaths of revenge (NYT120, AP133, AP134, G27, R131, R132, CP6). Interestingly, the organization’s assurances of pending imminent attacks (NYT122, AP132, AP137, R131, R134, CP6, CP9, CP14) do not become speculative fodder for press officers given al Qaeda’s questionable ability to deliver such promises in the face of organizational disintegration. A crumbling guerrilla troop badly damaged by the American “fightback” in Iraq, even al Qaeda leaders are “starting to prepare their people for strategic failure” (G28). With one third of its command staff killed in combat (NYT122, G30, G31, G32), the group’s integrity is dubious; even now its attacks mostly function as propagandist slogans rather than crippling strikes (AP137, CP15). Given that general terrorists derive their attributed characteristics from the al Qaeda organization, such characterizations also call into question the threat potential of even unnamed terrorist actors (G30, G31).

Moreover, al Qaeda’s legitimacy as a vehicle for retribution on behalf of Muslim populations is jeopardized as the discourse of martyrdom (AP133, AP134, AP135) is overwhelmingly silenced by the condemnation of suicide tactics (NYT120, AP146, G27, G29, R131, R133, R134, CP9, CP12), which locates the act in the criminal rather than the divinely righteousness (Fierke 2009). The invocation of “suicide bombing” over “car bombing” not only locates political legitimacy on

the side of the targeted but also cultivates a moral superiority that delegitimizes the validity of grievance motivating the terrorists. In identifying al Qaeda as the bombers, the narrative establishes a model of virtuous victim versus depraved radical other, polarizing the liberal democratic West and an oppressive, backwards foe. The attacked nation consequently has no need to defend the legitimacy of its own actions given the contrast to the depraved methods of the terrorists.

Such an act of savagery is to be expected in a comparatively unprincipled country such as Pakistan, given its infantile and unstable system of governance (NYT118, AP132, AP134, G30, G31, R132) and repeated failure to improve security (WP86, AP133, AP134, AP135). The embassy bombing is the latest in a “wave of bombings” that has rocked the nation in preceding months (WP87) in response to authorities’ well-intentioned but naïve attempts to deal with insincere tribal militants (AP132, G31). Ironically, in what was once considered “one of the safest places in Pakistan” prior to these efforts, residents are now “afraid to come out” (G33). Continual comparisons of this degeneration in security imply that were the misguided Pakistani Government willing to heed the advice of its more experienced and knowledgeable Western neighbors, such security could be easily restored.

Nor are the identities of the detained suspects of an unexpected nature, as they were already suspected in a string of previous bombings (AP138, N9) and have well-established links to top Taliban commanders in the Waziristan region (AP138). Consequently, both the operation and its authors were predictable and the atrocity therefore preventable; the scenario was not so much committed as allowed to happen, intimating that it could and should have been stopped.

Denmark itself was both an active and aware target, having identified (AP136) and prepared for the al Qaeda threat in advance (NYT120, AP133, R132, CP8, CP12, CP13) as its publications resulted in a “sharpened [militant] focus” on the country (AP137). In turn, the European nation’s blatantly unrepentant attitude (CP6, CP7) is interpreted by the international community as a strong defense of free speech in the face of adversity, rendering Denmark—to the consternation of al Qaeda leaders—the heroic figure. Given the clarity with which actors in this narrative assume their projected identities as well as the resolution presented by both the apprehension of the suspects and the recognition of feasible steps to prevent a similar future occurrence, the 2008 Danish Embassy bombing discourse leaves little to the imagination in terms of potential threats.