Modelo de diseño

1 9 6 8), pp . 3(1— 6 5 . .

2. See for example: Fowler to Wilson, 8.3-05, UNA A 1 2 / 6 ; Jervoise, Report on Masindi District for October 1906, UNA SMP/515/part 2; Grant to Boyle, I .7.O7, UNA SMP/751/07;

Knowles to Wilson, 6 .1 0.0 8, UNA SMP/1520/08.

3* Hesketh Bell to Crewe, 8.5-08, UNA SMP/549/08.

4, Boyle to Crewe, 4.1.10, PRO C O /5 3 6/3 2.

182

There is an important sense, however, in which the colonial era in ^ango can he said to have begun during the l8 9 0's rather than the years 1907-18- The government cotild not afford to ignore Lango completely, partly because its enemies tended to take refuge there, and partly because the Langi continued to

raid areas which were now administered. From 1894 onwards, there fore, Lango was penetrated by British expeditions, which made a stronger impression than any previous raids, and which were a foretaste of the colonial regime to come. The long interval between the first appearance of British officials and the begin­

ning of formal administration allowed the Langi to devise res­

ponses which determined their behaviour when the government arrived in strength. For the most part, their response was one of resistance to alien incursions, and despite the highly

localised range of this resistance, it was remarkably effective right up until the beginning of administration in 1 9 0 8 - 9 and beyond. By that time certain patterns of accommodation had also emerged, especially in western Lango. In the context of Lango history, the real significance of the years from 1 8 9 4 to 1 9 0 8 lies in this diversity of contact with - and response to - the colonial power.

Between 1894 and 1901 the government was obliged to take action in Lango on account of the flight there first of Kabarega, and then of Kabaka Mwanga and the Sudanese mutineers. The brief campaign of 1893-94 ended B u n y o r o 1s independence, and established the British and their Baganda allies in control; but their p o s i ­ tion remained insecure as long as the Omukama was at large.

Early in 1894 Kabarega crossed into Lango, and his headquarters was alfnost continuously there until he was captured five years

later, in Angai, n e a r Lake. Kwania. During his last year of*

freedom Kabarega was able to make common cause with Mwanga and the remainder of the Sudanese mutineers who escaped to Lango early in 1 8 9 8 after their defeat in Buganda. Mwanga was cap­

tured along with Kabarega. The mutineers established themselves in a fort on the upper Toci, at a place called Modo, near the confines of Acholi country. They were finally captured during a protracted campaign of several months by government forces under Delme-Radcliffe in 1901, D e l m e - R a d d l i f f e 's expedition, though more elaborate than most, was in fact the tenth that had entered Lango since 1 8 9^. During that period, much of western and southern Lango had been traversed - the valleys of the Toci and the O k o l e , the right bank of the Nile from Aber up to

Namasale peninsula, and the eastern shores of Lake K w a nia.’*' In these .areas the Langi had not been idle witnesses of others' misfortunes, but had been directly involved.

Some Langi had been actively engaged on the side of the f u g i t i v e s , Kabarega's purpose in moving to Lango was partly to have a convenient bas.e for retaliating against the government, but partly also.because he hoped that friendly Lango clans would provide him with military reinforcements, as well as a place of refuge, On account of the collapse of regional leadership early in the l890's, Kabarega could no longer rely on the aid of large clan c o m b i n a t i o n s , and no war-bahds came from the north-east at all; but in wouth-west Lango, where Kabarega was based from

•ft

-189^-95, some of the clans joined the abarasura (royal army)

1, The p r i n c i p a l .sources for these expeditions are as follows:

the series A2 and Al- in U N A ; the Foreign Office series 4l03/211, 2(il and 3 1 8, in the PRO; A. G. B a g s h a w e , 'Journal of Lango Expedi­

tion' , MS in M a k e r e r e ,University Library; Seymour Vandeleur, Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger (London,1 8 9 8); C.A.Sykes Service and Sport on the tropical Nile (London,1 9 0 3).

\A

, P 184

hap o

The Colonial penetration of western Lango

' 1 8 5 ' ■

1 . - ‘

in - their raids across the Nile, and when a British column pur­

sued Kabarega northwards along the right bank of the Nile in May 1895* it had to force a passage over the Aroca, Support

for Kabarega was strongest in the wouth-east, probably on ac­

count of the vigorous lake trade of the Banyoro. When Kabarega xvithdrew along Lake Kwania in. April 1899? his pursuers were

attacked, and Lango warriors were at Itabarega’s side when he was captured a few days later. The expedition retaliated by

destroying villages and granaries. 3 o

Although the Sudanese mutineers lacked any previous connec­

tion w ith the Langi, they too were able to come to an arrangement with local clan leaders. A handful of mutineers stayed with

Odongo Aja in Kaindini; they sold him a few firearms and ins true-ted some of the Jo Arak how to use them; they also joined

Odongo on some of his raids. 4 When Delme-Radcliffe entered

kango at the mouth of the Toci in April 1 9OT, the mutineers had evidently left K a m d i n i , and Odongo himself was cooperative, but during the course of the expedition he was suspected of complicity with the mutineers, and two of his villages were attacked in

1, Some observers attributed the raids on Bulemezi and Buruli to the Langi alone (Ternan to Commissioner, 5*1»95, UNA AA/A;

Pulteney to Commissioner, 1 6.3.9 6, UNA AA/i ; V a n d e l e u r ,o p .c i t . p. IOAO). Col. Evatt, whose expedition captured Kabarega in l899i was of the opinion that K a b a r e g a ’s followers were solely respon­

sible (Eva.tt to Ternan, 10 . 5 * 99 »UNA A4/17). The truth is probably that the Langi took part in raids organised by the Banyoro; they are mentioned together in connection with a raid in February 1895

(Dunning to C o m m i s s i o n e r , 13•2.95 5 UNA A A / l),

2. "The Wakidi were soon dispersed by the M a x i m ” . Vandeleur, op.cit; p .7 2.

3* Evatt to Staff Officer, 8.4.99\ UNA A A / l6 ; Evatt to Ternan , 10.5 *.99 j UNA Ak/17* Interviextfs: Gideon Odvrongo, Tomasi Ojuka, Reuben Ogwal.

A. Interviexvs: Misaki O k i , Kosia Ato, Leoben Okodi, Fancio Itot, Koranima A y e n a . Wilson to Johnston, 7*10.00, UNA A12/1.

August.

1

They used their surplus of firearms to equip local allies, p r i n ­ cipally the Alwaa clan; mutineers and Langi raided the Acholi as well as Lango clans hostile to the Jo Alwaa. 1 The. clans who- supported the mutineers were punished accordingly: a small

expedition in 1 8 9 9 fired their villages and crops, and this t r e a t m e n t .was repeated on a much larger scale by Delmd-Radcliffe-in 1901. 4

However, the injuries inflicted on the Langi during the years 1894-1901 went a good deal further than retribution for supposed offences. During the 1 8 9 0's the number of troops in.

the Protectorate was so small that large numbers of irregulars had to be employed in the pursuit of K abarega and the mutineers.

These irregulars were mostly Baganda, whose m ain objective was to return with as much plunder as possible. The handful of British officers who led the expeditions were usually quite

unable to prevent the Baganda from raiding into the Lango hinter-land for livestock and provisions. 5 In Ocini this behaviour provoked a strong reaction from Owiny Akulo and the Jo Arak;

in M a y 1 8 9 5 they ambushed and killed 150 Baganda irregulars as

1. D e l m e - R a d c l i f f e , Diary of Lango Field Force, entries for 26.4.01,27.4.01,15.8.01,16.8.01, PRO FO/4 0 3/3 1 8; Bagshawe,

’Journal', entry for 17*8.01. Interviews: Juma Arbam, Edwardi Olir.

2. Anderson to Johnsto'n, 21.3.00, UNA A4/27; Macallister to J o h n s t o n ,20.11.00, UNA A l 6 / l , Interviews: Yakobo O l u g o , Yokonani Alyai.

3* Sykes, op. cit. pp.240-4l.