Modelo estimado para el cultivo de maíz duro

Let us start with a bit of background fact-finding. In fact, there is nothing w rong with tiie assum ption as such. An extem alist will have no problem w ith the assum ption A at the sameness of behaviour entails the sam eness of mental states. Actually the problem that the extemalists have is that they cannot accept the assumption as conceived by the internalists. This is due to the kind of notion of behaviour that the intem alists employ in the assumption. Otherwise, the assum ption actually einbodies a common insight about mental states. To start with, w e know that the need for having mental states in our story of the world was felt when we needed to explain behaviour. And so the central role that m ental states played in explanation of behaviour was regarded as

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one of the key features of a mental state. This is one of the reasons that w e find a close link Ixtw een mental states and l?ehaviour. There is another reason for w hich behaviour came into the discussion of mental states. Earlier on, philosophers t)elieved that w e could know about m ental states purely by introspection. But w ith the realisation that there w ere m any serious problems with the introspective method, philosophers started to think th at we could know about m ental states by looking into the role that those mental states played in explaining t>ehaviour. This close relation that mental states are taken to have w ith the behaviours that they explain, m ight have been the reason behind having this assum ption in the first place. Philosophers also felt that the evaluation of the w orth of a theory about the m ind w as tied w ith the question of how best could the role of the mental states in the explanation of behaviour be captured in that th e o r In fact; w e find philosophers taking into account the different roles th at the mental states play in explanation of t)ehaviour while classifying them into different kinds (e.g. l>eliefs, desires etc.). It is obvious that these classifications are closely tied w ith the question of individuation of mental states. Now psychological explanations of behaviours in term s of mental states actually presuppose causal interactions t)etween mental states and behaviour and other mental states. This has m ade philosophers to think that w e need to define mental states in terms of their causal powers. And it is here that the internalist extemalist controversy comes in.

The question around which the controversy arises is w hether to classify mental states like intentional states we solely have to look into w hat goes inside the subject, or do we have to, at least partly, look into what the environm ent is like. The intemalists think that in order to define mental states in terms of their causal powers w e have to

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individuate them intemalistically and not extemalistically. And here the assum ption has become different for the two contending parties. We find them differing even in their conception of behaviour, and consequently differing about w hat one should regard as the explanandum of psychology. We shall see that the reasons for their taking any particular stance ab o u t w h a t could possibly be the explanandum of psychology are related to their conceptkm of psychdogy itself. Intem alists and extem alists differ in their views about mental states, about behaviours (the explanandum of psychology) and psychology itself. All these notions are intertw ined in such a way that one's views about any one of these notions have immediate bearing upon one's views about tiie others.

Let us now consider the assumption. As w e have already said, our first task is to show that intemalists do indeed have this assum ption. To refresh ou r m em ory, the way that Segal and Fodor try to argue against Tyler Burge show s that they have this as an underlying assum ption, i.e. that the sam eness of behaviour provides good reason for the sameness of mental states. They say that since Ed and Ted behave in exactly the same way in earth and twin-earth in the presence of w ater and tw ater respectively (and also since they would behave in exactly the sam e way if they w ere to change places, unbeknownst to them), they m ust be in type-identical m ental states. They go on to say that we could give a full explanation of behaviour in terms of mental states individuated purely intem ally and w e do not need any essential m ention of the objects towards w hich those mental states are directed.

The m ain problem with this assumption is that the notion of behaviour that these philosophers are working w ith is already a narrow

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or an intem alistic one. Consequently, an extemalist can well say that it is because they have a narrow notion of t)diaviour, the intem alists think that a purely intem alist individuation of mental states is sufficient for the explanation of behaviours in psychology. The extem alist would say th at had th e intem alists em ployed a broad/w ide notion of behaviour, then narrow m ental states w ould prove lo be insufficient for their e3qpUnations. In response to this extemalist charge, the intem alists have tried to dem onstrate th at it is this narrow notion of behaviour which w e em ploy in psychology and it is this kind of behaviour that have to be explained and can be explained in psychology. A nd since an intem alistic individuation of mental states rather than an extem alist individuation is sufficient for the explanation of narrow behaviour, intem alism is die right thesis about the m ind and the m ental

The two main concerns for us in this chapter are to find out w h at is the notion of behaviour that w e m ust adopt and w hat should be the nature o f psychological explanation. And in knowing the answer to these questions w e will be able to have a clearer view about how m ental states are to be individuated — an issue which is at the veiy centre of our entire discussion in this thesis. As w e have already noted in the very beginning, the two questions are, in fact linked together. We shall see that the notion of behaviour that a philosopher opts for is largely influenced by his notion of psychological explanation or his tielief about w hat is it that we are trying to explain in psychology and vice versa.

I have found argum ents going both ways. To start w ith w e can discuss Jerry Fodori^^ and also Tim Crane*'*® w ho try to show that it is

See 'Modal Argument from Narrow Content', The Journal of Philosophy Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 1, Jan., 1991.

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impossible for us to reconcile causation w ith content, if w e take psychological states to be wide. And since psychological explanations should be causal explanations, w hat we are explaining cannot be w ide and consequently mental states should not be individuated w idely, i.e. sameness of b eh a\io u r narrowly conceived indicates sameness of mental states. We shall also consider Jaegwon Kim's thesis of psychophysical supervenience^ which Kim thinks, has to be respected, and if it is respected then there is no way that w e can have extem al mental states and extem alistic explanations in psychology. W hat Kim tries to show is that extem alist explanation is red u n d an t The supervenience thesis is at the centre of m ost of the discussions in this area and w e shall see how Fodor too has emphasised its importance in the discussion of psychological explanations.

Extemalists like Peacocke^^^ have brought forward argum ents against the intem alist by showing that psychological explanation can be extemalistic. And if th at is so, then the way that Fodor, Crane and Kim have tried to argue w ould not be acceptable. In addition to this w e have extemalists coming u p with arguments in favour of a wide notion of behaviour^R I shall be discussing how an intem alist thesis m ight be compelled to have a very restricted notion of behaviour, which w ould make l>ehaviour identical with bodily movements. I discuss Fred Dretske's w ork here in order to show that bodily movements cannot be taken to be the explanandum of psychology. I shall be discussing Fedor's argum ent against w ide content/behaviour and I shall try to counter his contention following Peacocke's argument in 'Extem alist Explanation',

See his 'All the Difference in the World'.

See his 'Extemalist Explanation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1992.

-42 See Jennifer Hornsby's Thysicalist Thinlong aind Conceptions of Behaviour^ in Pettit & McDowell (ed.). Subject Thought and Context.

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and then go on to see if a w ide notion of behaviour can t)e supported at all. I feel that Peacocke's argum ent m ight well apply against Kim.

But before going into this controversy w e m ight just stop and consider a radically different view which questions both the intem alist and the extem alist positions. There is a radically different view about w hat psychological &q>lanation should t)e like: One m ight think that it is w rong to think th at psychological explanation is necessarily causal. A nd if that is so, then the kind of argum ent which is designed to show that w e cannot reconcile causation w ith w ide content will prove nothing. We shall first consider this position and see if it is tenable. This is so because if it is indeed tenable, tiien w e need not be concemed a t all by the internalist's argum ents.

3J1 N on-C ausal Explanations

There are philosophers, like Anscomh>e^^, K e n n y Meîden^^, who think that explanation of behaviour is non-causal. W hat they say is that w hen w e give an explanation of the behaviour of a person, w h at w e do is give the reason(s) for w hich the person had behaved in that particular way. A nd they say that the relation between reason and action is not a causal one.

There are other philosophers, like Davidson, w ho defend the view that rationalising in this way is a kind of causal explanation. W hat exactly is the relation l>etween a reason and an action? W hen w e give reasons for our actions, w e try to explain w hat reasons w e had for doing that particular action. The reason helps us to see w hy that particular

her Intention, Blackwell, Oxford, 1959.

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action appealed to the agent and w hat led the agent to perform the particular action a t that particular situation.

D avidson says that whenever anyone does anything for a reason, we can characterise her with a kind of pro-attitude and a belief. For instance, if I see a person w earing a heavy sweater on a w arm and sunny day, I w ill think she has a reason to wear such dotiies. She possibly believes that she has fever and that she fed s cold and th at the sw eater will keep her warm . Possibly both the pro-attitude and the t)elief lead the agent to do the action. Davidson says that w hen w e try to rationalise a person's action, w h at w e are lookiiig fw is the prim ary reason tiiat she had for doing the action. How can w e characterise a prim ary reason? Davidson gives a prelim inary definition of a prim ary reason, viz.:

'C l. R is a prim aiy reason w hy an agent perform ed tiie action A

u n d er the description d only if R consists of a pro-attitude of the agent tow ard actions w ith a certain property, and a tielief of the agent that A , under the description d, has that property

Now let us consider Davidson's example. Suppose I flip the sw itch and by doing so I turn on the light, illuminate the room, caution the prowler, make m y neighbours think that I am home and so on. But w hy did I flip the switch? I could have done it to caution tbe, prow ler or I could have done it to let my neighbours know I am home, but let us suppose I didn't. It seems that the prim ary reason is that I w anted to turn on the light and by doing so illuminate the room. But this doesn't seem to have the kind of generality that is required of a prim ary reason. W hat Davidson w ants us to realise is that tiie event, the existence of which makes 'I turned on the light' true is not the object of I w anted to tu rn on

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tiie lig h f. W hen I turned on the light I turned it on at a particular m om ent and in a particular way. But when I say that I w ant to turn on the light, then I do not always have a particular m om ent of time in m ind in which I w ant to tu rn on the light or any particular way.

A prim ary reason consists of the pro-attitude as well as the belief related to i t For instance, if 1 w an t to turn on the lig h t then I w ill flip the sw itch only if î believe that by doing so I w ould be able to satisfy m y w a n t B ut w e really d o n 't need to mention tiie belief w hich accompanies the pro-attitude all the time, as it is quite easily understood.

In trying to trace the prim aiy reason of an action, w e are trying to fit the action into a general rational pattern of behaviour of an a g e n t We are trying to flesh o u t a character trait of a person. We are rationalising. We assum e tiiat others like us are rational and so they m ust have good reasons behind acting in a particular way. W hile assigning pro-attitudes and beliefs to anyone, w e are actually interpreting the person so as to make h er beliefs, attitudes, actions cohere.

Some philosophers think that the concept of cause that is applied elsew here canSibt be applied in the case of the relation between reasons and actions. Their alternative view is that the m ain thing that one is trying to do w hile giving reasons for a person's actions is simply giving a re-description of it, w hich makes sense of i t

Some philosophers have concluded tw o things from the above which D avidson thinks does not follow at all;

See his ’Actions Reasons and Causes', p. 687 The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.LX, No.23, Nov., 1963..

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1. Causes are distinct from effects and since to explain one's actions by giving reasons is to re-describe i t reasons cannot be causes.

2. As reasons trace actions in a pattern, they explain them.

D avidson is questioning both. He says tiiat w e should not think that reasons are not causes just because they are re-descriptions of the actions in question. To start with, w e h a w already seen th at reasons are belW s and pro-attitudes taken together. Consequently they cannot be the same as actions. Then it is also true that events are often re-described in terms of their causes. A bout the second, Davidson says th at it alone cannot do the job of explanation. It is not a t all clear how talking about the pattern and the context w hich contains both the action and the reason can tell us how the explanation story goes. The pattern is not enough as there m ay be m any such different patterns and it is only w h at is behind the pattern that m atters. This is so because w e need to find o u t w h at is behind the pattern as th at w ould help us in finding some kind of regularity in l>ehaviour.

Davidson takes u p Melden's example of a driver's raising his arm to signal. W hen a driver is approaching a turn, if he know s he ought to signal, and if he knows that to signal t e needs to raise his arms and knowing all this in that situation, if he raises his arm , then he is m aking a signal. Davidson says that all that this shows is th at he has a reason to raise his arm. But was it this reason which m ade him actually raise his arm? Unless it is the intention to signal which caused the driver to raise his arm , the description 'signalling', Davidson says, w ould not manage to explain the action of hand raising. Davidson refuses to accept a 'm ysterious connection' between reasons and actions. O ne may have a reason to act in a way and m ight act in that w ay for that reason. But

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another person or the same person could have the sam e reason to act in