Towards a Theological Didactics, aspects of approach and curricular design
3. Un modelo para evangelizar, aporte para las trasmisiones teológicas
East Prussia and the Great Elector
The Link with the Hohenzollerns
The two generations which preceded Frederick William Ts succession in 1713 had seen little effective challenge to the quasi-independent position of East Prussia within the Hohenzollern Monarchy. The dynasty in Berlin had not contested the traditional degree of self-government which the native elites had enjoyed, and this was to be one factor in the resistance which Frederick William I would subsequently encounter as he strove to extend his authority in the Kingdom. Berlin's control had at times been very limited indeed during the first century of Hohenzollern rule in East Prussia.
Historians acknowledge that one notable example of the state-
building which occurred throughout Europe after the Thirty Years' War was provided by Frederick William of Hohenzollern (1640-1688), known as the "Great Elector".^ In the aftermath of the war, Frederick William managed to develop foreign and domestic policies that enabled him to recover some political independence, build up a powerful army and shape his scattered and fragmented territories, which were spread out over eight hundred miles from Jülich West of the Rhine to East Prussia on the Baltic Sea, into a
^See the standard biography, Ernst Opgenoorlh, Friediidi Wilhelm. Der Grofie Kürfurst von Brandenburg. Bine poiitisdie Biographie, two vols., Gottingen:
Mustersdimidt, 1971-78.
Chapter 2 — The Linl^. with the Hohenzollerns 71 stronger German state. Although Brandenburg-Prussia remained at best a minor state at Frederick William's death, he has been credited with laying the first foundations for its subsequent rise to great power status, which came about in the eighteenth century during the reign of Frederick the Great. Yet his achievements can too easily be exaggerated in light of
Prussia's subsequent history. One should remember that fundamental to his significance is that he survived and kept the scattered territories together.
The Rule of the Teutonic Order
It is important to sketch some of the developments within the territory prior to the Great Elector.^ The territory of East Prussia had only been a duchy of the Hohenzollern rulers of Brandenburg since 1618. Prior to that, as far back as the thirteenth century and under the control of the Knights of the crusading Teutonic Order, there had been a "German" influence since about the year 1225. The Order essentially had received the opportunity to conquer the land between the rivers Vistula and Memel without tax or any other burdens either to the Emperor or the Pope who authorised their conquest of expansion into the region. This was a small reward for the difficulties encountered in establishing control. There was an initial period of strong resistance to Christianity and to the rule of the
Teutonic Order by the pagan Slavonic tribe of Prussians living there. By about the middle of the thirteenth century, however, the dominance of the Order in Prussia was apparent, although it was not secured for another half a century. It was the Teutonic Order that demanded complete submission of the former Prussian nobility to the point where many became serfs, while others were deported from their native villages. Feudal obligations were introduced and enforced as never before in the region. This situation provides the origins of the position of the peasantry and nobiHty in
^Neitmami, Klaus, "Die preufiischen Stande und die Aufienpolitik des Deutsdien Ordens vom 1. Thorner Frieden bis zum Abfall des Preufiischen Bundes (1411-1454)," in Ordensherrschaft. Stande und Stadtpolitik: Zur Entwicklung des PreuCenlandes im 14. und 15. Tahrhundert. edited by Udo Arnold, Liineburg: Verlag Nordostdeutsdies Kulturwerk, 19^, pp. 27-79; Hartmut Boodonann, Deutsdie Gesdiidite im Osten Europas: Ostpreufien und Westpreuèen. Berlin; Siedler Verlag, 1992; Christian Krollmann, Der deutsche Qrden in Preussen. Elbing: Preussenverlag, 1935. These works form the basis of tills section. See also Carsten, Origins of Prussia. Chapter 5 and Kodi, A History of Prussia. Chapter 1, for a brief account.
Chapter 2 — The Rule of the Teutonic Order 73 subsequent centuries, as set out in the introduction to this study. It is
important to remember that the socio-economic composition of the Teutonic Order was never completely clear. There was not, for example, the total domination of the nobility over the peasants, or the Order over church or state affairs inside Prussia. All were influential in varying degrees, with the exception of the native Prussian peasantry. Yet these divisions did not lead to internal conflict or strife of some kind. Instead, the Order managed to expand and increase its influence over Prussia. The Duchy was unique in the entire Baltic region for the degree of domination exercised by the all- powerful nobility. It was only in the fourteenth century that the Order emerged as the dominant authority over Prussia.
With the internal threat reduced a new and external danger emerged, that of the CV\r ip^^powers, most notably Prussia's neighbour, Poland. The Grand Master of the Teutonic Order (Hochmeister), the highest official in the Order in the early fifteenth century, Ulrich von Jungingen, confronted the Poles and Lithuanians at the battle of Tannenberg on 15 July 1410.
Outnumbered almost two-to-one and using outmoded tactics on the battlefield, the Teutonic Knights suffered a disastrous defeat. This major loss was combined with the start of a recurring agricultural and economic decline that would last into the fifteenth century. The end result of these series of disasters was the inabihty of the Order to make promised payments to the Poles after Tannenberg.
In addition, the Order faced its most serious internal conflicts to date. In an agreement which was intended to quell all of the difficulties, the Order established the Estates, the so-called handesrat in 1412. Its members were drawn exclusively from Prussia's urban and rural elite and primarily were charged to vote appropriate taxation in order to pay the Duchy's debts to the Poles. When this body was established, it was hoped that it would also alleviate some of the internal divisions starting to affect the Order's
Chapter 2 — The Rule of the Teutonic Order 74 coherence. Although the problems continued, and even worsened, the
handesrat survived in recognisable form into the eighteenth century as the Duchy's Estates. The territory, however, became divided in 1466. At the Peace of Thorn in October 1466, after the notably unsuccessful 'Thirteen Years' WaP with Poland, the Order had ceded sovereignty over many areas to the Polish King. In particular, Poland received Pomerellia, the
Kulmerland, Marienburg, the area surrounding Christburg and Elbing, as well as the Bishopric of Ermeland. The Order secured the impoverished and less productive areas of Pomesania and Marienwerder but most
importantly, the significant block of territory of East Prussia. In addition, the leader of the Order, the Grand Master, was obligated to swear allegiance to the Polish King as the territory became a Polish suzerainty as a result of the settlement. For approximately the next forty-five years, there was a continual struggle for full sovereignty of East Prussia between the Order and Poland.
After the Margrave Albrecht of Hohenzollern was elected Grand Master in 1511, he refused to swear his allegiance to his uncle, the Polish King, John Sigismund. This was by far the strongest act of defiance by the Order since the war that ended in 1466. The resistance faltered, however, and by 1521 negotiations between the two sides began. During the
following four year period, the settlement talks required Albrecht to travel to Germany where he came in contact with Luther, Erasmus, and other leaders of the Reformation.^ Albrecht's slow acceptance of the Reformation, which by this time had been spreading throughout East Prussia, meant the dissolution of the Order. One of the main objectives of Poland had been the
%ernliard Lohse, "Albrecht von Brandenburg und Luther," in Erzbischof Albrecht von Brandenburg (1490-1545): Bin Kirdien- und Reichsfürst der Frühen Neuzeit. edited by Friedhelm Jürgensmeier, Franlcfurt am Main: Verlag Josef Knecht, 1991, pp. 73-83; Peter Walter, "Albrecht von Brandenburg und Erasmus von Rotterdam," in Erzbischof Albrecht von Brandenburg (1490-1545). pp. 102rll6.
Chapter 2 — The Rule of the Teutonic Order 75 destruction of the Teutonic Order wliich meant there was now more latitude for compromise. The King of Poland proposed that in return for the
dissolution of the Order, East Prussia would become a Polish duchy with Albrecht as its hereditary ruler. Although this was not acceptable to all the Knights of the Teutonic Order, it was the basis for the settlement that was adopted in April 1525.
This improved the political standing somewhat of both the former Grand Master, now "Dulce of Prussia" and the territory in foreign affairs. It also gave significant new authority to the East Prussian elite to the point, one may argue, that they were directly involved in foreign policy objectives. This is also the start of the relationship between the Duchy's ruling elite and the King of Poland. The Estates could now state their grievances directly to the King which they would do not only under the Duke but also with future Hohenzollern rulers.
The Hohenzollerns took the title of Duke essentially by default and by the failure of heirs. Through a series of deaths and subsequent regencies, the Hohenzollern ruler of Brandenburg became regent, and then Duke of East Prussia from 1618 onwards. It was in tins year that John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg, formally became sovereign ruler of East Prussia (as Duke). Therefore, in the reign of the Great Elector, there was still a sense of novelty about the links between East Prussia and Berlin, forged only a quarter century before. The independent minded Estates that we have seen develop, particularly during the sixteenth century, would play important part in the history of the territory for the next hundred years.
The Rule of the Great Elector
The Great Elector attempted to estabhsh supremacy in his territories mainly tlirough administrative means when he became the Hohenzollern ruler after his father, George William, died in 1640. Frederick William exerted influence by strengthening the role of the military and raising taxes — increasing his troops to 22,000 men, and securing in the principal
territory of Brandenburg, in 1653, the right to raise taxes without the consent of the Diet. At first this was for six years but it became permanent,
primarily due to a subsequent war between 1655-60. These years of conflict, the so-called 'War of the North' with Sweden and Poland as its largest combatants, were also important in the history of East Prussia. The Great Elector first fought in alliance with Sweden and defeated the Polish army in 1656 at the battle of Warsaw. Although he was a vassal of the Pohsh King, he recognised that he would probably lose East Prussia altogether should he fight on the side of Poland, Therefore, he aided Sweden and after victory was secured over Poland, he allowed the Swedish King, Charles X (Charles Gustavus) to use East Prussia as a Continental base from which to prepare for future battles. In addition, the Great Elector shared in the territories revenues much as he did with the former overlord, the King of Poland.^
When war broke out between Poland and Sweden again later in 1656, both sides were in need of Brandenburg-Prussia's support. It was in this second period of the war that Frederick William was able to negotiate for full sovereignty over East Prussia. Sweden agreed to the Great Elector's
%liis was secured through the Treaty of Konigsberg in January 1656.
Chapter 2 — The Rule of the Great Elector 77 demand in return for his support but complete recognition of his full
sovereignty was not guaranteed by either Warsaw or Vienna. It was Imperial politics and Vienna's need for Frederick William's vote as Elector of Brandenburg in the Imperial election of 1657 that finally brought the Great Elector to have his army fight along side of the Polish King, John Casimir. The Habsburgs were able to exert sufficient pressure on the King of Poland that he finally agreed to recognise full and hereditary sovereignty of the Hohenzollerns over East Prussia. This was secured by the Treaty of Wehlau in September 1657. The war, however, ended with the Peace of Oliva in 1660. The Great Elector, although delighted about securing full sovereignty over East Prussia was less than pleased with the Oliva settlement which forced him to relinquish Vorpommem to Sweden.
Within East Prussia, however, Frederick William's efforts met with uneven success. Although Ms legal supremacy in these lands was formally recognised, de facto authority proved considerably more difficult to
establish. East Prussians were not eager to surrender autonomy to which they were accustomed. The situation of succession in the Duchy and tensions between Frederick William and the Estates was reported
by Lisola, the imperial envoy to Poland who was also the negotiator between the elector of Brandenburg, East Prussia's Estates and the King of Poland, John Casimir (ruled 1648-68), In one report, Lisola commented on the intertwining of the issues of religion, sovereignty over East Prussia and the relationship between the Estates of East Prussia, its Duke and the Polish King. There was, Lisola, wrote:
"strong aversion against the Elector in the whole Duchy of Prussia, not just among the Catholics but also among the Lutherans and the common folk... they all plan rebellion as soon as possible, mainly because of religion, and because the Elector aims at gaining sovereignty over Prussia, to subject it to the arbitrary power of liis ministers from Brandenburg and to abolish all privileges... the fifth reason is the
Chapter 2 — The Rule of the Great Elector 78
fact that the Elector joined the Swedish party without the consent of the estates, thereby provoking the revenge and the hahed of the Poles against them/'^
Twelve years earlier in 1648, however, the Peace of Westphalia restored peace to Germany, after a generation of fighting. The settlement strengthened the position of princes and weakened imperial authority, acknowledging that a German ruler had sovereignty within his or her territories, known as Landeshoheit.^ With the treaties of Osnabriick and Münster, moreover, German princes such as Frederick William, at last secured legal recognition of the right to conduct their own foreign policy, de jurerecognition of what they had for long possessed de facto7 It should be
said this was true only to the extent that German rulers did not work against the interests of the Emperor, though this restriction was in practice of little importance.
Following the conclusion of peace at WestphaUa in 1648, the Great Elector possessed more territory than any other prince of the Holy Roman Empire except the Habsburgs.^ However, East Prussia lay outside the Holy Roman Empire and was not subject to imperial authority in any way and was accustomed to having autonomy in local affairs. Unlike Brandenburg and the other western territories, the Thirty Years' War had not affected East Prussia, which had been largely isolated from the fighting and consequent devastation. The Duchy was accustomed to enjoying considerable
Vota [pseud, for Onno Klopp], Der Untergang des Ordensstaates und die Entstehung der preufiischen Kônigswürde, Mainz: Kirchheim & Co., 1911. Cited in Friedrich, "The Other Prussia," p. 450. Lisola's reports of 1656.
^Midiael Hughes, Law and Politics in Eighteenth Century Germany: The Imperial Aulic council in the Reign of Charles VI. Woodbridge: Boydell Press (The Royal Historical Society), 1988, pp. 16-17.
^Ibid., p. 17.
A. Beller, "The Thirty Years War," in The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 4 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 354.
Chapter 2 — The Rule of the Great Elector 79 autonomy in local affairs, and resisted many of the changes attempted by the Great Elector.
Rehgion was one particular realm within which Frederick William was not entirely successful in exerting his influence. Although German princes were officially granted more influence over the rehgious complexion of their territories after the Peace of WestphaHa, this did not ensure that their subjects would meeldy accept their influence. In East Prussia, the Hohenzollerns met with resistance when attempting to enforce their own religious preferences on the territory.
The Reformation in East Prussia was part of the secularising carried out by Albrecht von Hohenzollern in 1525, and so preceded that in
Brandenburg. The Hohenzollerns' of Brandenburg themselves accepted the Lutheran Reformation after 1539 with the accession of Joachim II.
Brandenburg became primarily Lutheran with the Rhineland territories of Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg developing as the only Calvinist enclaves.^ Elector John Sigismund (1608-1619), however, secretly converted to
Calvinism in about 1606, two years before he became Elector, wM e his youngest brother, the Margrave Ernst (1583-1613) was the first to openly practice the Reformed religion in 1610. ^® This conversion was central to Brandenburg-Prussia's Second Reformation. Throughout the later sixteenth
and first half of the seventeenth century, the Hohenzollerns attempted to impose their distinctive brand of Calvinism onto their Lutheran subjects. With considerable determination, they supported and encouraged Calvinist campaigns to convert their subjects but not by force - which is an important
%ee the recent study by Bodo Nischan, Prince. People, and Confession: Tire Second Reformation in Brandenburg. Philadelpliia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994. See also, Reihnold A. Dorwart, "Church Organization in Brandenburg-Prussia from the Reformation to 1740," Harvard Theological Revtezv, vol. 31:4,1938.
^^Nischan, Prince. People, and Confession: The Second Reformation in Brandenburg, p. 83.
Chapter 2 — The Rule of the Great Elector 80 distinction: especially at this period. What is surprising, however, is that Calvinist rulers left most of their population Lutheran. The East Prussians with the strong aid of Polish King Sigismund III always were successful in preventing Calvinism from gaining a foothold in the territory. The
Hohenzollerns themselves converted to Calvinism from Lutheranism wlule many of the territories over which they ruled remained Lutheran, including Brandenburg and East Prussia.
East Prussia was acquired as an hereditary possession (subject to polish suzerainty) in 1618, a gain which approximately doubled the amount of territory under Hohenzollern control. In addition, Brandenburg and East Prussia were linked more than ever.^^ The commitment of East Prussians to Lutheranism, however, was strong and the Hohenzollerns' attempts to change this were resisted from the start. Konigsberg became a hotbed of anti-Calvinist writings by the Lutheran clergy wliile other areas of the Duchy showed equally strong signs of re sista n c e .N o t only did the clergy resist but so too did most other groups within East Prussian society. It was this lack of grass-roots support that prevented the successful conversion of East Prussia.
The East Prussian elite was also a major obstacle to any successful