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Considering that the New York Party was weakened by lack of

official union support and a weak electoral machine, it could be argued that it had done surprisingly well. It had also suffered from a city hall that had kept them out of the local elections, and a Socialist Party that was still a substantial third-party force. The problem for

the new party was how to stop being the fourth party, rather than becoming the second or even first.

^ Congressional Quarterly Guide to U.S. Elections, p. 743; Shannon, p. 158; John Patrick Buckley, The New York Irish: Their View of

American Foreign Policy 1914-1921, (New York: Arno Press, 1976), p. 11, pp. 182-184 passim.

Unlike New York, the Seattle Labor Party faced no such barriers; the Socialists were weak and, after the 1920 election, the FLP could declare itself a second party. However, though it might be said with hindsight that the vote was not disastrous, and perhaps could have been used to build the beginnings of a new party, contemporaries did not feel that way. To face up to these disappointments and to sustain the Party required some form of a stable base, either of individual

membership or union support. However, as we have already seen, the Party had already lost its official union support and had not built an active membership. The loss of union support was a major factor in the Party's inability to build an effective membership. For example the defeat of the progressive pressmen by the conservatives saw them removed and replaced with reactionaries. Similar action was taken in the Carpenters’ locals. These conservative victories inside unions which had supported the Labor Party further weakened the progressives

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of the New York central labor bodies.

The new party failed to establish its own newspaper and had to depend on the Call for coverage. This meant that for the most part even

its successes were ignored. This had serious consequences; for it meant the Party had no clear independent voice. It had to depend on the AFL union machine and other affiliates to spread its organization. When it lost the support of these organizations, it was left high and dry with no way of extending its support beyond the layer of minor officials in the New York labour movement. It was one of the Party’s most central activists, Lefkowitz, who described it as a party of minor union officials. He believed that, given a little more time, it could have gone back from the "central body into the local unions and gotten the support of the rank and file". The problem with this strategy was its reliance on the union machine. The starting-point was the central body, and even when Lefkowitz and his comrades were in control of the central body there were many barriers, with some local union officials blocking

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progress.

Perhaps activists like Lefkowitz were prisoners of their own past experience, used to passing resolutions inside the unions and passing on the results to members. Having gained control of the central body, they overestimated the power it gave them to involve the rank and file.

^^Rogin, pp.30, 35-36.

Using minor union officials, and the women of the WTUL, for

administration and electioneering blinded the progressives to the reality of their shortcomings. When the struggle was on the up-and-up, as it was in 1919, this did not matter. The conservatives had their hands full dealing with insurgent workers; it might even have suited

them to let militancy find an outlet on the political field. This situation gave the progressives the upper hand; however, once the struggle subsided the conservatives were able to use the weight of a long-established union machine against the progressives. They had powerful allies: the AFL national leadership, leaders of the International unions and the political strength of Tammany.

In a situation such as this, the progressives needed a power base from which to defend themselves. They had tried to use the central body as one, but it proved to be an unreliable weapon. The Socialist unions offered little support and, having failed to build any independent foundation, the progressives were easily defeated. The progressives had failed to sink any lasting roots into the insurgent spirit of 1919. They had failed to bridge the gap between the impulse for a new party and actually establishing one.

Tammany was quick to learn the lesson of this episode. For a brief while officials loyal to it had switched to the new party. It could not take union officials' loyalty for granted; it had to be more sensitive to the aspirations of these officials. Those who had

organized the defeat of the progressives at the CTLU were given rewards. Holland was found a $5,000 a year post on the Board of

Standards and Appeals. Costello and Coughlin were rewarded with minor positions. These were jobs which had been temporarily withheld. A whole number of officials who supported the ALP ended up in the Tammany

fold.^