¿Los hombres tienen miedo de mujeres seguras de sí mismas?
3. Miedo a que una mujer le haga daño o le deje.
The most common way in which Serbian authors take on the role of spokespersons for the nation is by granting themselves the authority to make evaluations, recommendations and normative/prescriptive judgments concerning Serbia as a political community. By offering guidance on the country’s political affairs, they present themselves as political guides for the nation.
The analysis shows that several authors do so by criticising Serbia’s political elites, specifically by blaming them for the country’s hardships. A clear illustration of this specific strategy of spokespersonship for the nation is found in Three leaders by Bačević [S08]. Throughout the piece, the author speaks not only as someone who is poised to criticise the conduct of the country’s major political leaders, but also as an advocate of general political consensus and national unity in times of crisis. The last paragraph most clearly attests to this form of discursive self-positioning:
(24) For the three Serbian leaders who last week displayed an enviable dose of political immaturity, there exists a proposal which is totally unrealistic, but it is logical. (25) Forget about the media, the public opinion polls, foreign friends who friendly took a piece a land away from you, as well as domestic partners who dream of isolation so that they can further strengthen their business empires through smuggling or the usual robbery. (26) You failed to agree on a single meeting, but perhaps you will agree on important matters. (27) This seems impossible today, but over time it will become clear that some balance between past and future, Kosovo and Europe, must be achieved among the leading parties in Serbia.
The three leaders (President Tadić, Prime Minister Koštunica and the opposition leader Nikolić), who arguably stand metonymically for Serbia’s entire ruling class, are
depicted as incompetent, self-interested and embroiled in illegitimate affairs. This negative presentation is intensified by means of irony (e.g. “enviable dose of political immaturity”, “friendly”) and cynicism (e.g. “totally unrealistic”, “usual robbery”, “impossible”). In sentences 25 and 26, the author openly engages the above- mentioned politicians through direct address, advising them to enfranchise themselves from public opinion and untrustworthy associates. This exhortation, however, is labeled as “unrealistic”, therefore it should not be read as a genuine piece of advice, but rather as a rhetorical move intended to further discredit the addressees. In the final sentence, then, Bačević puts aside his criticism of Serbian ruling elites and outlines a political vision for the future of the country that is infused with a sense of historical necessity (indicated by the future “will” and the modal “must”).
In the example above, the articulation of a political vision for the nation occupies only a marginal place in comparison to the criticism of political elites. In several texts from the sample, however, the former strategy emerges as a paramount form of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation (under the rubric of political guide). A salient illustration is found in the following excerpt from Kesić’s commentary [S07]:
(8) [...] the political and intellectual elite of Serbia today have two major tasks before them: first, to cleverly and necessarily avoid any armed conflicts over Kosovo, especially the potential conflict in which the great powers would flex their muscles over our neck. (9) Secondly, to precisely consider the circumstances in which the country finds itself, define the state and national goals, and, as politicians would say, subordinate everything to their achievement. (10) Whether Serbia will actually prove to be able to defend and reclaim Kosovo through a long-lived diplomatic struggle depends on how these issues will be addressed.
Here, Kesić spells out what he regards as Serbia’s key political objectives. A number of linguistic aspects are worth noting: first, the author’s instructions are directed at the country’s elites broadly understood, not only to its political leaders, and should therefore be viewed as forming a comprehensive social and political vision rather than as simply a blueprint for political action. Secondly, the argument largely rests on an implicit topos of threat and danger, which emerges from the adverbs “cleverly” and “necessarily”, and can be deconstructed as follows: if a political action or decision bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences (such as an armed conflict), then
one should not perform it. This topos is further substantiated in Kesić’s warning about the risk of Serbia being drawn into an international conflict (in this regard, see the third theme of the discursive representation of Serbia as a nation discussed in § 5.3.3), and finally reinforced by the exhortation to Serbia to pursue its goals through a “long- lived diplomatic struggle”. Lastly, the choice to put forth a normative/prescriptive argument without using modal verbs (such as “should” or “must”) lends objectivity to the prescribed actions and goals, and can therefore be regarded as a persuasive device. As a result of these discursive strategies, Kesić assumes and performs the role of political guide of the nation by urging the elites to act with prudence and in the best interest of the national community.
In some cases, the two strategies of spokespersonship for the nation discussed above (i.e. criticism of the political elites and articulation of a political vision for the nation) appear in combination. This occurs, for instance, in Despotović’s opinion piece, Time for responsibility, sobriety and reason [S05]. The author levels a series of accusations against Serbian political elites, reproaching them for their inability to properly articulate and pursue the good of the Serbian people:
(12) Instead of focusing on29 concrete people, their lives and their rights, our current
politics asserts the priority of abstract principles such as territorial integrity, international law and inviolability of borders. [...] (14) This is a dangerous tendency, because once the well-being of concrete citizens is neglected in favour of inapplicable principles we are only one step away from the political syndrome of the 1990s, that is, from an aggressive and hostile attitude towards the outside world, and from the limitation or the violation of rights and liberties as far as internal relations are concerned.
Despotović accuses Serbian political elites of favouring compliance with abstract norms over the prosperity of concrete individuals, which is implicitly elevated as a higher goal. Two linguistic features seem particularly important in this regard. The first is the predominance of nominalisations (such as “politics”, “tendency”, “political syndrome”, “attitude”, “limitation”, “violation” etc.) and impersonal verbs, whereby concrete agents are backgrounded while processes acquire realness and permanency. The second is the construction of a catastrophic scenario raising the spectre of a
relapse into the unrest and discontent that marked the 1990s. The relapse is said to be “one step away”, which creates a sense of risk and danger. From an argumentative perspective, this constitutes a topos of threat and danger, as the main claim (i.e. that the political elites should look after the well-being of the citizens) is supported with reference to the devastating consequences of acting otherwise. Moreover, this could also be regarded as a fallacy of the slippery slope type, as the author fails to demonstrate the inevitability of the predicted sequence of events.
In the second half of the article, Despotović constructs a polarisation between Serbia, which is portrayed as being in a pathological state of regression, and Europe (i.e. Western Europe), which instead appears as a symbol of progress and prosperity. The closing paragraph contains a wholehearted appeal for Serbia’s political leadership to finally embrace European integration as a way out of the country’s long-standing deadlock:
(38) The elimination of this social pathology and European integration actually represent for us one and the same process. (39) For this reason it is high time for all responsible political agents to stop manipulating, deceiving and intimidating the public opinion and to finally, responsibly and explicitly set themselves on the path which we should have embarked on already in 1989 – the path of civilisational progress, the path of European integration. (40) After all the lost years, after decades of lies, evil, misery and shame, it is high time for sobering up, for a principled, responsible and reasonable politics. (41) For Europe.
The central prescriptive argument, i.e. that Serbia’s political elites should uphold the country’s process of integrating into Europe, rests on three main discursive devices. First, the representation of integration into Europe as a metaphorical path (the word “path” itself is repeated three times) leading out of backwardness and towards progress and prosperity. Second, the creation of a compelling sense of urgency (see the repetition of “it is high time”) and missed opportunities (“already in 1989”, “all the lost years”, etc.) underlies a topos of urgency, which has the following general structure: decisions or actions need to be made very quickly because of an external, important and unchangeable event or higher cause. Third, the emphasis on the related notions of (political) responsibility, maturity and reasonableness, which are aptly encapsulated by the very title of the opinion piece.
While in the first excerpt Despotović harshly criticises Serbia’s incumbent political leaders by warning the reader of the perils arising from their alleged incompetence, in the second example he makes an enthusiastic plea for Serbia’s European prospects. As a result, Despotović emerges not only as an intransigent analyst of Serbian politics, but also as someone who can provide guidance to the nation by indicating the pathway to recovery and prosperity, which in this case corresponds to European integration. Another important way in which the intellectual can act as political guide for the nation is by representing her or himself as a vocal proponent (if not a leader) of an epoch-making process of national regeneration. A salient illustration of this form of spokespersonship for the nation is found in Kosovo and us by Vuk Drašković [S10]. This is hardly surprising, given that Drašković’s own political ideology revolves precisely around the idea, and the ideal, of a national regeneration for Serbia. After depicting the situation of the Serbian nation as bleak and desolate (a “breakdown” and a “defeat”), the author details his blueprint for national recovery and victory:
(6) Kosovo and the Kosovo epic, as the Serbian Iliad and Odyssey, have always turned defeat into national victory, and not into a self-destructive cancer. (7) Reason requires that the same be done now. (8) Victory can be achieved only by a strong Serbia [...] (9) Our most pressing duty is to recover from the causes of defeat, from the politics which, at the end of the 20th century, turned our national victories in the two Balkan wars, as well as in the First World War, into a breakdown.
Through the glorification of Serbia’s mythical (6) and historical past (9), the emphasis on the momentousness of the present (7) and the foreshadowing of a future victory (8), this passage frames a powerful teleological narrative of national catharsis and regeneration. In argumentative terms, this narrative serves as warrant for the prescriptive claim made in sentence 9, in which the author calls upon his fellow- citizens to repudiate Milošević’s ruinous politics and its legacy, and thus pave the way to the final goal of national recovery. The style is made declaratory and grave through lexical choices that convey a sense of duty, necessity and resoluteness, such as the predominance of the indicative mood, the recurrence of words such as “always”, “now”, “only”, and the explicit reference to a “most pressing duty”. Another relevant linguistic device is the shift of perspective that occurs in the last sentence of the excerpt, where the possessive our in “Our most pressing duty” and “our national
victories” constructs the author as a member of the Serbian nation. At the same time, this is also a strategy of involvement whereby readers too are made to feel part of the nation. All these discursive elements concur to represent the author as a spokesperson for the nation, specifically as an advocate (and a guide) of the nation’s envisaged renewal. Broadly speaking, in Drašković’s opinion piece reason and national victory are aligned axiomatically, in the sense that the full exercise of the former is equated to the attainment of the latter. This can be regarded as a salient way of combining intellectual estrangement predicated on the ‘courage to be reasonable’ (see § 5.1.1) and intellectual spokespersonship for the nation based on the role of political guide. In conclusion, the analysis provides evidence that several authors act as spokespersons for the nation by framing their role as political guides, and that they do so in three main ways. First, by coming forward as critics of the nation’s political elites, and particularly by blaming them for the nation’s ills. Secondly, by articulating so-called national interests, that is, by setting goals and priorities in order to achieve prosperity. Thirdly, by acting as proponents and interpreters of a process of national regeneration culminating in the nation’s ultimate actualisation/realisation. As seen in the last example, these strategies may also occur in combination.