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Essential thinking becomes absolutely crucial in finding our place in the world. But have we found our place, our dwelling? Have we become alienated? Heidegger poses these two questions What is the state of dwelling in our precarious age and

and what are poets for in a destitute time 1 _{Before these questions can be dealt with,}

we must first understand what this destitute or precarious time is What emerges as the primary object of this destitution is the homelessness of human beings the lack of a dwelling, and the fleeing of gods, all of which are intimately related.

Homelessness so understood consists in the abandonment of beings by being.

Homelessness is the symptom of the oblivion of being. Because of it the truth of being remains unthought 2 _{This homelessness is the consequence of our detachment from}

our understanding of our own essence, the way we are in the world. Our destitution is a product of hiddenness of essences and meanings and concealment of truth as well as

1 _{Martin Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New}

York Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2013 p 89 Building Dwelling Thinking in Poetry, Language,

Thought, p. 158.

2 _{Martin Heidegger Letter on Humanism in Pathmarks, p. 258. This is reminiscent of the Early German}

Romantic poet Novalis who said Philosophy is really homesickness the desire to be everywhere at home

(in Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, translated and edited by David W. Wood [Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007] entry 857, p. 155).

Budha 66 the path towards it. It occurs when our calculated ordering of nature gives rise to the illusion about the prosperity and the abundance of our time. When metaphysical thinking becomes too enamored with itself, it loses the trace of the essential path. It becomes destitute by losing the path that leads away from this destitution. When the

destitute time is no longer able even to experience its own destitution then appears the time s absolutely destitute character 3 _{This destitution of homelessness is the}

forgetting of Being by human beings.

Heidegger says that the human being is the being whose being as ek-sistence consists in his dwelling in the nearness of being. The human being is the neighbor of being 4 _{As noted previously Heidegger uses ek- to talk about the thrownness of our}

existence into the world. We do not simply exist as objects in the world. Heidegger thinks that our existence is a thrown existence; we are hurled into existence without our say in the matter What throws in such projection is not the human being but being itself, which sends the human being into the ek-sistence of Da-sein that is his essence 5

Thrownness means that we exist historically and have a surplus of meaningful

connectedness to our past. But in our thrownness, we are not chained to the past; we are also projected towards the future. This projection is the condition for the possibility of actualizing what we seek to actualize. Understanding, our sense-making activity of

3 _{Heidegger What are Poets For in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 91.} 4 _{Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 261.}

Being, is what projects us to this future, to the possibility of revealing the meaning of our being Understanding is thought at the same time from out of the unconcealedness of Being. Understanding is ecstatic, thrown projection, where ecstatic means: standing in the realm of the open 6 _{We exist essentially in this thrownness of the past and the}

open projection to the future. We are faced with making choices and willing. We are faced with the predicament of actualizing multiple possibilities.

Moreover Heidegger says this destiny of thrown projection] propriates as the clearing of being which it is The clearing grants nearness to being 7 _{The clearing is the}

realm of freedom that lets human beings participate in a more fundamental

encountering of the world. We are free to the possibility of being in touch with our own essence. As long as there is no such clearing, we cannot recognize or even begin to encounter the essence of existence our Dasein Thus the clearing of being is to be understood in terms of this thrown projection ; it is the open space of meaning.

World is the clearing of being into which the human being stands out on the basis of his thrown essence 8 _{The world is always primarily the basis of our existence. Our}

thrownness cannot be anywhere but in the world as manifested openness. It is the ground in which beings like us occur and emerge in time. This is why Heidegger thinks

6 _{Martin Heidegger Introduction to What is Metaphysics in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill}

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 286.

7 _{Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 257.} 8 _{Ibid., p. 266.}

Budha 68 that human Dasein has a unique relationship with existence. One aspect of the

uniqueness of humans that is denied to entities such as animals and plants is the

nearness to the truth of existence as Heidegger says man s being open is a being held

toward whereas the animal s being open is a being taken by and thereby a being absorbed in its encircling ring 9 _{Humans have the freedom to exist in the openness and}

thus make sense of their existence in this freedom. Animals are essentially unfree in that they are within the open realm that remains before the human. This leads Heidegger to say that humans are world-forming and animals are world-poor 10

But this does not lead to the conclusion that the human being is the lord of

beings instead the human being is the shepherd of being 11 _{Human beings as entities}

in the world do not have precedence over other entities. Being, as an essential clearing, is not one of the faculties that is at our disposal and is not something that we have mastery over At best we are shepherds of Being we are the caretakers of Being We respond to Being with a responsibility to preserve our essential relation to it. The lordship of nature is a residue of the metaphysical thinking that has dominated our present discourse whereas the thinking that thinks from the question concerning the truth of being questions more primordially than metaphysics can. Only from the truth

9 _{Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, p. 343.} 10 _{Ibid., p. 177.}

of being can the essence of the holy be thought 12 _{Only this kind of thinking can think}

more primordially and rigorously than the thinking of metaphysics. When Heidegger talks about the holy, it is not clear if he is suggesting it as religious practice.

Nonetheless, there is a religious dimension to the idea of the holy in Heidegger, as it is thought of as a place of ritual practice, our comportment towards a way of being in the world Insofar as thinking limits itself to its task it directs the human being at the present moment of the world's destiny into the primordial dimension of his historical abode 13 _{Thinking about the truth of our being directs our attention to the manner in}

which we inhabit the earth, our dwelling, our historical abode But what is this dwelling?

Heidegger says that dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth 14

This idea of dwelling is quite contrary to how we conventionally understand dwelling, which is a mere occupying of a lodging 15 _{Heidegger thinks of dwelling as a place of}

freedom as he says that to dwell to be set at peace means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The

fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. 16 _{In this formulation,}

dwelling sets at peace this open region of freedom for beings to be close to their Being,

12 _{Ibid., p. 267.}

13 _{Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 267.}

14 _{Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 146.} 15 _{Heidegger Poetically Man Dwells Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 213.} 16 _{Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 147.}

Budha 70 as freedom here is revealed as letting beings be 17 _{Letting beings be is not to be}

understood in a negative sense of letting alone, of renouncing it, of indifference and even neglect it is the heeding and preserving of Being18 _{Thus letting be is a being}

at home with our own existence and taking care of the home, the dwelling place. It is what saves us from the danger of losing ourselves, of being homeless, of losing our relationship to Being Heidegger quotes Hölderlin But where danger is, grows / The saving power also 19 _{In this danger of losing ourselves and our bearing in the world, if}

we are able to recognize where we have erred and what is wrong with our condition, we are also able to save ourselves from the very danger But this saving does not only snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free into its own presencing 20 _{Just as dwelling lets beings be, human beings must also let dwelling,}

the earth, be; human beings must save the earth. But by saving the earth, the mortal does not master the earth and does not subjugate it but becomes a caretaker a shepherd of the Being of beings.21 _{In saving the earth, we mortals do not become} saviors because a savior traditionally understood as a detached being intervening on the

matter at hand; but for Heidegger, it is rather to be understood as an engaged being

17 _{Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 248.}

18 _{Martin Heidegger On the Essence of Truth in Pathmarks, ed. William H. McNeill (Cambridge:}

Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 144.

19 _{Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology p 34}

20 _{Heidegger Building Dwelling Thinking Poetry, Language, Thought p 148 Letter on Humanism} Pathmarks, p. 252.

who has just as much of a stake on nature as nature itself.

Heidegger recalls the saying of Heraclitus Fragment 119 which goes ethos

anthropoi daimon, usually translated as A man s character is his daimon 22 _Ethics

which is rooted in the Greek word ethos bears the weight of the meaning of the word abode An ethical life is a dwelling in the nearness of divinity of daimon. Heidegger further interprets this saying The familiar abode for humans is the open region for the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one 23 _{This suggests that only by dwelling can}

we exist in the openness to the unfamiliar realm of the holy, which demands our ethical attention and care. Only by being situated in the familiar realm of our dwelling can we then venture towards the unfamiliar realm of the holy. Our destitution occurs when our dwelling our ethos itself becomes unfamiliar to us To dwell means to be in the

presence of the holy. However, the kind of thinking that truly ponders the truth of our being and so defines the human being s essential abode is set out neither by ethics nor by ontology.24 _{If philosophy is to overcome its grounding in metaphysics, it has to think}

more rigorously, as discussed in Chapter 3, and ponder our essential way of being in the world. It cannot simply satisfy itself with the truths created by apophantic logos. It has to dwell on our more originary relationship with the world through hermeneutic

logos. This thinking has to care about the ethical bond in the time of technological

22 _{Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 269.} 23 _{Ibid., p. 271.}

Budha 72 human beings 25 _{Our ethical bonds become even more important, become more}

threatened, once there is a calculated ordering by a metaphysical thinking that creates a separation between us and other entities, nature, and Being itself. A calculated

gathering is not a poetic gathering fostered by art and safeguarded by our dwelling. We might be able to live in technology but not dwell in it.

We measure deeds of scientific knowledge and its research projects by the impressive and successful achievements of praxis 26 _{But the deed of thinking is}

neither theoretical nor practical nor is it the conjunction of these two forms of comportment and yet it is a deed a deed that surpasses all praxis thinking

permeates action and production, not through the grandeur of its achievement and not as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its inconsequential

accom plishment 27 _{The thinking that Heidegger wants us to participate in is not}

subservient to practical use For Heidegger questioning is the piety of thought 28

Thinking, as discussed in Chapter 3, is the same as questioning; it is an opening up of a horizon of possibilities in order to recognize our ends and well as being in tune with our origins. It attends to the clearing of being, the thrown projection of our existence. Hans Jonas gave an interesting insight into this matter He says that in Aristotle s

25 _{Ibid., p. 268.}

26 _{Heidegger Letter on Humanism Pathmarks, p. 257.} 27 _{Ibid., p. 274.}

thinking speculative theoretical sciences were concerned with unchangeable and eternal first causes and intelligible forms of being without an action of their own and the practical sciences were concerned with experiential knowledge by the planned changing of the changeable 29 _{The practical sciences are valuable because they are}

engaged in producing results that are applicable, whereas the theoretical sciences were done for their own sake But as Descartes gave birth to a theory with inherently

technological potential it resulted in a fusion of theory and practice 30 _Theory

became transformed to serve the function of knowledge and praxis. It was no longer an activity done for its own sake. It was no longer a deed but became a means for all deeds; theory became an instrument.

Now, one asks the question: what is the use for this new kind of theory that has technological potential Jonas says The ultimate end of all use is the same as the end of all activity, and this is twofold: preservation of life, and betterment of life that is, promotion of the good life 31 _{As I had mentioned in Chapter 2, as far as the}

preservation of life is concerned, this new scientific theory has proven extremely useful with the modern technology of medicine, health services, and increase in the overall longevity of human life. It has also given rise to new technologies in architecture that

29 _{Hans Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biological, p.}

189.

30 _{Ibid., p. 190.} 31 _{Ibid., p. 191.}

Budha 74 can sufficiently cope with the effects of earthquakes and tsunamis. The list of the

achievements of this scientific theory is inexhaustible and there is no denying the

inherent goodness of these acts. However, only inquiring about how the preservation of life can be accomplished and how catastrophes can be averted might make us feel excused from inquiring into ends 32 _{It would be ridiculous to think about how to save}

for a retirement plan when one is inside a burning house. Obviously, averting

catastrophe is an urgent matter and there is nothing more competent than technological science to resolve these issues of emergencies But Jonas says the anticipation of

success inherent in all struggle against danger, misery, and injustice must face the question of what life befits man when the emergency virtues of courage, charity, and justice have done their work 33 _{For Heidegger thinking of a new kind that is neither}

practical or theoretical has this responsibility to inquire into the truth of our existence our ultimate end. Thinking of this kind is a deed that denies this metaphysical

distinction of theory and practice. It not only thinks about the ends but also the origins; thinking about the end of being is ultimately thinking about the origin. In the

conventional use of the word origin there is no suggestion towards ends and has a connotation of being more primitive than ends temporally, as well as in terms of sophistication. But for Heidegger, the question about ends is intimately bound up with

32 _{Jonas The Practical Uses of Theory p 208} 33 _{Ibid., p. 208.}

the question about origins. Thinking of this sort is circular in that it ends up where it begins something that is echoes in the Heraclitus Fragment 79 B103 The beginning and the end are common in the circumference of a circle and Parmenides Fragment 5

for me it is indifferent from where I am to begin: for that is where I will arrive back again But the destitution of our time is such that what must already be familiar to us, our origin, remains concealed. As long as we cannot situate ourselves in our origins, we cannot think about our ultimate ends. As long as we cannot dwell, we cannot

encounter the holy. Origin is what takes us back to our being, which something that modern thought has forgotten.

However, in pursuing our origin and philosophizing about the primordial human essence isn t Heidegger committing an error that Nietzsche dreaded in his

Genealogy of the Morals? That was the error that permeated philosophy since Plato to

Hegel that in its pursuit of the origin Ursprung it aimed to capture the exact essence of things their purest possibilities and their carefully protected identities 34

The origin was thought of as a pure, untarnished essence that can somehow be captured through methods that are also pure, transcendent, or absolute. Someone like Kant did not simply venture to pinpoint the exact essence of reason but also the essence of morality, the practical sphere of human life. Whenever someone speaks of human

34 _{Michel Foucault Nietzsche Genealogy History in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rainbow (New York:}

Budha 76 nature as so and so or talks about the nature or essence of things, one is attempting to point at an immobile time or space that precedes all events. Foucault says that the fixation on origins is a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth. 35 _{But when dealing with}

Heidegger s approach one should not think of origin as these independent entities that precede all contingencies; the origin is grounded in the temporality as an

admixture of countless meanings surrounding it Therefore Heidegger s pursuit of origins is the kind of pursuit that Nietzsche, in fact, thinks is the task of the thinker, which is to trace the origin as genealogy (Herkunft) and not as Ursprung. Foucault says,

an examination of descent Herkunft) also permits the discovery, under the unique aspect of a trait or a concept, of the myriad events through which they were formed. Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things 36 _{The approach of the genealogist}

is very much attentive to the historical details that a traditional metaphysical historian might count as insignificant, and addresses the chains that were broken, replaced,