Modelos de Imanes curvos 108 

Having started his analysis with the so-called trivialities, Heidegger has led the listener to recognize that life is tendentially lived in the world. The aim is to point to the basic characters of life. But the descriptions also lead to the realization that your experience is different from my experience – we still view the lectern differently. What is experienced manifests itself in a manifold of ways. With these considerations, my particular circumstantiality comes to the foreground of the search. Each experience belongs to a particular self-life. Everything manifests itself in a concrete experience. The self-life is put in the limelight as the center of manifestation. That everything is experienced in this way is seen even when we look more closely at the concrete work of the sciences. Although science is aimed at only one aspect of life, whereby life is stabilized, objectified and taken

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Phenomenology as origin-understanding | 77

out of its worldly directions, it still works out of the availabilities, which then are taken into a scientific context. The question for Heidegger is how something is encountered before taking it into a scientific context. He is pursuing the possibility of pointing ahead to (the basic characters of) factical life in life’s vitality. With this aim, he turns to the forms of expression where life is seen to express itself in its pre-theoretical relations. He finds these forms in biographical and autobiographical works.

Heidegger claims that in biographical and autobiographical works factical life comes to light in a distinctive way.84 _{For in such works the self-life and life-worlds emerge as} intertwined, even if the aim is then to take the self into a scientific context of expression. It becomes visible that the self-life is always lived in the world and in the direction of the life- worlds. To put it differently: in appealing to autobiographical and biographical works, Heidegger makes a claim for the primacy of the self-world. The self-world becomes central in two respects. On the one hand, life is shown to be lived always already in the worldly directions. On the other hand, attaining the self-world as such becomes the aim of philosophy.

With the term self-world, the self and the world are brought together in life in itself as it is lived in its fullness so that the objective-subjective split between them is removed. According to Heidegger, as soon as the self-life is brought forth, it expresses at the same time the life-world, the living context of the self-world and its rhythm. Furthermore, from the self-world, which echoes the life-worlds, the tendencies and motives, the possibility of their fulfillment arises:

Life as factical centers in a certain way in a temporal particular self-world. From out of this temporally particular self-world grow the tendencies. Out of the selfworld’s own history, the motivations to new tendencies awaken, and the fulfillments of these always run back, as such, into the selfworld and its temporally particular situations awaiting fulfillment, which are the factical [situations] of factical life. (48-49 [63])

Insofar as the self-life and the life-worlds are intertwined, insofar as there is echoing between the self-life and the life-worlds, one’s own life is to be seen as the manifestation of the life-worlds. There is an interconnection between the temporally particular self-world and the forms of manifestation. The life-world manifests itself in some way in the current situation of the self-world. Factical life and its basic characters manifest themselves in the temporally particular situation in which it is lived. Thus, Heidegger is able to say that the

84 _{For as Heidegger says: “[t]his mode of depiction of the self-life in biographical research, historically}

understood, underlies the conviction that factical life and its world can be centered somehow in the self-life, inasmuch as the self-world gives itself initially as changeable circumstantiality. It shows that factical life can be lived, experienced, and, correspondingly, even historically understood in a peculiar intensifying- concentration on the self-world” (46 [59]).

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78 | Paths Towards Philosophy

characters themselves “can be immediately experienced and that is accented by the self- world” (46 [60]). Certainly, this also means that the basic characters of factical life can be experienced and are experienced everywhere in life. However, as Heidegger insists, most of the time the accentuation85 _{of the self-world is improminent [Unabgehoben]}86_{. The} accentuation of the self-world is not necessarily brought into prominence [Abgehobenheit]. As such, the reference to self-world does not yet indicate how to point ahead to factical life. That is, it does not enable production of the access searched for in terms of philosophy. Rather, with the reference to self-world the possibility of accessing factical life and its characters within factical life itself is affirmed and the direction for philosophy has been given. That is, philosophy must turn towards the self-world. The question of how to access factical life and its basic characters now becomes the question of how to bring the accentuation of the self-world into prominence. In order to lead towards the possibility and meaning of a prominent experience without being entangled in a theoretical approach to the self-world,87 _{Heidegger calls once again for a looking into the full factical life-experience,} into improminent experience. How does one have oneself in improminent experience, in the genuine life which is now to be seen as echoing the life-worlds?