Modelo de Bernstein

362 _{Cowan, New Zealand Wars, p.201}

363 _{Fused shells are intended to detonate in the air to deliver and all round explosion and when they go}

off on the ground they tend to blow upwards more than outwards.

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In interpreting this attack Cowan uses the opportunity to present both sides positively in a heroic light with the authority of a first-hand account. The actions of the participants are presented to highlight the lack of animosity by Cowan’s source and consequently the post- battle events receive a significant amount of attention. Cowan’s traditional narrative gives us the tragic story of defeat in a distinctly human account. Cowan begins with a description of the early morning with the troops standing to and a Maori signal gun being fired to initiate the assault.365 This is immediately a questionable presentation of the information as the soldiers would not have been stood to at this hour without an alarm prompting them. Normally the soldiers will be stood to (dressed, armed and ready to fight at their fighting positions) around 30 minutes before sunrise in New Zealand with dawn taking a full hour to complete on a clear day.366 Sunrise on February 23rd 1861 was approximately 0615 and the assault began a considerable time prior to this at 0345. Maori demonstrated a repeated ability to deliver co-ordinated volley fire, even in conditions of poor light. It seems more likely on this occasion that the firing of a single weapon was an accidental discharge, particularly in the context of the assault parties attempting their action by stealth and already being inside the redoubts ditches.

Cowan very quickly abdicates his narrative to Colonel H. Stretton Bates, who had served as an Ensign during the war and whose unpublished work comprises 80% of Cowan’s coverage of the fight. Bates’ work does coincide very closely with Cowan’s own style in its tone and gives a highly detailed version of the events for Cowan. Much of Bates’ account deals with his interactions with the Maori wounded, speaking of their dignity and courage.367 He focuses in particular on one young man whom Bates held while he died and then of learning the youth’s name, and later being able to tell his family of his death. This is very good evidence of the lack of animosity between the participants, but not of the events themselves.368In fact none of the important questions are addressed by Cowan, and we learn nothing of why the attack played out the way it did. Cowan’s surrogate narrative has no answers for these questions and our understanding of the event from Cowan’s account is incomplete. For Belich’s revisionist narrative there is difficulty reconciling this event necessitating an explanation to maintain the consistency of the narrative line. . Belich presents the attack as being the result of “boredom” and describes it as the “greatest mistake made by Maori during the war” and his treatment of the event is constructed to prove this.369 We are actually offered no real narrative of the event to work with, but rather Belich focuses on applying what

criticisms to the operation he has sources for and asserts that the British could have achieved the same effect by remaining in New Plymouth.370 He suggests that the Maori actions were

365 _{Cowan, New Zealand Wars p. 200}

366 _{The purpose of “Stand To” at dawn and dusk is to be prepared for attacks employing the changing}

light to deliver either an attack with the intention of escaping after delivery a blow employing the failing light at dusk or using the darkness of pre-dawn to prepare for an attack at first light. This is often combined with sweeping patrols that clear the area of any concealed enemies.

367 _{Cowan , New Zealand Wars, p. 206} 368 _{ibid p. 204}

369

TVNZ Documentary, Episode 2

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the result of a speech made in December 1860, before the sapping had begun exhorting the Maori to abandon their pits and throw themselves headlong at the military.371 This takes evidence out of context, particularly when Belich’s reinterpretation is obviously not what took place in this engagement.

Belich does begin with an acknowledgement that the attack was evidence of an impact on Maori, calling it the “best evidence for a baneful psychological impact”.372 But this is followed with undermining that very point with his claim that “the unsuccessful attack on number 3 redoubt did very little to vindicate Pratt’s approach.”373 Indeed Belich had already reinterpreted Colonel Mould’s description of the attrition impact on the moral of the Maori has an effort which would have “bored them” into submission.374 Belich then employs this own reinterpretation as evidence of Maori of being “bored to frustration” leading them to attack.375

In fact Belich reacted to the attack with almost visible disappointment, calling it the greatest mistake of the war for the Maori being “unnecessary and desperate”376 Belich ignores that the Maori were badly defeated by an effective and aggressive mobile response suggesting he has not given this sufficient attention. Belich successfully negates the more reasonable and obvious interpretation that the attack was the result of pressure being placed on the defenders by the sapping and a very clear indication that it was succeeding. This interpretation is essential to support the assertion that the entire sapping operation was pointless and no real threat to the defenders. At the same time the perceived pointlessness of the Maori attack has led to an absence of evaluation and the same questions not addressed by Cowan are similarly ignored by Belich and the narrative is incomplete.

The attack was very obviously a complex, coordinated attack involving multiple Maori units, operating at night, with the assault directly led by the senior commanders. The attack on Number 3 Redoubt had serious intentions, which resulted from the threat the sapping operation posed. But the attack failed to achieve its objectives for reasons that remain somewhat unclear on the part of the Maori. The British response was professional and effective in driving off all remaining Maori, who were still able to withdraw. Although Cowan’s account gives some light to the events, it is only half the story. Belich’s contribution does not add to our understanding of the event in any useful manner.