Modelos de oficinas de transferencia

At the end of 1998, commenting on the efficiency of VAs, Börkey and Lévêque (1998, p21) state:

“Empirical and theoretical results on the efficiency of negotiated agreements are still lacking”.

In the conclusion to the same report to the OECD, the authors point out that little information has been gathered on the efficiency of VAs and therefore, no comparison can be made between VAs and regulation. Only qualified support is given to anecdotal evidence of environmental effectiveness. To assess environmental policies in general and VAs in particular, the report offered a number of comments.

• Environmental effectiveness.

Environmental ambition. If social welfare is maximised when the environmental benefits balance the social costs, then the gap between the effective target and the target actually adopted represents the effect of the bargaining power of the participants. More ambitious targets might be seen as a measure of the political commitment to the particular process,

while under ambitious or less ambitious targets might be seen as concessions or even regulatory capture.

Implementation effectiveness. This deals with the actual result and whether there is a gap between the target and this final result; an implementation gap. The gap is seen as a failure to set optimal standards and/or standards that are not backed by adequate sanctions and effective monitoring. These conditions may lead firms to risk not complying with a standard as the cost on non-compliance is less than the cost of compliance. Where firms are collectively liable, and even if there is a collective benefit, there is always the opportunity for free riding. Weak sanctions and ineffective monitoring are also factors in the occurrence of free riding.

• Economic Efficiency

The setting of group targets places the burden of compliance on all members of the group without recognition of the differences between those members. In practice, there is a disparity between members of a group and it cannot be assumed that all are operating at the same level of efficiency, all have the same or similar market share or all are at the same level of environmental impact. Group targets call for an equality of burden sharing and do not allow for differentiation of targets among the member firms.

• Administration and Compliance Costs

Regulation incurs costs. On the Government side, administering a regulation requires regulatory agency costs and further costs for information gathering, measurement, monitoring and for the application of sanctions. On the side of the private firms, there are costs involved in meeting the standards required. The VA transfers some or all of these costs to the branch association and the firms, so that any savings are for the Government. Unless firms and their industry bodies are more efficient than a regulatory agency, net costs are unlikely to change with the probability of increased costs to the firm.

• Other Efficiency Issues

Wider economic effects. These are described as the impacts on price levels, competition or income distribution resulting from market distortions. Barriers to entry by the setting of particularly ambitious targets are a typical example of favouring financially strong or technologically advanced firms.

Soft effects. With VAs being used as a co-operative measure, the opportunities are available for increased co-operation, trust, consensus building, exchange of information and changes in attitudes and awareness.

Innovation. Once a firm has reached compliance with a standard, there is no incentive for further advances. Innovation can be enhanced or promoted by incentives that actually reduce costs for the firm when the environmental target is reached but particularly when

the target is exceeded. A lack of ambitious target setting would be less efficient in generating innovation than regulation.

Viability and Feasibility. This refers to the political and social acceptance of the VA and the credibility of the process. Although an effective VA requires time and application, the European experience is that the VA is preferred to regulation. On the other hand, transparency is required to eliminate any perception that the VA is used to avoid more substantive environmental improvement.

Table 7 provides a useful summary and overview of the conditions applying to VAs in a number of the EU countries.

Table 7 Overview of VAs in Different Countries of the EU

Legal status Sanctions Signatories Government Signatories Industry Non-binding None Min. of Environment Branch Associations

& Large Companies

Austria

Complement to command and control legislation.

Austrian law does not allow for VA to substitute for legislation. Backed by threat of regulation.

Non-binding None Min. of Environment Regional Authorities

Branch Associations & Large Companies

Belgium

Waste management dealt with at Regional level

Non-binding None Min. of Environment Branch Associations & Large Companies

Denmark

Linked to threat of new regulation

Industry associations not prepared to accept policing role for binding agreements.

Non-binding None Min. of Environment Regional Authorities

Branch Associations & Large Companies

Finland

Focus on energy efficiency

Non-binding None Min. of Environment Branch Associations & Large Companies

France

Background threat of regulation.

Monitoring procedures not always defined.

Most recent agreements with a single large company. Non-binding None Min. of Environment

Regional Authorities

Branch Associations & Large Companies

Germany

Strong background threat of regulation.

No direct sanctions – indirect sanction through regulatory threat. Non-binding None Min. of Environment

Regional Authorities Branch Associations & Large Companies

Ireland

Only 1 agreement – packaging waste.

Repak (the recycling agreement) managed by group of industrialists. Non-binding None Min. of Environment

Regional Authorities

Branch Associations & Large Companies

Italy

Generally not collective agreements.

Non-binding None Min. of Environment Branch Associations & Large Companies

Luxemborg

Complement to command and control legislation. Binding Via

licensing

Min. of Environment Local Authorities

Branch Associations & Large Companies The Netherlands

Key policy instrument. Status of a civil law contract.

Declaration of intent signed by government and branch association as a framework for agreements between government and individual firms. Administered and monitored by local authorities.

Non-binding None Min. of Environment Large Companies

Portugal

Complement to command and control legislation. Industry commitments unilaterally defined by authorities. Binding &

Non-binding

None Min. of Environment Branch Associations & Large Companies

Spain

Complement to command and control regulation.

Non-binding None Min. of Environment Branch Associations & Large Companies

Sweden

Linked to threat of new legislation.

Enforced at branch association level – peer pressure.

Non-binding None Min. of Environment Branch Associations & Large Companies

UK

Used as a selective means to tackle particular problems. Implementation delegated to industry – peer pressure.

adapted from Börkey and Lévêque, 1998, p31