Lic. Verónica Fernanda Pardo Frías LOJA – ECUADOR
UN MODELO DE DESARROLLO DE LAS HABILIDADES DE AUDICIÓN
The allocation system of national R&D funds, which determines the incentive structure of beneficiary organisations and researchers, changed to the PBS in 1996. This new system was introduced to promote innovation by broadening the autonomy and strengthening the transparency of conducting R&D projects (Lee 2006).
Prior to the introduction of the PBS, government R&D funds were stably supplied by top-down, mission-oriented NRDPs (Lim 2000). Little competition among research groups and organisations was needed (Interview 13 (GRI)). Thus, NRDPs were able to be stably conducted by a team or department base comprising 10-20 researchers led by a team leader (Kim 2011). These mission-oriented NRDPs were effective in the catching-up stage at localising foreign technologies and products under a clear industrial policy (Suh 2000). However, on the negative side, team leader-centred project allocation and operation caused bureaucratic and unclear management of NRDPs (ibid.). The PBS was introduced to solve such problems and encourage innovative research.
Since the introduction of the PBS in 1996, research projects have been acquired by competition between research teams. The PBS operates via a quantity-based evaluation of research performance known as 3P; it looks at the number of publications, patents, and projects obtained (and the return of technology transfer). Under the PBS, competition to obtain R&D projects has been considerably intensified to supplement researchers’ salaries, which are set at a base level (Interviews 4, 13 and 28 (GRI)).
5.3.1.2 Dual effects of the project-based system
Amid competition to acquire research projects, and due to its stress on quantity-based performance, the PBS has had dual effects on the operation of NRDPs. As noted, on the positive side, a significant improvement in research performance, especially in terms of knowledge accumulation in the form of papers and patents, was identified (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
However, on the negative side, industrial potential became a secondary concern after publication and ‘blinding’ patenting (regardless of any real application or technology transfer). That is, the PBS forced researchers to prioritise quantitative performance based on publication and patenting (Lee 2003, Yim and Kim 2005) to secure the continuation of projects, which are normally evaluated every year (Interviews 11, 13, 26 and 27 (GRI)).112
Moreover, increased competition has caused inevitable overlap of research topics between R&D teams in a few trendy and popular areas such as ‘bio nano-’, ‘bio-drug’, or
‘stem cell’. This tends to minimise the risk of selection failure when applying for NRDPs by benchmarking others’ research topics (Interviews 11 and 26 (GRI)).
A team leader of a drug research project at a GRI, the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology (KRIBB), characterised these negative effects as an overall outcome of the new incentive system (Interview 26):
We [team leaders who were responsible for acquiring projects] could not put innovation and commercial potential first when we applied for a project, though we recognise the importance of industrial potentiality in national projects based on people’s tax. For us, guaranteeing the continuation of present projects and acquiring more projects are the most critical tasks for maintaining our research team and keeping our team members’ salary at a certain level.113 Because of this, a considerable part of our time at work is spent not conducting research, but applying for projects, networking with administrative officers and reporting the interim and final results every year.114
Under the PBS, no researchers would be willing to conduct explorative long-term research. A failure in obtaining a successful research outcome means subsequent failure of acquiring the next NRDP. Thus, many projects implicitly attempt to benchmark other research projects to avoid the risk of failure. Thus, research topics become similar, focusing on a few popular research areas.115
112 Specifically, they pointed out PBS as the most serious inhibitor that disturbed the long-term, more exploratory research in GRIs, even within a long-term project, due to annual and quantity-based interim evaluations.
113 ‘Besides, we [researchers] actually can perform a few research projects but we propose many projects by packaging them like different topics. Although we know it is wrong, we have to first concern ourselves with the evaluation based on the PBS. We make different project reports with a few original projects.’
114 In reality, in a survey of the PBS to researchers in GRIs and universities, conducted by a member of the National Assembly, Doo-un Chung in 2011, 43% of the total number of respondents indicated private networks as the most important factor to acquire NRDPs (the total number of respondents – 345).
115 This was also pointed out by a team leader of the KIST, Dr Ji-yun, Kang (Interview 11).
In fact, in 2010, 95% of all NRDPs resulted in the successful completion of their projects, according to the National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC). According to Dr Chang-gyu Hwang, former head of R&D strategy at MOTIE, this means that there was almost no risk-taking R&D. ‘R&D fund was given to projects that were almost guaranteed success’, he said. That is, R&D funds were used for technological validation in repetition rather than exploration.
The prioritisation of quantitative criteria based on publication and blind patenting prevails not only at GRIs, but also at universities. An assistant professor in a biotechnology department at a university who succeeded in transferring a research outcome to a Chaebol (SKC) criticised the fact that the benchmark in evaluating promotion is the quantity of publications. Technology transfer is not regarded as being as valuable as publications, even though most of the university’s royalties are obtained through technology transfer (Interview 22 (university)).116
Publication-centred evaluation has also influenced private innovation actors’
participation in NRDPs, particularly that of DBFs. The former president of the Korea Biomedicine Industry Association (KOBIA) pointed out that the government also based the distribution of R&D funds to industrial developers such as DBFs on publications (Interview 20 (DBF)).117 It is inevitable that DBFs will prioritise publication in order to acquire NRDPs.
The negative effects of this quantitative, performance-oriented incentive structure are amplified by the low impact of scientific publication done in Korea. Korea had the lowest impact factor among OECD countries while producing the 11th highest number of publications (based on SCI), according to a survey conducted by NSTC in 2011 (The Hankyoreh, 14/2/2012).
Related to this, a leading researcher at the Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials (KIMM) pointed out that integrative R&D planning that reflects commercial potential and demand is difficult to set up if each team or researcher is making dispersed and competitive project applications. Under the present structure of the PBS, research results with high commercial potential will not be produced (Daedeok Net, 11/8/2011).
Summarising remarks
116 Technology transfer about micro-needle technology in 2007.
117 The CEO of Proteogen and the former head of Genetic research centre (GRC, the forerunner of KRIBB) of KIST.
Overall, this sub-section traced the problematic aspects of the PBS-based incentive structure. Innovation performance of NRDPs has been mainly expressed in the rapid accumulation of publications and patents, making the NRDPs appear successful for the science-driven transition. However, while a good quantitative performance in the short term means the ‘administrative’ success of NRDPs and guarantees the sequential acquisition of new research projects, it does not always lead to the establishment of promising research activities and successful industrial development. That is, it is difficult to ascertain whether PBS has promoted autonomous, long-term, risk-taking and industry-reflective research.118
5.3.2 Selection mechanism of national R&D programmes