Modelado de Procesos del Negocio con BPM

Introduction

The previous chapter explored the online deliberation literature. It highlighted challenges emerging from current research and noted the increased interest in the role of design and the development of innovative platforms to address these challenges. Many of these innovative platforms have emerged from academic fields outside of deliberative democratic theory, notably informal logic and collective intelligence. This chapter will explore the role and influence of informal logic.

Informal Logic is the study of reasoning in natural language arguments (NLAs). Johnson and Blair (1987:148) define informal logic as “the area of logic which seeks to develop non-formal standards, criteria, and procedures for the interpretation, evaluation and construction of arguments and argumentation used in natural language.” The development of informal logic can be understood as a response to perceived limitations of formal logic and deductive validity in analysing and evaluating NLAs and reasoning in decision making situations (Walton et al 2008, Walton and Godden 2007). The field has also been influenced by the educational objective of improving critical thinking skills amongst students (Johnson 2006).

Theories of informal logic share a broad commitment to the idea that despite the limitations of formal logic, there is nevertheless something to be preserved in the notion of good reasoning and the normative force of reason; this is sometimes expressed as the obligation to reason well (Pinto 2009, Blair 2012). How one should understand the nature of good reasoning, or the illative force of inference, remains the subject of debate and is a central concern throughout the literature (Gilbert 2004). In order to retain normative force a theory of argumentation must navigate the perceived dangers of relativism (relying on what a given audience finds persuasive) on the one hand and an unhelpful absolutism (relying on what the argumentation theorist finds persuasive regardless of the judgement of others) on the other (See Hu 2017). As the field has developed there has been

greater diversification in theories and methods. Tindale 1999 (in Pinto (2009) observes three broad perspectives on argumentation, logical, rhetorical and dialectical, and notes the further variety in how these perspectives unfold into accounts of argument. There have also been important debates around the possibility of non-verbal arguments (Blair 2012) and the role of emotion in reasoning (Gilbert 2004).

Informal logic shares some common areas of concern with deliberative theory, and has been influential on the development of platforms and tools supporting large scale deliberation. Despite this, there has been very little communication between the fields (Curato 2012), and there is therefore a need to better understand the relationship between these approaches at a theoretical level and the implications this has for understanding practical developments in online deliberation.

In the first section, this chapter will review informal logic literature and outline key themes and concepts. The second section of the chapter will compare how informal logic and deliberative democratic theory approach the issue of decision making and deliberation, and explore the implications this has for our understanding of the challenges of online deliberation. At a theoretical level this chapter will argue that informal logic, and specifically the contributions of argumentation schemes and dialogue types provide a framework within which to explore questions on the nature of argument, how we should evaluate arguments and moves in deliberation, and what kind of practical tools could support real world decision making. Furthermore, the discussion identifies ways in which informal logic may benefit from incorporating considerations of power offered by deliberative theory and critical theory into its analysis of natural language arguments.

Concepts and Themes in Informal Logic

The Limitations of Formal Logic

Formal logic is the study of deductive arguments in a formal context. The inference from premise to conclusion is evaluated in relation to the concept of deductive validity or proof. An argument is deductively valid if it is impossible that the premises could be true and the conclusion false. An argument is sound if it is both valid and the premises are true. The distinction between validity and soundness highlights two aspects of argument, the acceptability of the premises (premissary concerns) and the logical relationship between premises and conclusion (illative concerns) (Hansen and Cohen 2011). Formal logic is concerned with the illative quality of an argument. In contrast the acceptability of the premises, whether they happen to be true or false, is taken to be the domain of other areas of philosophy such as epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Formal logic distinguishes three broad categories of proposition, true propositions (logical truths), false propositions (logical falsehoods) and contingent propositions. Formal logic does not propose a method for establishing the acceptability of contingent propositions, consequently the analysis of arguments takes place within the context of a formal language which assumes perfect knowledge of the truth of the premises involved and the range of premises involved.

Advocates of informal logic highlight a number of limitations in applying the methods of deductive reasoning to NLAs (Hansen and Cohen 2011, Walton et al 2008). Hansen and Cohen (2011) observe that most NLAs involve contingent claims made under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge. Under the conditions of real world decision situations, illative and premissary concerns becomes problematic to disentangle and deductive validity becomes an inappropriate standard with which to evaluate good reasoning. Consider the following argument

P1) I need to arrive at Manchester for 12:00

P2) If I take the 11:05 train then I should arrive in Manchester for 12:00 Conclusion) I should take the 11:05 train

The reasoning in this argument is intuitively plausible based on the available information. Yet the argument presented could not be described as deductively valid. Numerous other goals and alternative courses of action potentially influence the acceptability of the conclusion. For example, other means of travel may be preferable due to considerations of convenience and cost. We may attempt to make our argument more robust by clarifying such assumptions (or enthymemes). Our efforts to do so would be ultimately limited. Many real-world decision situations are characterised by incomplete or uncertain knowledge of the range of alternative courses of action, the consequences of a given action, and the relationship they have to multiple potential goals of the various individuals involved in the decision. In the absence of complete and certain knowledge regarding the premises of the argument, we rely on notions of plausibility, probability and reasonable doubt, rather than proof or deductive validity (Walton et al 2008). In this sense, non-deductive forms of reasoning such as defeasible reasoning, inductive reasoning, and probabilistic reasoning play an important role in NLAs, where deductive validity is often not an appropriate standard of evaluation.

Collective decision making situations present specific challenges to our capacity to interpret and evaluate NLAs. NLAs may consist of judgements of fact, ethics or aesthetics, and there is not universal agreement over how such judgements should be treated in terms of their truth conditions or status in the context of argument (Walton 2008). When we analyse arguments as observers or participants we cannot be certain of the implicit commitments of the speaker. The terminology or framing of an argument may reflect values or assumptions which are either contested, or should be subject to scrutiny. Value pluralism may lead individuals to rationally reach different conclusions while in agreement of the facts of a situation, and it is important to distinguish this from bad reasoning (Atkinson 2006). Consequently, there is a need to explain how different aspects of an argument can be identified and prepared for evaluation (Blair 2012, Cohen and Hansen 2011). There is a question of methods of illative evaluation; what does it mean to talk about good or bad reasoning in the context of NLAs, how does one arrive at reasonable, well justified or satisfactory conclusions and decisions, or refute bad reasoning?

The Development of informal logic and Scope of the Research

Informal logic emerges in response to these perceived limitations in formal logic as a means for understanding NLAs. The field of Informal logic is often thought to begin with the publication of Johnson and Blair’s (1977) Logical Self Defence, which motivated the First Symposium on Informal Logic in 1978 and the development of the Informal logic newsletter (Hitchcock 1996). Prior to this publication, a number of works had argued that formal deductive logic was not the logic of argumentation (Johnson and Blair 1987). Influential earlier works include Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca’s (1969) The New Rhetoric, which emphasises acceptability amongst an audience and the notion of justice, and Toulmin’s (1958) The Uses of Argument, which provides an influential model of argument grounded on the notion of warrants and justified belief, represented diagrammatically. There is a strong pedagogical aspect to the development of informal logic; Johnson and Blair’s (1977) Logical Self Defence began as an attempt by the authors to amend the limitations of existing text books on logic, and develop a learning manual or textbook to support students understanding of real world arguments (Blair 2012). Other writers observe the development of informal logic alongside the critical thinking movement which attempts to improve the teaching of critical thinking skills (Johnson 2006, Maynes 2015). The departure from formal logic has led to a re-examining of the definition of argument and reflection on the nature and scope of informal logic as a field. This has given rise to a number of key questions and research tasks, which are summarised below.

1) A Theory of Argument

How should an argument be conceived, for example should it be understood as a process or a product, as an abstract object or a speech act (Simard Smith and Moldovan 2011)? How should argument be understood in relation to related concepts or terms such as argumentation, rationality, inference and the “illative core” (Blair 2012)? Johnson and Blair (1987:149) identify other questions that arise from the development of a theory of argument, “how should argument be conceived, as a proof? as persuasion? as a conversation? as a competition?... as an address to

an audience? As all of these? Is there one central notion of argument or a family of concepts?” Do arguments consist of different modes, for example emotional modes (Gilbert 1997, 2004) or non-verbal modes (Groarke 2015)? How should argument be understood, interpreted and prepared for analysis (Blair 2012, Hansen and Cohen 2011)?

2) A Theory of Argument Cogency

When can an argument be considered cogent? Should we adopt the view of an external critic or a fellow participant? Should the judgement be timeless or constrained by historical and other circumstances? Does our evaluation of argument depend on local (field specific) or global techniques of evaluation (Blair 2012)? Should our evaluation depend on dialogue type or the intentions of the participants (Van Laar 2011)? If we assume different modes of argument exist do these require different forms of evaluation (Groarke 2015)?

3) A Theory of Fallacy

Informal logic has been closely associated with the study of informal fallacies, particularly in the early stages of the development of the field (Walton 2008, Blair 2012). The literature includes different approaches to understanding informal fallacies (Johnson and Blair 1987), attempts to catalogue informal fallacies (Hansen and Fioret 2016) and research that seeks to understand why they are persuasive (Walton 2010).

4) Informal Logic and related fields

A key concern in the literature is the relationship between informal logic and other fields, in particular, rhetoric, dialectics, and critical thinking. In her discussion of this aspect of the literature Jorgenssen (2014) identifies how Blair for example suggests rhetoric studies argument in speeches, dialectics in conversations, and logic studies good reasoning in both, but she wishes to argue that attempts to impose rigid boundaries between these fields inhibits the potential for fruitful reflection on the different insights these fields offer. Johnson and Blair (1987) observe how a fear of psychologism has been overcome within the field of informal logic, as it has begun

to embrace research in cognitive psychology and explore the insights this offers for understanding human reasoning, fallacies and critical thinking (See for example Maynes 2015).

In Hitchcock’s (1996:274) discussion of the development of informal logic and the focus of research he makes the following observation

In 1978, Blair and Johnson produced an amazingly prescient list of 13 key problem areas: theory of logical criticism, theory of argument, fallacy theory, fallacy vs. critical thinking approach, inductive/deductive distinction, ethics of argumentation and logical criticism, assumptions and missing premises, context, methods of extracting argumentation, methods of displaying arguments, pedagogy, nature and scope of informal logic, relationship of informal logic to other inquiries... Every one of these problem areas has been the subject of discussion in the subsequent informal logic literature, and hardly anything else has been.

Blair (2012) discusses informal logic in relation to the task of argument identification and argument analysis and evaluation. The motivation for incorporating broader interpretations of arguments reflects the desire to consider the nature of real world decision making and the process by which we form beliefs and make judgements; this would undoubtedly include a broader range of phenomena than ideas expressed in a clear premise and conclusion form. The broader interpretations of argument present a range of challenges and demands for the project of informal logic. As the notion of argument broadens to include non-verbal arguments and other phenomena there is an increasing burden on the tasks associated with argument identification and management. Furthermore as the notion of logic or acceptable reasoning broadens (for example following Gilbert 1997) the task of identifying the persuasiveness of good reasons distinct from the persuasiveness of cognitive bias or bad reasoning becomes more complex. The following section will highlight key contributions to the field.

Toulmin

Toulmin’s 1958 The Uses of Argument provides a significant early approach to accounting for natural language argumentation that remains influential on scholars in the field of informal logic. Toulmin presents a model for practical argumentation that relies on 6 components. These are outlined below

Claim (C): a conclusion that is being asserted

Datum or Fact (D): information that is presented as providing support for the claim Warrant (W): a statement that authorises the move from datum to claim

Backing (B): a statement that provides support for the warrant

Rebuttal (R): Statements which present restrictions to the move from datum to claim Qualifier (Q): The degree of force that the warrant allows one to make from datum to claim, for example whether we can say that the truth of the datum makes the claim “certain” or simply “likely”

Toulmin (1958) illustrates the relationship between these components of argument through visual representation and example.

Toulmin 1958:92

The illustration above shows the relationship between the fact “Harry was born in Bermuda” with the claim that is being asserted “Harry is a British subject”. The

warrant provides the grounding for the move between data and claim. If we think of NLAs involving inferences from fact to conclusion as presenting warrants, then it is possible to observe different types of warrants, for example some warrants would appear to assert a link of certainty between fact and a conclusion, while other warrants assert likelihood or a particular probability for the link between fact and conclusion. To account for this, Toulmin introduces further components to argument; the qualifier indicates the degree of force that the warrant allows in the move from datum to claim, while the rebuttal identifies conditions or facts that represent exceptions or reasons for rejecting the move from datum to claim. These components of argument are represented below.

Toulmin 1958:94

Toulmin’s work represents an early identification of the limitation of informal logic (Blair and Johnson 1987). His model of argumentation can be understood as a tool for arguers rather than a theory of argumentation, and this could well be understood as a more legitimate way of understanding the project of informal logic. The components that Toulmin identified have provided an influential framework for thinking about NLAs, for example Blair (2012) draws on the idea of warrants when thinking about conditions of relevance and sufficiency, and Walton’s (2007) development of argumentation schemes and critical questions shares parallels

Toulmin’s model. In the second section, it will be argued that this approach could usefully inform research into deliberative processes, as well as support those engaged in argumentation.

Johnson and Blair’s Logical Self Defence and the RSA Criteria

Johnson and Blair’s (1977) Logical Self Defence is a key influence on the development of the field of informal logic. Johnson and Blair’s work identifies informal fallacies as taking three general forms: Problematic premise, irrelevant reason and hasty conclusion. From these categories of fallacies Johnson and Blair develop criteria for good argumentation, which are understood to be implicit in our understanding of the flaws: Acceptable premises, relevant reasons and sufficient grounds (Johnson and Blair 1977). These have been referred to as the RSA criteria (relevance, sufficiency and acceptability) and these criteria have framed the way many scholars in the field of informal logic have discussed issues around argumentation (see for example Gilbert (2004) and Govier’s (2006) ARG conditions for argumentation). How these criteria should be understood and the extent to which they should be taken as the basis for good argumentation has been subject to much debate in the literature (Hitchcock 1996, Blair 2012, Botting 2013). For example, relevance has been defined as “lending support to” and compared to Toulmin’s concept of a warrant (Blair 2012); in order to distinguish “relevance” from “sufficiency” on this understanding, Blair (2012) suggests that the concept of relevance implies a minimal authority, while the concept of sufficiency involves the degree of authority. Some have challenged the necessity of relevance to an understanding of the criteria of argument (Botting 2013), for example if an argument includes premises that are irrelevant, it may be inelegant but it does not make it a bad argument (Hitchcock 1996), and it could be supposed that “sufficiency” and “acceptability” assume relevance in a way that does not require a separate category. Blair (2012) concludes that while the RSA critieria are intuitively plausible, the challenge lies in operationalising these criteria and specifying these concepts to allow for judgement over when they have been satisfied in particular cases. Blair (2012:126) observes that

while there have been a number of attempts at this, no results have found widespread endorsement.

In Manifest Rationality, Johnson (2000) develops his original account of argument by introducing a further dialectical tier. This development reflects increased interest in dialectical approaches and argumentation theory. Johnson argues that the purpose of argumentation is rational persuasion, and for the need to reflect on the significance of the social context in which argument takes place. This allows him to talk about the obligation on participants to not only put forward arguments that reflect the RSA criteria, but to also rebut the arguments of others, and in this sense to participate in argumentation in a way that exhibits the qualities of rationality. Errors of Reasoning: Fallacies and Bias

Informal logic has been closely associated with the study of informal fallacies and the desire to support students in identifying faulty reasoning (Johnson 2006, Aberdein 2017). Johnson and Blair (1977:55) define a fallacy as “a pattern of argumentation that violates one of the criteria a good argument must satisfy and that occurs with some marked degree of frequency”. As theorists diverge in their understanding of what an argument is and what criteria contribute to an understanding of good argumentation, the way they understand fallacies also changes. As such the term fallacy becomes a general phrase to denote faulty reasoning within a given theory of argumentation; in some cases, fallacies can be discussed as a shift from one dialogue