Modelo de Promoción de la Salud El MPS representa una guía para explorar fenómenos biopsicosociales complejos que motivan a los individuos a

This chapter consists roughly of two parts. After an introductory explanation of attempts to reform self-management the first part examined the concept of property and property rights within the privatisation debate; the second part explained the concept of market that was held by the people who promoted privatisation. I argue that Croatian economists didn’t make the distinction between property and property rights which was explained in chapter III, section 1; therefore their proposals for institutional changes didn’t define clearly which

property rights were to be transferable (for example the right to residual income or the right to control and manage resource). Croatian economists didn’t propose the creation of market institutions because they neglected the insight that the institutional form of a market depends on the right that was to be transferred (and on attributes of assets). However, at the end of the day market participants decide which rights were to be transferable and under which institutional conditions, but Croatian economists didn’t even open discussion about this problem.

Croatian economists were divided on the question whether self-management represents private ownership or public ownership or if it was nobody’s property. Thorough analysis of this disagreement showed that the discussion failed to answer clearly the questions that were raised at the beginning of this chapter: What structure of market and property rights was to be achieved? What did those involved expect that a privatised economy would look like? In my opinion the answers were absent and disputants disagreed whether social ownership was private or public because it was neglected that property rights represent the power to capture income from a resource; or in Coase’s words “what [the owner] in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions”. Self- management was a form of collective ownership; it could be efficient only if the assignment of rights to individuals is too costly. In the middle of the 1980s it was definitely concluded that the costs of collective control of resources were too high. Privatisation was proposed, which meant an assignment of property rights to individuals, but it was not articulated which rights were to be allocated.

The right to capture income from resource, management rights and the right to control a resource were - under the system of social ownership - clearly divided between the state, the local community, and individuals (employees and managers). Discussants in the privatisation debate understood ownership implicitly to be a unified bundle of property rights, if the question was addressed at all. Since disputants didn’t discuss the possibility of the division of the bundle of property rights, they didn’t address which property rights were to be transferable; accordingly they didn’t develop market institutions appropriate to transferable rights. They considered property as absolute, and not dynamic; i. e. it wasn’t taken into account that property rights develop depending on the attributes of assets, costs and benefits.

Those who considered social ownership already to be private assumed that the decision on the transformation of property rights belongs to private owners

(employees). This privatisation proposal was called the method of “coexistence of social and private ownership”. This method exposes collective ownership to tunnelling; i.e. the pulling out of assets from a collectively owned company into a private one at the expense of collective owners. The theft of collectively managed assets was already recorded under socialism and this was one of the arguments that social ownership was in fact no-ownership.

Though widespread and generally accepted, the no-ownership characterisation of self-management was never and nowhere thoroughly elaborated. A key argument of those who considered social ownership nobody’s property was the restricted transferability of the right to use the flow from the company’s income. A restricted transferability of property rights was recognised by those who characterised self-management as already private ownership. They proposed only a gradual relaxation of the transferability of property rights and opposed the possibility of radical deregulation of the capital market. It seems that they were afraid that self- management wouldn’t withstand competition if markets were deregulated. No-ownership rhetoric might be understood as a request for an immediate and radical change of the regime of property rights. The privatisation of nobody’s property implies an initial appropriation. It divides individual property on the one side and all other property arrangements on the other side. The proposal that socially owned assets should be distributed without evaluation fits into the no- ownership rhetoric. Since it was nobody’s property nobody claims that it has any value. It might be initially allocated as if it was a lottery. It was considered minimally unjust privatisation. An intensive exchange of property rights was expected. This assumption was wrong, since intensive trade requires high transparency and a developed system of information. The consequence of distribution without evaluation was a market without information; the acquisition of valuable property was left to insiders. As for the moral aspect of privatisation, the vouchers (lottery tickets) that were to be distributed were understood as an instrument of social policy.

A description of the processes of privatisation in Croatia (chapters VI and VII) and Slovenia (VIII) follows. The processes are divided into two periods: initial allocation of legal property rights and the period of exchange of property rights on the financial market. The development of financial markets distinguished the processes of transformation of the property regime in the two countries.

Chapter VI