MEZCLAS DE LAS ALAS (AVION) MEZCLAS DE LAS ALAS (AVION)

5-1. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, po- litical, economic, psychological, and civic actions. Successful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with legitimacy and the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, and security. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal tensions, and injus- tice. As such, they defy nonviolent solutions. Military forces can compel obedience and secure areas; how- ever, they cannot by themselves achieve the political settlement needed to resolve the situation. Successful COIN efforts include civilian agencies, U.S. military forces, and multinational forces. These efforts pur- posefully attack the basis for the insurgency rather than just its fighters and comprehensively address the host nation’s core problems. Host-nation (HN) leaders must be purposefully engaged in this effort and ul- timately must take lead responsibility for it.

5-2. There are five overarching requirements for successful COIN operations:

z U.S. and HN military commanders and the HN government together must devise the plan for at- tacking the insurgents’ strategy and focusing the collective effort to bolster or restore govern- ment legitimacy.

z HN forces and other counterinsurgents must establish control of one or more areas from which

to operate. HN forces must secure the people continuously within these areas.

z Operations should be initiated from the HN government’s areas of strength against areas under

insurgent control. The host nation must retain or regain control of the major population centers to stabilize the situation, secure the government’s support base, and maintain the government’s legitimacy.

z Regaining control of insurgent areas requires the HN government to expand operations to secure

and support the population. If the insurgents have established firm control of a region, their mili- tary apparatus there must be eliminated and their politico-administrative apparatus rooted out.

z Information operations (IO) must be aggressively employed to accomplish the following:

„ Favorably influence perceptions of HN legitimacy and capabilities. „ Obtain local, regional, and international support for COIN operations. „ Publicize insurgent violence.

„ Discredit insurgent propaganda and provide a more compelling alternative to the insurgent

ideology and narrative.

5-3. COIN operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations to achieve the stable and se- cure environment needed for effective governance, essential services, and economic development. The fo- cus of COIN operations generally progresses through three indistinct stages that can be envisioned with a medical analogy:

z Stop the bleeding.

z Inpatient care—recovery.

z Outpatient care—movement to self-sufficiency.

Understanding this evolution and recognizing the relative maturity of the operational environment are im- portant to the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of COIN operations. This knowl- edge allows commanders to ensure that their activities are appropriate to the current situation.

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5-4. Initially, COIN operations are similar to emergency first aid for the patient. The goal is to protect the population, break the insurgents’ initiative and momentum, and set the conditions for further engagement. Limited offensive operations may be undertaken, but are complemented by stability operations focused on civil security. During this stage, friendly and enemy information needed to complete the common opera- tional picture is collected and initial running estimates are developed. Counterinsurgents also begin shaping the information environment, including the expectations of the local populace.

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5-5. The middle stage is characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term recov- ery or restoration of health—which in this case means achieving stability. Counterinsurgents are most ac- tive here, working aggressively along all logical lines of operations (LLOs). The desire in this stage is to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the HN government and security forces. As civil se- curity is assured, focus expands to include governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development. Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed and strengthened. These relationships increase the flow of human and other types of intelligence. This intelligence facilitates measured offensive operations in conjunction with the HN security forces. The host nation increases its legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.

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5-6. Stage three is characterized by the expansion of stability operations across contested regions, ideally using HN forces. The main goal for this stage is to transition responsibility for COIN operations to HN leadership. In this stage, the multinational force works with the host nation in an increasingly supporting role, turning over responsibility wherever and whenever appropriate. Quick reaction forces and fire support capabilities may still be needed in some areas, but more functions along all LLOs are performed by HN forces with the low-key assistance of multinational advisors. As the security, governing, and economic ca- pacity of the host nation increases, the need for foreign assistance is reduced. At this stage, the host nation has established or reestablished the systems needed to provide effective and stable government that sus- tains the rule of law. The government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and builds legitimacy through effective governance, has effectively isolated the insurgency, and can manage and meet the expec- tations of the nation’s entire population.